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"..there is an inherent rationality to life that makes it intelligible at a much




This thesis adopts a complex systems stance towards the origin and growth of in¬
telligence in biological and artificial systems at both reactive and reflective levels of
adaptation. A synthetic strategy is employed dually informed by characterisations
of complex biological systems together with the engineering of embodied artificially
intelligent systems.
Following a review of the two dominant, and often construed as mutually exclusive,
"rule-based" and "behaviour-based" characterisations of systems it will be argued that
neither provide a comprehensive account of the growth and organisation of complex
biological systems, and that both result in brittle, hand-crafted and, critically, pre-
interpreted artificial systems. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the growing
consensus that this impasse can be resolved by conjoining conventional reactive and
reflexive components in a single architecture should be rejected. Such considerations
indicate that a new agenda is required.
A synthetic intelligence stance is adopted herein, motivated by convergent biological
and engineering approaches within a dynamic systems framework which emphasises
system self-organisation. In this context some new experiments on mobile robot navi¬
gation are reported which demonstrate the feasibility of the synthetic approach. The
implications of this novel stance are discussed with particular emphasis on the future
of self-organising artificial systems.
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Prologue
The concern of this thesis is the origin and growth of cognition in biological and
artificial systems. Three interlinked positions are advocated: a complex systems stance;
a dynamical systems perspective; and a synthetic strategy.
The complex systems stance eschews the traditional reductionist mode of enquiry that
tends, within psychology, to focus exclusively on low-level, reactive behaviours. In¬
stead it is argued that an understanding of systems is best achieved by investigating,
and attempting to replicate, the competences of complex systems directly. Such a
position requires accurate and comprehensive characterisations of complex biological
systems. An appreciation that complex systems retain many reactive features (espe¬
cially important to self-preserving behaviours), and that simple systems incorporate
many precursors of more complex competences is fundamental.
In common with a growing movement (van Geert, 1994; van Gelder & Port, 1995; Mc-
Gonigle & Chalmers, 1998a, for examples) towards a dynamical perspective in terms
of both empirical observation of biological systems and associated model construction,
it is argued that the fundamentally dynamic nature of cognition, and cognitive de¬
velopment, must be incorporated within both characterisations of biological systems,
and engineering of artificial systems. The dynamical perspective holds that systems
should be regarded as essentially, and influentially, embodied and situated. Further¬
more, it provides a rich language with which to describe system organisation and
change, and stresses that initial system conditions (de Lorenzana & Ward, 1987), in
combination with behavioural mechanisms common to all systems, serve to constrain
possible developmental trajectories. Critically, the dynamic stance emphasises system
self-organisation over the whole life-span, indicating that an open-ended, life-historical
approach must be taken both when characterising biological systems, and when con¬
structing artificial robotic systems (Chalmers & McGonigle, 1997; McGonigle, 1998).
Finally, a synthetic strategy is advocated which extends Braitenburg's (1984) concept
of 'uphill analysis, and downhill synthesis'. It is suggested that the most promising
approach to the understanding of systems is a dialectic strategy of theory construction
and refinement informed by characterisations of complex biological systems in their
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own right, in conjunction with reverse-engineering, and the principled construction of
artificial systems.
The central theoretical arguments of, and robotic implementation described within,
the thesis are not constructed to be falsifiable in the Popperian (1963) sense — recent
calls for quantitative analyses of robotic architectures (Duckett & Nehmzow, 1997,
for example) are suggested to be premature partly because of the currently limited
range and complexity of robotic implementations available for comparison, but more
importantly because the mapping of theory to model within robotics is often either
implicit and therefore opaque, or lacks coherency. Furthermore, no consensus exists
within the field with respect to the kinds of benchmarks of achievement which might
form the bases of comparison. For these reasons the thesis should be read within the
philosophical perspectives of Lakatos (1978) and Kuhn (1962)1.
The initial theoretical portion of the research strives to demonstrate that both tradi¬
tional stances within cognitive science and artificial intelligence can be regarded, in
many important respects, as degenerating research programmes (Lakatos, 1978) —
with the recently developed dynamical and situated stances, although providing criti¬
cal theoretical advances, inspiring artificial implementations of only small improvement
over the traditional approaches. Currently, following the growing prominence of dy¬
namical and situated perspectives, the conceptual terrain is confused, both in terms
of biological characterisations and, especially, the resulting prescriptions for the con¬
struction of artificial systems.
The remainder of the theoretical section of the thesis expounds a synthetic theory of
intelligent systems, grounded in the reverse engineering of complex biological systems,
in more detail and thus advocates a "paradigm shift" (Kuhn, 1962) towards a synthetic,
complex-systems research programme. The review of studies of complex biological
systems suggests a number of essential features of such systems which could be used as
metrics to compare and contrast robotic architectures motivated by varying theoretical
stances. The experimental section of the thesis describes an architecture which is
designed to incorporate some of these features, whilst providing for the easy addition
of others at a later date, and some preliminary experiments in the field of mobile robot
1 See section 6.3.4 for further discussions of these points.
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navigation which are designed to illustrate the ability of this novel stance in supporting
the development of adaptive artificial agents.
The following precis aims to elaborate some of the main themes which will be discussed




Classical, or "symbol-based", and "behaviour-based" characterisations of biological
systems are analysed and their implications for the construction of artificial systems
addressed. Classical (symbolic representational) stances might appear superficially to
be promising, focusing, as they do, on complex competences as the critical indices
of systems. It is argued, however, that these stances tend to lead to static charac¬
terisations of ungrounded preadapted cognitive agents, and brittle, semantically-blind
artificial agents. Behaviour-based stances tend to adopt a reductionist strategy, fo¬
cusing on observable reactive behaviours, and associationistic principles of behaviour
modification. The competences of complex systems are not addressed directly which
means that a plausible account of the development of complex competences from their
more simple precursors must be provided. It is argued herein that behaviour-based
stances fail to provide a plausible account of such development in biological systems
and, furthermore, are incapable of supporting the progressive development of artificial
systems. In both cases the 'scaling-up' problem remains unresolved.
The most obvious solution to this impasse is hybridisation of conventional reflective and
reactive components: ideally such a system would incorporate both deliberative and
reactive components thereby balancing internal goal-directedness with sensitivity to the
dynamic external world. It is suggested, however, that such hybridisation is doomed
to failure from the outset since although these two stances are often construed as
mutually exclusive both result in artificial systems which are brittle, hand-crafted, pre-
interpreted, and semantically-blind. Hybridisation of the two can result only in systems
which are preinterpreted and hand-crafted at both representational and behavioural
levels.
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In recent years a consensus has begun to emerge within psychology, cognitive science,
and artificial intelligence, that neither the classical symbol-based nor behaviour-based
approaches constitute an adequate theory of biological systems, and have been singu¬
larly ineffective within the artificial domain. Likewise, their conjunction has produced
few clear benefits. It is suggested that theorising needs to progress from all mind (logic
and symbols) or all behaviour (acquisition/adjustment of tight couplings) characterisa¬
tions towards a more inclusive view of system competences firmly grounded in accurate
characterisations of complex biological systems.
Chapter two
Dynamic and situated perspectives on cognition, both of which have been proposed
as potential solutions to the impasse, are reviewed with regard to their application to
cognitive systems, and their prescriptions for the implementation of artificial systems.
The major contribution of the dynamic perspective is suggested to be a rich metaphor¬
ical language for describing complex systems over time, and an emphasis on the open-
ended self-organisation of systems from their lower ontological bounds over develop¬
ment. It is argued, however, that with regard to the construction of artificial systems
the dynamic approach has been embraced only by the ALIFE community and that
this represents, as currently formulated, little improvement over traditional behaviour-
based approaches.
It is argued that the situated conception of intelligence, grounded in naturalistic and
evolutionary epistemology, laudably stresses dynamic agent-environment interaction
as the root of meaning for systems, suggesting a middle-ground between the pre-
interpreted domains of symbol-based and behaviour-based stances. A brief examination
of situated agent research reveals some advances over classical symbolic and behaviour-
based implementations yet, it is concluded, the situated perspective, as currently in¬
terpreted by researchers within artificial intelligence, yields few coherent principles for
the design of artificial intelligent systems.
Although both dynamic and situated approaches make important theoretical contribu¬




Given that both classical symbol-based and behaviour-based characterisations have
failed to deliver complex artificial systems, and that dynamic and situated perspec¬
tives alone have currently failed to provide an agenda for the development of artificial
systems and have motivated artificial implementations of only little improvement, it
is argued that a synthetic strategy of mutually informing biological characterisations,
and engineering must be adopted. The first section of this chapter discusses one such
biological characterisation and the resulting prescriptions for the design of artificial
systems, whilst the second describes some robotic implementations motivated by the
biological characterisation.
Biological characterisation Initially it is suggested that comparative psychology
has failed to adequately characterise the differences between species — largely
as a result of the behaviourist domination of animal learning paradigms. This
approach is contrasted with evidence from ethology and neuroscience which pro¬
vides much richer characterisations of biological systems.
Next, a novel characterisation of complex biological systems is described. This
characterisation, informed by dynamic and situated perspectives, has been de¬
veloped by McGonigle and Chalmers (1984,1996,1998 for example), and depicts
the growth of epistemic competences in complex biological systems. Central
to this characterisation is the notion of the self-organisation of competences by
agents on open-ended growth trajectories toward maximally economic, gener¬
ative, information-handling strategies in order to deal with ever-larger search
spaces. Such internal control requires interpretation and thus contextual repre¬
sentation, in order both to learn from error and for arbitration between competing
behaviours.
Engineering It is suggested that the novel characterisation described reinforces ear¬
lier criticisms of symbol-based and behaviour-based approaches and suggests a
number of important design principles for the construction of artificial systems.
This characterisation has inspired a number of robotic implementations within
our research group. These implementations, precursors of the novel architecture
presented in chapter 4 are briefly described. A number of key architectural fea¬
tures are incorporated such as state-based (re-)interpretation of signals, and the
development of a robotic task grammar.
Of the design features suggested by McGonigle and Chalmers' detailed characterisa¬
tion of complex biological systems a number have already been incorporated within
previous robotic architectures within our research group. The next chapter describes
a new architecture designed to incorporate, and extend, design features such as state-
based interpretation and the recombination of behaviours from a core repertoire, whilst
providing for new architectural features such as error recovery and, critically, self-
organisation in accordance with an inbuilt economy metric.
Chapter four
An architecture is presented which is inspired by the biological characterisation, and
constitutes a progression from the robotic implementations, described in chapter 3. It
makes no claim to embody all of the design features which emerge from the analysis of
chapter 3 but has been constructed such that the remainder can be implemented later
without requiring radical redesign of the system.
The architecture controls a mobile robot and is thus embodied and situated in a real-
world environment. The system is autonomous — not merely trivially with respect to
a power cable, but imbued with the potential2 for the controller to select behaviours
based on task demands. The system is inherently hierarchical, with behaviours con¬
structed to allow serial control, a behavioural syntax, and error cognisance. The sys¬
tem has memory — providing the potential for progressive adaptation over time. The
central feature of the architecture is the controller which maintains all global state
information, implements behaviours in the task queue and logs error. Its role is easily
extendible.
A pragmatic view of representation is adopted — currently state serves primarily to
tag whereabouts in task-space, behaviour name and status, previous behaviours etc. A
global world model is not maintained by the system and has not been found necessary
for the competences engineered so far.
2 Albeit at a prototype stage.
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Development of the architecture is possible both horizontally (addition and modifi¬
cation of behaviours) and vertically (progressive addition of increasingly abstracted
control and learning mechanisms) as advocated by McGonigle (1991). Although not
at present inherently dynamic the system is capable of supporting self-organised com¬
petences with the further possibility of epistemic derivations.
Chapter five
A description is provided of the application of the architecture to navigational compe¬
tences. Navigation was chosen both because a locative competence is absolutely critical
to any locomoting system and has been argued to be ontologically and ontogenetically
prior to any other (McGonigle, 1991) and because there exists a history of navigational
implementations from within our research group on which to build.
Specifically two approaches were examined:
Navigation without learning A simple and reliable navigational algorithm (util¬
ising on-board odometric data) was developed which, in conjunction with sep¬
arately engineered taxes allowed the robot to dead-reckon 'home' from distant
parts of the niche. Preliminary investigations indicated that robust navigation
could be achieved in the absence of planning and that the architecture success¬
fully supported error cognisance and recovery.
Learning to navigate Two approaches to route learning through the niche are pre¬
sented. The successful strategy was based on trial-and-error and subsequent
self-selection of privileged vectors in accordance with an inbuilt economy metric.
This method provided the opportunity both for progressive behavioural adapta¬
tion, and critical epistemological derivations.
Related navigational implementations are briefly evaluated with respect to the syn¬
thetic programme adopted herein specifically with regard to economy of both design
and computational resource together with their potential for scaling-up, focusing on
those which are pre-installed with, or acquire, map-based representations, both geo¬
metric and topological. Although successful in the navigational domain it is suggested
that such implementations require a greater computational resource, and provide fewer
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opportunities for extendibility than the implementation described herein. It is argued
that this implementation provides evidence that a synthetic analysis of intelligent sys¬
tems results in novel approaches to the construction of artificial intelligent systems
possessing an inherent extendibility. The self-organised navigational competence de¬
scribed leads, through situated activity, to representations of the environment, based
on system behaviour which are, therefore, both economical and inherently meaningful
to the agent.
Chapter six
The argument of the thesis is summarised, and the synthetic stance advocated herein
restated. This stance is distinguished from traditional reverse engineering which tends
to focus on the locomotor behaviours of simple systems. Two future research directions,
error interpretation and self-organised action selection, are discussed, and potential






For most of the past century characterisations of intelligent systems, within both the
psychological sciences and artificial intelligence, have tended to fall in either of two
camps (see table 1). One, the classical 'symbol-based' characterisation of systems,
primarily adopts a top-down perspective, focusing on complex competences such as
reasoning, problem-solving, and memory in predominantly static agents. The other,
'behaviour-based' characterisation, is primarily bottom-up, concentrating on the reac¬
tive behaviours of simple systems as a consequence of a quantitative view of differences
in system complexity.
Table 1.1: Conflicting stances within psychology and artificial intelligence.
'Symbol-based' and 'behaviour-based' characterisations tend to be viewed as mutually
exclusive stances. Indeed, the 'symbol-based' stance in psychology developed in large
part as a reaction to its 'behaviour-based' predecessor. Artificial intelligence has wit¬
nessed the converse transition. Paradoxically however, as we shall see over the course
of this chapter, the kinds of artificial intelligent systems inspired by these 'competing'
characterisations are formally isomorphic in a number of limiting respects.
Psychology Artificial intelligence





CHAPTER 1. TWO DOGMAS
1.1 Symbol-based stances
2
Classical symbolic representational stances initially appear promising, focusing, as they
do, on complex competences as the critical indices of systems. On closer inspection,
however, it emerges that the end-state characterisation lacks psychological plausibil¬
ity, and that fundamental developmental questions remain unanswered. Furthermore,
the artificial systems inspired by these stances are brittle, often hand-crafted and are
semantically blind — operating in highly constrained, preinterpreted domains of com¬
petence (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986).
1.1.1 Cognitivism
The cognitivist stance in psychology began to cohere in the late 1950s and early 1960s
largely as a consequence of the failure of behaviourism to account for phenomena
such as latent, observational, and linguistic forms of learning (Chomsky, 1957), and
was especially motivated by dissatisfaction with the behaviourist concentration on
observable action rather than putative internal knowledge structures.
Informed by theories which characterised information in terms of internal processes
of ambiguity reduction (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), and research conducted at Cam¬
bridge by Bartlett (1932, 1958) and Craik (1943, 1966) which viewed agents as active
participants possessing unique experiential histories and thought as a collection of
mechanisms similar in principle to those of artifacts, together with the discovery of
'chunking' phenomena in memory research (Miller, 1956), cognitivism re-legitimised
the study of internal psychological processes.
Primitives
The mediating internal processes on which cognitivism concentrated were those re¬
garded as the distinguishing feature of human beings, the epitome of complex systems
— thought and language. The Cartesian view of the abstracted mind led to a charac¬
terisation of internal, mental processes as arbitrary and amodal (Barsalou, 1993, 1999).
This characterisation immediately suggests a linguistic analogy and, indeed, the most
widely accepted view of internal representation became the concept of the 'language
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of thought' (Fodor, 1975).
The mind was characterised, in analogy to human language, as a symbol system —
a set of arbitrary tokens that can be manipulated on the basis of explicit rules which
are themselves tokens, or strings of tokens. The rules by which tokens may be ma¬
nipulated concern only the shapes of the tokens rather than their meanings, they are
purely syntactic. The relevant explanatory aspect of mind became its status as a
symbol system, and the internal processes of interest the logical manipulation of such
internal symbols. The rules by which internal representations are manipulated were
identified with those of the 'supreme' human achievement, deductive logic. The be¬
haviours of interest to cognitive science became, therefore, those which depend on the
construction and manipulation of such internal representations — language production,
memory and reasoning skills. This focus on loosely-coupled, 'deliberative', abstracted
cognitive behaviour, described by and attributed to logical symbol manipulation, stud¬
ied predominantly in unnaturalistic laboratory settings merely served to reinforce the
assumption of independence of body and mind.
The language of thought hypothesis is generally construed as an empirical theory about
the nature of cognition and thus stands or falls on its ability to account for cognitive
adaptation1. We shall see how well it fares in the task.
An abstraction mistake
Much of traditional cognitive science assumed that the mind can be safely abstracted
away from its bodily instantiation and studied independently. Based on the neo-
Cartesian view of the existence of the 'purely mental' (Strawson, 1994) the details of the
physical embodiment of cognitive agents were ignored with respect to the explanation
of cognitive phenomena (Wheeler, 1995). Theorising was purely at the algorithmic
level (Putnam, 1975) and thought assumed to be analogous to language, consisting of
the sequential processing of amodal symbols 'stored' in list or sentence-like internal
structures (Fodor &: Pylyshyn, 1988). Critically, the interrelationship of cognitive,
perceptual, and bodily processes, which had formed an essential component of theories
of mind from Aristotle (4th Century BC/1961) and Epicurus (4th Century BC/1994)
1 Although some have attempted to argue for such a view on a priori grounds (Davies, 1989, 1991;
Lycan, 1993; Rey, 1995).
CHAPTER 1. TWO DOGMAS 4
onward, was abandoned with the adoption of this disembodied and unsituated view
of cognition. We will see that this abstraction mistake lies at the root of the many
problems which have befallen cognitivism.
Amodality
Although cognitivism has played an important role in re-legitimising internal psycho¬
logical mechanisms in explanations of behaviour, what evidence is there for the type
of internal processes postulated? Currently little direct empirical evidence has been
reported for the existence of amodal symbols (Shannon, 1987). The correct interpreta¬
tion of Moyer's finding of the symbolic distance effect (1973) remains unresolved and
has prompted an ongoing debate about the nature of representation (Potts, Banks,
Kosslyn, Moyer, Riley, k Smith, 1978, for a review). Debate ranges from those who
adopt a strongly amodal symbolic position (Banks for example) to those who postu¬
late the existence of both symbolic and analogue codes (Paivio, 1986). Recent reviews
(Glaser, 1992; Seifert, 1997, for example) suggest that internal representations appear
to have a perceptual (and therefore a situated and contextual) character.
Neuroanatomical evidence suggests that categorical knowledge is grounded in sensori¬
motor areas of the brain — damage to certain of these areas leads to disrupted concep¬
tual processing of relevant categories (Damasio, 1989; Gainotti et al., 1995). Further¬
more, the representation of spatio-temporal forms of knowledge using purely amodal
symbolic structures has been argued to be unlikely as the computational systems which
would result are (expected to be) both brittle and, in some respects, intractable (Wino-
grad k Flores, 1986; McDermott, 1987; Glasgow, 1993; Clark, 1997). Finally, when
the influence of context on behaviour is universal in the remainder of the biological
realm (Hinde, 1982), and a fundamental quality of human language (Wittgenstein,
1953; de Saussure, 1974) — the very phenomenon which inspired cognitivism — what
would the loss of such contextual information buy a system?
Logic or rationality?
How accurate is the symbolic "rule-based" characterisation of complex systems? Al¬
though early formalisations of logic (Boole, 1854/1951, for example) were also regarded
as the principles governing thought processes, the late twentieth century has rediscov-
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ered the 2 distinction between normative and descriptive views of logic (Oaksford &
Chater, 1998a).
Over the past three decades a consensus has developed that human cognition obeys
rational rather than strictly (deductive) logical principles (Wason, 1966; Wason &
Johnson-Laird, 1972; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kahneman et al., 1982; McGonigle
& Chalmers, 1977, 1994; Oaksford & Chater, 19986). Performance on a number of
laboratory tasks, construed as indices of logical ability, often falls far short of that
expected of a logical agent (Wason &; Johnson-Laird, 1972; Kahneman & Tversky,
1973; Kahneman et al., 1982, for examples). Significantly, altering stimuli to those
more often encountered in the course of everyday life results in improved performance
(Wason, 1977). The Piagetian (1953, 1955) 'transitive inference' task is often regarded
as a good index of the understanding of necessity through the logical coordination
of internal symbolic representations (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). However, effects of
presentation mode (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984) together with the existence of high
levels of transitive choice in four year old children (Lawrenson & Bryant, 1972) and
in non-human primates (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977) cast doubt on this interpreta¬
tion. Indeed the production system model of Harris & McGonigle (1994) is capable of
generating 'transitive' choice in the absence of logical coordination mechanisms and,
furthermore, accurately characterises performance on untrained triadic choices.
In addition to these 'transitive' abilities, hierarchical competences indexed by class
inclusion (Inhelder &: Piaget, 1964) and quantifier use (Johnson-Laird, 1983) are gen¬
erally regarded as an outcome of logico-linguistic ability. However evidence suggests
that this too is based on the internal generation of economic information management
principles (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a) which presuppose no logical abilities on the
part of the agent.
A consensus has developed which suggests that intelligent systems are more accurately
characterised as rational rather than logical. Indeed systems are rule-based, or at
least describable by such, yet these rules are not those of deductive logic but reflect
computationally economical information-handling procedures (McGonigle & Chalmers,
2 "Why is it that I am not compelled to do that which is entailed?" Aristotle (4th Century BC/1990)
'Essay on rational action'.
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1998a).
Origins and growth
The origins of intelligence
As previously mentioned although one benefit of the cognitive stance is the recognition
of the complexity of systems from the outset, the focus is on the preadapted agent
— little attempt is made to connect the logico-mathematical end-state characterisa¬
tion with phylogenetic development, and the progressive, life-long, adaptation of the
epistemic agent over ontogeny goes largely ignored.
The most comprehensive account of the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of cognition from
a classical symbolic perspective is Piaget's (1970, 1971) genetic epistemology. Al¬
though admirably aspiring to be an account of the interrelationship of 'Biology and
knowledge' (1970) characterising knowledge gain as a process of regulation within the
organism-environment system and thus grounding symbolic competences in earlier or¬
ganic autoregulation, it is in reality adult-centred with the aim of reconstruction of
the developmental mechanisms from the endpoint (Inhelder, 1990). Despite adopting
an early systems stance, genetic epistemology under specifies the critical role of lower
ontological bounds (Le Gare, 1987; de Lorenzana & Ward, 1987), and the mechanisms
by which they constrain epigenesis.
More recently, grounded developmental accounts (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Halford, 1993,
for example) have attempted to account for explicit knowledge through processes of
reorganisation and abstraction. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) hypothesises that human cog¬
nitive development involves the complementary processes of progressive modularisa¬
tion and explicitation of knowledge. 'Representational redescription' is posited to be a
spontaneous reiterative process whereby domain specific (implicit) knowledge, is made
progressively explicit via redescriptive processes both within and across domains, cul¬
minating in a publicly transmittable symbol system (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Clark &
Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). However, the theoretical relationship between language and
abstracted explicit knowledge remains unresolved: the mind's capacity to enrich "itself
from within by re-representing the knowledge that is has already represented" has been
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argued by Karmiloff-Smith (1983, 1992) to be rarely present in other species except,
possibly, the chimpanzee although here the resulting higher-level codes are suggested
to be relatively impoverished.
Halford (1993) suggests that the observations which inspired developmental stage the¬
ory (Piaget, 1950) might instead reflect progressive representational differentiation over
ontogenesis. Performance on Piagetian tasks within stages is interpreted as a result of
an increased capacity for parallel processing of more complex relations. Here cognitive
development is suggested to depend on the interaction of processing capacity and ac¬
quisition processes (Halford, 1971; Halford et ai, 1995, for example) such that acquired
knowledge depends dually on experience and current system processing capacity. This
growth of processing capacity is regarded as an important explanatory principle for
cognitive development. Halford et al. (1998) suggest that non-human primate is ca¬
pable of processing explicit representations based on the research of Premack (1983)
and Holyoak & Thagard (1995), yet the relationship between pre-linguistic and linguis¬
tic relations is unclear, as is the reliance of the progressive development of relational
processing on linguistic experience.
Although both of these examples strive to explain the origins of 'symbolic' compe¬
tences in pre-linguistic abilities it is becoming increasingly clear that the search for the
origins of explicit, transmittable knowledge in symbol-using human agents is greatly
complicated by the fundamental interconnectedness of language and thought. What
is required is an empirically motivated research programme which attempts to trace
the origin of knowledge, and knowledge acquisition devices, over the life-history of in¬
dividual non-linguistic agents (Chalmers & McGonigle, 1997; McGonigle & Chalmers,
1998a).
The origin of meaning
What is it to mean? Conventionally symbols are supposed to 'remind us' of their
referents, not through resemblance, nor known causal relationships, but rather through
arbitrary convention (Plato, 1926; Wittgenstein, 1953). By what process(es) are these
relationships established? We have already seen that, for cognitivism, meaning cannot
be grounded in bodily experience ruling out the logical positivist (Ayer, 1947, 1971;
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Russell, 1956/88; Mach, 1959, for examples) and naturalistic (Bergson, 1944; Popper,
1985) explanations. The alternative, however, is a futile quest to trace meaning back
through individual exposure until the first usage of a symbol is reached (see Kripke,
1980, for example).
So although one of the strongest assumptions for cognitive accounts is that the pos¬
session of a publicly transmittable symbol system reflecting an abstracted, internal,
language-like representational system indicates a new level of system development, the
origin of meaning for such symbolic systems remains unexplained. Whereas learning
stances view symbols as representative of pre-encoded 'objects' (Anderson, 1990), cog¬
nitive stances do not disambiguate symbols from their semantic content. Although the
meaning of such symbols can be made explicit to the agent grounding such meaning
within disembodied symbol systems might be impossible3.
The most famous critique, Searle's (1980) 'Chinese room' analogy, questioned the abil¬
ity, in principle, of a symbol system to pass the Turing (1950) test and concluded that
it was possible in the absence of real understanding. This led him to suggest (Searle,
1980a) that symbol systems lack "intrinsic meaning", or intentionality, in that a sym¬
bol system alone has no understanding of the symbols it manipulates. For Searle the
ability of the inhabitant of the Chinese room to pass the Turing test is not sufficient,
he argues that understanding can arise only in conjunction with consciousness and
that consciousness arises only within systems which possess the appropriate physical
structure: an evolved brain. According to Searle, the problem can be resolved by ex¬
amination of the physical properties of brain which might reveal which "causal powers'
might underlie intentional mental states. More recently Searle (1992) suggests that the
human brain is not the only structure which can support such mental states although
the appropriate causal property of brains remains unclear, as does the phylogenetic
division between conscious and non-conscious brains.
More recently Harnad (1990a,b), restating Kripke's dilemma (1982), dubbed this the
'symbol grounding problem' and pointed out that the search for meaning in symbol
systems results in an infinite regress through layers of meaningless syntactically related
symbols. Thus we see that, once more, abstracting the mind away from the body results
3 Unless, of course, one accepts Fodor's (1975) original claim that all concepts are innate!
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in an insurmountable difficulty — how to reconnect them again!
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Summary
The emphasis of cognitivism on linguistic tasks reinforces the assumption that the core
complex system competence is the logical manipulation of symbolic internal represen¬
tations. However, over the past two decades the cognitivist characterisation of complex
systems has come under increasing attack. It increasingly appears that the end-state
characterisation of purely symbolic level intelligence inadequately accounts for a range
of evidence which suggests instead that human cognition is more accurately charac¬
terised as rational rather than logical. Furthermore, the assumption that cognition
can be abstracted away from its biological instantiation has led to the faux problem of
symbol grounding — how to reconnect mind and body. Finally, cognitivism is unable
to explain how symbol-level competence might be rooted in pre-linguistic primitives.
The mischaracterisation of a logico-mathematical developmental end-point would ren¬
der the attempt to trace its origin impossible, fortunately however, such attempts are
rarely motivated by the formalist stance which is more concerned with the characteri¬
sation of preadapted agents than with their phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins.
The cognitive account, therefore, fails in two fundamental areas: its characterisation
of intelligent systems; and their phylogenetic origins, and ontogenetic growth. The
conflation of external symbolic representations with neurological and psychological
structures and processes (Vera & Simon, 1993) does seem to be a category error. Such
considerations do not bode well for classical Al which also shares this assumption.
1.1.2 Classical AI
The discipline of Artificial Intelligence (Al) was born in the late 1950s and early 1960s
and grew out of the earlier fields of philosophical logic, computing, and cybernetics.
Whitehead & Russell's (1925) proof that mathematics is substantially derivable from
the predicate calculus grounded mathematics in logic resulting in the primacy of the
deductive method in the field of computability. Electronic computers were first built
during the 1940s as part of the Second World War effort of the United Kingdom and
the United States, and were the result of previous mathematical work by Alan Turing
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and John von Neumann, both of whom were concerned with computability and the
theory of games — critical early research areas for the newly-formed discipline of Al.
Turing, particularly, published papers on the prospects of making computers intelligent
(Turing, 1948/1970), and asked whether computers could think (Turing, 1950).
The symbolic representational stance within Al, derived jointly from the origins of com¬
puting in philosophical logic with consequent envy of the power of logico-mathematical
symbol systems (Whitehead & Russell, 1925; Godel, 1990; Turing, 1950), and the preva¬
lence of cognitivism at the time of its origin, embodies a rationalist desire to apply
mathematical standards of proof and analysis to the construction of intelligent agents
(Luger &; Stubblefield, 19986). Just as cognitivism identified the rules of thought with
those of deductive logic, for classical Al the primary system competence is characterised
as the logical manipulation of internal, symbolic representations. An inevitable con¬
sequence of this stance was that the behaviours of interest for classical Al became, as
with cognitivism, those thought to depend on reasoning and representation — problem
solving and planning.
Although the primary focus of classical Al was on reasoning and problem solving im¬
plementations (Newell et al., 1957, 1959, for examples) and thus the development of
efficient search algorithms, given the context of this thesis the focus of this review will
be classical robotics. The accepted goals of artificial intelligence are the construction
of intelligent systems, and the understanding of biological intelligence (Winston, 1984;
Pfeifer, 1996, for examples); what progress has been made?
Primitives
The physical symbol system (hereafter PSS) hypothesis (Newell & Simon, 1976) un¬
derlies, more or less explicitly, classical robotics. The underlying assumption is that
the necessary and sufficient condition for any system to exhibit intelligent behaviour is
that it is instantiated as a physical symbol system. Only such systems (and any which
are appropriately organised) are capable of intelligent behaviour, where intelligent be¬
haviour means that appropriate to the system's ends and adaptive to environmental
demands, the scope of which is seen as being approximately that of human behaviour.
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The pss hypothesis commits its advocates to a number of methodological principles:
• The world should be described, as far as possible, exhaustively.
• This description should be symbolically based.
• Heuristic search should be used to explore the potential inference space.
• As all computational systems are functionally equivalent, the cognitive architec¬
ture of a system should be independent of its physical structure.
So the computational agent became characterised as a disembodied information pro¬
cessor, leading to the input-output model of intelligence which was to dominate al for
the first three decades of its existence. Classical robotic architectures represented the
world by internal symbol systems, usually based on the predicate calculus. All aspects
of the world tended to be represented, state was unpartitioned, and acontextual.
A classical robot
Possibly the clearest exemplar of classical robotics is the use of the Stanford Research
Institute Planning System (strips) and the control system planex, which were used to
drive Shakey, an experimental mobile robotic platform (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971). Shakey
possessed on-board visual, tactile and acoustic sensors with an off-board computer used
for signal processing, pattern recognition, model building and plan generation. Initially
possessing two representation systems (map-like and predicate), a predicate-based sys¬
tem was finally chosen, incorporating predicates concerning five classes: the robot
itself, objects, rooms, doors, and walls. Predicates expressed information concerning
the name and coordinate location of an entity, as well as more complex relational
statements such as containment of a particular object by a particular room (Nilsson,
1984).
This internal model was used to generate action sequences using strips, to drive ac¬
tions themselves, and to coordinate the control system (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971; Fikes
et al., 1972; Nilsson, 1984). planex was used to execute generalised versions of a
plan, having equivalent actions to all operations expressible in strips. The Shakey
project was designed to investigate the problems of efficiently representing the world,
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and implementing a planner based on heuristic search through a symbolic search space.
Explicit goals included the solution of incompletely specified problems which would re¬
quire the construction of intermediate goals and strategies, and to improve performance
over a training period (Nilsson, 1984).
Both Shakey4, Mark I and II exemplify classical robotics:
• The system is implemented in an inherently undynamic5 unchanging Platonic
domain.
• A global world model is constructed, maintained, and manipulated. A plan
is constructed off-line, on the basis of this model, before being implemented.
A sense-think-act, or sense-model-plan-act (Brooks, 19916), control cycle is
adopted, analogous to the TOTE units of cognitivism (Miller et al., 1960).
• The domain is preinterpreted — the meaning of representations are installed
within the system reflecting the ontological stance of the designer.
A second abstraction mistake — the disembodied robot
As the symbol level was regarded as a natural functional level of its own, possessing
invariances independent of specific physical instantiations, intelligent behaviour was
thought to arise from any PSS regardless of its particular physical implementation.
Traditional Al systems are therefore only trivially embodied and situated. Arguably,
applying cognitivism to robotics provided an opportunity to reintroduce embodiment
and situated behaviour as fundamental constraints on the structure and processes
of intelligent systems, yet the PSS hypothesis explicitly excludes this possibility thus
rendering classical robotics susceptible to the fatal criticisms applied to cognitivism.
Although the aim of classical robotics was to construct artificial intelligent systems the
single-minded devotion to a symbolic perspective on intelligent systems uninformed
by adequate biological characterisation was to prove its undoing. Ethological and
comparative research had established that the sensorimotor capacities of biological
4 See also Hillaire (Giralt et al., 1984) and cart (Moravec, 1982).
5 Notwithstanding the Cartesian 'gremlin' which inhabited Shakey's environment.
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systems critically constrain information processing6 — as had been argued by Turing
as early as 1948. Furthermore, the behaviour of biological systems was observed to
be adaptive within the system's niche — behaviours contribute to evolutionary fitness
thereby providing a fundamental criterion by which their success can be judged (Hinde,
1966; Bateson & Klopfer, 1982, for example). Paradoxically, by abstracting away
intelligence and thus ignoring the fundamentally embodied and situated nature of
cognition, classical robotics achieved the construction of 'disembodied robots'. As
with cognitivism, the abstraction of mind away from body was to lie at the root of the
many problems which afflicted this programme.
Modelling the world
Exhaustive symbolic representation of the sensed world rapidly led to significant dif¬
ficulties — sensor inaccuracy and environmental dynamism meant that the formation
and maintenance of a robust internal world model from logically manipulated symbols
was not practicable. The environment is only partially knowable for all systems so
constructing an exhaustive world model is doomed to failure from the outset in the
real world. Furthermore, even if it were possible to construct such a model, maintain¬
ing it would require an unfeasibly large computational resource. Shakey, and other
implementations such as the copy-demo (Winston, 1972), shared the assumption that
an accurate internal world model could be constructed, maintained, and manipulated.
The impossibility, in principle, of exhaustive knowledge of non-trivial domains, led to
the adoption of highly constrained, "toy-world", environments.
The failure of classical Al to accurately model the world led to many criticisms of the
necessity and desirability of such models (see Winograd & Flores 1986; Suchman 1987,
for example) and a reaction against exhaustive, symbolic representational schemes that
is the origin of all other robotic paradigms now in existence.
Platonic domains
An obvious feature of human systems is their engineering of the world around them
in order to facilitate its comprehension. To what extent, however, should such en¬
gineering be employed when constructing artificial systems? Classical robotics, it is
6 For example von Uexkiill's (1921) concepts of umwelt and merkwelt.
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generally agreed, engineered the environment to suit the system to the extent that the
fundamental purposes of Ai (Winston, 1984; Pfeifer, 1997) were betrayed: first, the
environments in which systems operated were so divorced from the real world that it
became extremely unlikely that such systems would be of much general use; second,
the insights to be gained with respect to complex biological systems from this approach
were minimal.
Winston's (1972) copy-demo, Robert's (1963) vision program (the forerunner of all
modern vision programs) and Shakey, all relied on sparsely inhabited environments
with controlled lighting and background — utterly unrealistic scenarios. All of these
implementations, operating in toy-worlds with (near) perfect sensors, served to rein¬
force the assumption that an accurate symbolic world model could be constructed and
used to control behaviour. In the real, dynamic world this assumption simply does not
hold. One assumes that an implicit driving assumption behind the approach was that
dynamism could be added later without seriously affecting performance but this was
not to be.
Extreme brittleness became the outcome of this environmental simplification. Classi¬
cal implementations were fault and noise intolerant (Pfeifer, 1996)7 and incapable of
generalising their knowledge to new domains.
Origins and growth
Development
The ability to learn must constitute part of any artificial system with aspirations
towards intelligence. Learning within classical AI centres mainly on inductive gen¬
eralisation within, and sometimes across, knowledge domains with 'inductive biases'
providing constraints on possible generalisations.
Symbol-based machine learning is divided between supervised and unsupervised tech¬
niques. Both supervised (for example data-driven similarity based algorithms; explanation-
based and analogical learning which rely on prior domain knowledge in addition to
CART (Moravec, 1982), for example, existed in a static environment with the primary external
source of change being angular displacement of the sun — yet even this minimal dynamism resulted
in system failure Brooks (1991c).
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training data) and unsupervised (which tend to centre around category formation and
conceptual clustering) learning techniques presume some preinterpretation of domain
by the designer. Notwithstanding differences between the amount of domain preinter¬
pretation, prior knowledge, and training data required for these different techniques
all model the learning process as state-space search (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986, p.
606) and involve modification or construction of explicit symbolic representations.
Although symbol-based machine learning has been shown to be successful within cir¬
cumscribed problem domains a number of issues remain unresolved. Generalisation
requires rich training data and extensive preinstalled domain knowledge in addition to
constraining inductive biases — learning algorithms cannot merely be supplied with
examples and construct appropriate and effective generalisations. However, the re¬
lationships pertaining between these factors remain unresolved and reflect the often
implicit assumptions of the designer. Unlike human cognisers, machine learning im¬
plementations are effective only within a preinterpreted world (Luger & Stubblefield,
19986) and cannot yet reinterpret data or learned rules, nor move between different
interpretative perspectives as the situation demands. This 'inductive bias' (Luger &
Stubblefield, 19986, p. 772) of symbolic learning algorithms has motivated connection-
ist and emergent learning approaches which conversely suffer from a lack of inductive
constraint. All current machine learning approaches, whether symbolic, connectionist,
or emergent, lack a fundamental feature of human learning: semantic and pragmatic
constraint (Luger, 1994, p. 450) — they are predominantly neither knowledge driven
nor goal oriented.
Finally, biological systems possess a range of inductive mechanisms subserved by func¬
tionally distinct neuronal circuitry (Gazzaniga et ai, 1998) and optimised for particular
internal and external contexts (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1973; Gallistel, 1995). Clas¬
sical learning techniques, in contrast, are relatively ad hoc, acontextual and imposed
on top of preinterpreted, pre-installed representational schemes whose origins remain
unexplained.
The origin of meaning
We have seen that the origin of meaning remains unresolved in cognitive accounts of
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complex systems. How did classical Al overcome this problem? Initially the system
must build a model from sensed data. We have seen that this was possible only after
the adoption of highly constrained environments (Moravec, 1982; Nilsson, 1984).
For problem-solving Al the problem of grounding meaning did not arise. Symbol sys¬
tems are systematically semantically interpretable (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Harnad,
1992) so symbols can be defined syntactically in terms of other symbols and how they
are processed by some interpreter (Quillian, 1968; Newell & Simon, 1976). For non-
robotic Al, expert systems for example, the interpreter is a human operator so the
mapping of sign and signified is grounded in human experience8. For this reason the
relation of symbols to the outside world was rarely discussed explicitly (Harnad, 1993).
For classical robotics however, with the goal of the construction of artificial, au¬
tonomous., intelligent systems how could the meaning of symbols be made explicit
to the system, or be grounded in the external world? The solution to the problem was
preinterpretation of the world. Meaning entered the system through the translation of
the predefined semantics of a given logic-based symbolic representation (Winograd &
Flores, 1986, p. 18). We see, once again, that the abstraction of 'mind' from 'body'
lies at the root of the difficulty.
Meaning and context
The reliance of classical systems on their designer's ontological stance lies at the root of
the 'frame of reference' problem (McCarthy, 1963; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969). Although
multiple interpretations of this problem have now been discussed (van Brakel 1992,
1993, discusses the 'family' of frame problems; and see also Pylyshyn, 1987) the central
dilemma is the problem of handling change (Janlert, 1987). Given that the system
ideally possesses an exhaustive symbolic model of the world, the number of inferences
that can be drawn regarding which world states have been affected by a given action9
results in a massive combinatorial problem.
8 Attempts to remove the human operator from the loop such as the encyclopedia project (Lenat &
Feigenbaum, 1991), for example, required entering hand-crafted knowledge units into the system
with the vague hope that the system would be able to learn for itself by reading at some ill-defined
point in the future. Smith (1991) points out that the early part of this project was devoted to
finding more primitive levels of knowledge that would 'ground' the higher ones.
9 As Harnad (1993) correctly asserts, the problem is inherent to any new datum rather than action
per se.
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The problem raises the importance of knowledge of the side-effects of action and,
critically, the issue of the relevancy of knowledge. How is it possible, for a system
whose ontology is preinstalled, to determine what is, and is not, relevant? Various
solutions have been proposed ranging from McCarthy & Hayes' (1969) frames which
link related propositions together in an attempt to reduce the search space whilst
assuming that all other frames remain unaffected, to the anti-symbolism of Brooks
(1991c). Frame relations are rules which specify which predicates remain unchanged
by rule applications. However, this approach requires new frame rules to be devised
whenever a new predicate is introduced with a resulting exponential increase in search
time (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986, p. 191).
An alternative solution, the triangle tables used to store and organise macro operations
in STRIPS10 alleviated this problem somewhat by sacrificing exhaustiveness — only
postconditions of actions that are preconditions of consequent actions were retained by
the system. However, this approach also suffered from the combinatorial problem —
as the number of operators increases so does the degree of pattern matching required
to determine whether an operation can be applied (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986).
For classical systems, then, the frame problem is a consequence of the impossibility
of exhaustively representing the world in non-trivial domains (Luger & Stubblefield,
19986, p. 333). To compound the problem, classical representational systems are
acontextual and therefore provide little constraint on the assessment of the relevancy
of information, behaviour, or anything else. More recently circumscription (McCarthy,
1980; Lifschitz, 1984; McCarthy, 1986) has been suggested as a means of effectively
delimiting problem descriptions and thereby setting an interpretative context, but
classical robotic implementations could neither move between interpretative contexts
as the occasion demanded nor, indeed, accurately assess that the occasion had even
changed.
10 Triangle tables (Fikes et al., 1972; Nilsson, 1980) were designed as data structures for organising
action sequences, including those featuring potentially conflicting subgoals. The preconditions of
one action are related to the postconditions of all its preceding actions. Triangle tables were used
to determine when an operator could be incorporated within a plan.
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Summary
Classical Al suffers from two category errors, both of which result in insurmountable
problems, just as for cognitive accounts: that the 'mind' can be abstracted away from
the 'body'; and that the complexity of behaviour implies equivalent complexity of
internal control structures (Simon, 1962) — in this case internal, logically manipulated
symbolic representations.
The systems that result are brittle and unreactive. The assumption that an exhaustive
symbolic model of the world is a necessary feature of complex systems results in the
adoption of toy-worlds and pre-interpreted domains of competence. Even within these
unnaturalistic domains the systems are hand-crafted. Little progressive adaption of
systems occurs, learning is limited to refinement of hypotheses or small-scale expansion
into novel domains. Finally, the ontology of the system is that of the designer; such
systems are semantically blind.
1.2 Interim summary
Over the past two decades 'symbol-based' characterisations of intelligent systems have
been subject to increasing attack both within psychology where evidence accumulated
over the past three decades suggests that systems are more accurately characterised as
'rational' rather than logical, and within classical Al which has failed to synthesise sys¬
tems capable of operating robustly in non-trivial environments. Instead such systems
are restricted to highly-constrained, preinterpreted domains of competence.
Although the symbolic representational stances appreciate system complexity, they
ultimately fail to deliver a comprehensive account of intelligent systems. The char¬
acterisation falls on two counts: (1) Embodiment as a critical constraint on system
competences and future development, and the fundamentally situated nature of sys¬
tems are ignored, as are the dynamics of system behaviour. Furthermore, the classical
preoccupation with representations qua logically-manipulable symbols fails to take ac¬
count of the adaptive function of representation in contextually marking action, per¬
ception and their (re)interpretation which by no means necessitates all representations
to be symbolic. Rather it seems much more likely that cognitive systems make use
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of many forms of representation both internal and external11, symbolic, distributed,
and hormonal; and (2) classical symbolic stances fail to deal adequately with develop¬
ment — the mechanisms by which complex system competences might be rooted in
pre-linguistic behavioural system primitives are unaddressed and the stances therefore
fail to answer the fundamental question — what are the origins of intelligent systems?
The symbolic stance, then, provides neither a plausible account of the development of
complex intelligent systems from their more simple precursors over phylo- and ontoge¬
nesis, nor an adequate characterisation of such systems at later developmental stages,
nor does it support the construction of robust artificial intelligent systems.
1.3 Behaviour-based stances
The major alternative characterisation of systems, within both psychology and arti¬
ficial intelligence, regards (predominantly reactive) behaviour as the indexical system
competence. These stances developed as a result of dissatisfaction with introspective,
or symbolic characterisations and, therefore, eschew the explanatory role of internal
representational mechanisms. Complex system competences tend not to be examined
which means that a plausible account of the development of complex systems from
their more simple precursors must be provided. The behaviour-based stances posit
associationistic behaviour modification and acquisition mechanisms as the processes
underlying such development.
We shall see that the rejection of the explanatory role of internal mechanisms leads to
problems with the characterisation of the behaviour of complex systems and, indeed,
is in some important respects inadequate for descriptions of simple systems. Further¬
more, behaviour-based stances fail to provide a plausible account of the progressive
development of biological systems and are incapable of supporting such development
in artificial systems. In both cases the 'scaling up' problem remains unresolved.
11 Much has been made of the use of the environment to externalise computation recently with situated
(Suchman, 1987, for example) and extended-mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) theories of cognition
and action gaining prominence.
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[Psychology] "as the behaviourist views it, is a purely objective branch of
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the control and prediction of be¬
haviour, [it] recognises no dividing line between man and brute." (Watson,
1913, abstract)
Behaviourism dominated anglo-american psychology from the 1920s to the mid-1950s.
At its inception it was an attempt to objectivise psychology as a science by discarding
the traditional subjective, introspective modes of investigation: rather than consciously
acting, agents react. From the outset behaviourist research assumed a neo-positivist
stance — as mental (cognitive) processes are unobservable, scientific investigation must
be confined to the external manifestations of cognition — behaviours (Watson, 1913).
Primitives
Behaviourism, unsurprisingly, began with the assumption that the appropriate level of
investigation for all systems was observable, and measurable, behaviour (Watson, 1913,
1925, 1929; Skinner, 1953, for examples). Since 'no dividing line' was drawn between
man and brute, and the generalised laws of learning applicable to all species were the
goal of the project, simple reflexive systems, or reflexive subsystems of more complex
(epistemic) systems were the experimental targets.
All learning and behaviour were thought to be characterisable in terms of stimulus-
response or operant associations. The relationship between stimulus and response
over short spatio-temporal intervals and how such relationships change with varying
forms of local environmental contingencies were investigated. The larger the number
of these pairings, and the greater the capacity for their acquisition, the more complex
the organism. System differences were therefore characterised quantitatively.
One benefit of the behaviourist focus on primarily reflexive behaviours in simple sys¬
tems was that the tight couplings between inputs and outputs made such systems
transparent to traditional forms of reductionist analysis. Moreover, theories could be
constructed about the behaviour of simple systems (or subsystems) which were them-
CHAPTER 1. TWO DOGMAS
selves (relatively) simple and easily communicable.
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The task of behaviour-based approaches, though, is to account for the behaviour of
complex as well as simple systems, and to elucidate mechanisms by which systems
might progress from simple to complex over the course of ontogenetic development.
Critically, for the behaviourist approach to be viable, an account must be provided
of the internal reorganisation of system structure and function over ontogenesis which
underlies the progressive epistemic adaptation of systems, allowing them to become
ever-more inductively powerful over the life-span. To what extent does the behaviourist
programme accomplish this task?
A double edged sword
The anti-representationalism of behaviourism allowed the paradigm to make great
advances in the years after its inception. By focusing purely on simple behaviours
with clearly defined operational measures whilst simultaneously denying the import of
internal structures, it began to briefly seem as though objective descriptions of system
behaviour might be achievable and, furthermore, that changes in system behaviour
might be describable by an elegantly small set of principles.
However, notwithstanding this initial benefit, the laudable attempt of the forefathers
of behaviourism to distance scientific psychology from the previously all-pervasive in¬
trospective methodology through the rejection of the explanatory value of all forms of
internal representation went too far — dooming behaviourism to the characterisation
of simple systems alone.
Trivialising induction
Whereas early behaviourist research examined relatively complex behavioural compe¬
tences12 later research focussed almost exclusively on the performance of simplified
tasks13 culminating in Skinner box experiments featuring a binary choice between
pressing a lever to obtain food, or not. Such procedures served to maximise the rate
of learning at the expense of severe restriction of the inductive space. In addition to
12 For example maze learning using the Hampton Court Palace maze (Small, 1901).
13 Largely as a result of the underlying assumption that the same learning mechanism underlies all
forms of learning at all levels of complexity in all systems.
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this inductive trivialisation, measures of learning became purely operational: how a re¬
sponse was made became irrelevant. Furthermore the puzzle box paradigm, especially,
forced the agent to find the solution accidentally as a consequence of the fundamental
impossibility of perceiving the functions of, and therefore the material relationships
between, differing parts of the apparatus.
As there was little to learn within the restricted inductive space of classic behaviourist
experiments it is unsurprising that research was unable to fractionate simple and com¬
plex systems — but such findings merely served to reinforce the fundamental assump¬
tions of the behaviourist programme (Macphail, 1982, for example).
Origins and growth
What is learned, and how?
Behaviourism viewed adaptation as modification of the relationship between stimulus
and response. All adaptation was considered to be of the same form, all tasks were
thought to be subject to the same laws of learning regardless of the species studied or
the complexity of the task. No account was taken of the vast range of types of learning
or differences in competence across species. Furthermore it is unclear what is learned in
many traditional behaviourist tasks; the stimulus-response model of learning has been
subject to much criticism. Watson (1913) defined a response as a particular motor
or activity pattern yet evidence suggests that it is not particular motor patterns that
are learned but rather some 'purpose' or 'goal awareness' (Macfarlane, 1930; Tolman,
1932, 1948; Lashley, 1951). Yet if learning is not the modification of sensorimotor links
then, in the absence of representational systems of any kind, what can it be?
To compound this problem, the role of reinforcement in animal learning is not fully
understood. Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in determining the nature of re¬
inforcement required for a particular task, learning can occur both before (Tolman &
Horcik, 1930; Tolman, 1932, latent learning phenomena), synchronously with (Guthrie,
1952), and subsequent to (Hull, 1952) the provision of reinforcement. Furthermore,
modification of reinforcer value modulates response frequency (Adams & Dickinson,
1981) indicating that conditioning processes recruit epistemic/representational, in ad-
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dition to purely behavioural, adaptive mechanisms.
How general are the 'laws' of learning?
One goal of the behaviourist research programme was determination of the laws of
learning, those principles which might generate all forms of behaviour through learn¬
ing processes possessed by, and fundamental to, all biological systems at every level
of complexity. However, the assumption of equivalence of association underlying be¬
haviourist research has been conclusively demonstrated to be false. Associations which
are in accord with species-specific defence mechanisms, or relate to innate fixed action
patterns are much easier to learn that those which are not (Garcia & Koelling, 1966;
Bolles, 1970; Seligman, 1970; Hinde, 1982).
What of context?
In the biological realm stimuli do not elicit identical system responses at all times but
rather invoke varying responses modulated by internal factors such as endocrine state,
motivation, and memory. Within ethology, for example, the concept of innate releasing
mechanisms as under-specified forms of input eliciting adaptive behavioural responses14
has been abandoned with the recognition that there are many internal and external
constraining factors influencing both learning and the control of behaviour (Hinde &
Stevenson-Hinde, 1973). Furthermore, there is now much evidence to suggest that the
capacity of biological systems to learn and the nature of what is learnt is, in important
respects, biologically determined (Lorenz, 1935; Bateson & Klopfer, 1982; Hinde, 1982).
The complexity of behaviour
Lashley (1951) suggested that the problem of syntax is not exclusively linguistic but
rather pertains to the organisation of all forms of activity. Movement, for example,
presents the problem of sequences of actions that cannot be explained simply in terms
of chains of motor responses. How does behaviourism explain the complex serial be¬
haviours of natural systems which are pervasive within the biological world?
In keeping with the reductionist strategy of behaviourism it was argued (Skinner,
1938, 1953; Hull, 1934, for example) that all complex behaviours could, in principle,
14 For example Tinbergen's (1952) discovery that a painted lollipop stick can release attack behaviours
in the male stickleback.
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be explained as chains of responses each of which provides feedback (either internal
or external) which then becomes the discriminative stimulus for the consequent re¬
sponse. Although the concept of chaining of responses became widespread within the
behaviourist paradigm, and more recent behaviourist-inspired research, many forms
of possible chaining mechanism have been suggested and it remains unclear which, if
any, of these occurs. A competence such as maze learning which necessitates sequen¬
tial goal-approach behaviour might potentially be based upon many forms of chaining
mechanism indicating that a multitude of mechanisms15 are recruited by systems as
required. No single underlying mechanism underlies sequential behaviour.
Yet if it is the case that systems, at all levels, pragmatically recruit multiple mechanisms
what can the (non-representational) mechanism of this selection be? In laboratory
situations where stimulation is held constant, behaviour is not always stereotyped, but
permits of great variation. What mediates between stimulus and response in these
cases?
Scaling what?
A further problem associated with the minimised induction of classic behaviourist
experimentation concerns the nature of the acquired associations. The environment
within which systems were tested was far removed from their natural habitats with
the effect that the stimuli to which subjects were exposed, and the responses expected
of them, were fundamentally unsituated and inherently arbitrary. Behaviourism fo-
cussed on an associative inductive machinery which forms only part of the comple¬
ment of adaptive mechanisms which intelligent biological systems possess (Gazzaniga
et al., 1998). The associations constructed by this mechanism within the behaviourist
paradigm, formed purely on the basis of repeated connections of particular objects
and events (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a), leave little possibility of the acquisition
of systematic knowledge (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) or necessity (Smith, 1993) deriving
from experienced material relationships between causally linked phenomena, and thus
little basis on which to scaffold progressive epistemic system competences.
15 Behaviourist researchers have identified a number of chaining mechanisms underlying serial be¬
haviours including (but not limited to) response chains (Carpenter, 1984), stimulus-approach chains,
place (stimuli-configuration) chains, and S-R-S* (stimulus-response-stimulus) chains (Tolman, 1932,
argued that such chains might support economising inferences) with inference supporting models
constructed by Galiistel (1980) and Schmajuk & Thierne (1992).
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Summary
"Science today stands on something of a divide. For two centuries it has
been exploring systems that are either intrinsically simple or that are capa¬
ble of being analysed into simple components. The fact that such a dogma
as 'vary the factors one at a time' could be accepted for a century shows
that scientists were largely concerned in investigating such systems as al¬
lowed this method; for this method is often fundamentally impossible in
complex systems." (Ashby, 1956, p. 5, italics retained)
Ashby wrote this at a time of nascent paradigm shift — when the traditional reduc¬
tionist methodology of western science was beginning to come under threat from the
emerging sciences of complexity. His words remain equally valid today: almost a cen¬
tury's investigation of simple reflexive systems has failed to elucidate the fundamental
characteristics of complex intelligent systems.
We have seen that the experimental methodology of the behaviourist paradigm was
fundamentally unsuited to studying the behaviours of complex systems. Mishkin &
Petri (1984) suggest that behaviourist tasks recruit phylogenetically older areas of the
nervous system such as the corpus striatum, resulting in a levelling effect (Vygotsky,
1934/1961). There is no convincing evidence that those reflexive learning competences,
which are dependent on more primitive structures within the nervous system, are
extendible to more complex, especially epistemic, forms of adaptation (McGonigle &
Chalmers, 1998a). Unfortunately, misunderstanding of the weaknesses of the paradigm
has led to statements such as Macphails's (1982) null hypothesis: no qualitative changes
in the adaptive competences of systems appear until humanity.
Furthermore, the behaviourist characterisation of even simple systems lacks credibil¬
ity. What is learned remains unclear — it is not purely sensorimotor couplings but,
without representations of any kind, what else can it be? The role of reinforcement is
similarly confused: what is being reinforced, and when? Finally, by what mechanisms
are these poorly characterised behaviours transformed into the richness of those pos¬
sessed by complex systems? Over the past century no indications that systems can
make the transition from simple to complex, inductively weak to strong, through as-
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sociationistic mechanisms of behaviour modification alone have been reported (Fodor,
1983; McFarland, 1999; McGonigle & Chalmers, In pressa).
1.3.2 Behaviour-based robotics
The reactive behaviour-based (hereafter bb) approach within al, exemplified by sub-
sumption architectures (Brooks, 1985), arose as an explicit rejection of the symbolic
approach of classical al (Brooks, 1991c, for example). Inspired by a view of intel¬
ligence developed by Minsky (1986) where multiple simple elements operate concur¬
rently within limited problem domains, subsumption approaches adopt an explicit
anti-symbolic, situated agent stance. Intelligent behaviour is viewed as the outcome of
the internal interaction of multiple concurrent units together with interaction between
the agent and its environment and is, therefore, characterised as emergent.
Behaviour-based subsumption architectures support system behaviour which is an im¬
mediate, and generally stereotypical, response to a given sensed situation. No represen¬
tational system is instantiated16 thus no planning stage intervenes between sensing and
acting. Behaviours are engineered as sensor(s)-actuator(s) links, and are therefore best
described as tightly-coupled. All behaviours operate concurrently with inhibitory con¬
nections between them allowing higher level behaviours to 'subsume' (or, take control
of the system).
Primitives
Behaviour-based systems are constructed in accordance with the following guidelines
(Malcolm et al., 1989; Brooks, 1991c). Systems should be embodied and situated in
the real world. System competence should be decomposed by activity rather than
function. Intelligence should arise through emergence. Furthermore, systems should
be autonomous, and tested in real-world, dynamic environments. These principles
embody an explicit rejection of classical al.
Critically, bb systems should scale-up: becoming increasingly more complex over time.
Behaviour-based roboticists would follow the 'oxen-trail' of evolution, ultimately at-
16 At least in first generation implementations. See below.
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taining human-like levels of intelligent behaviour. With this end in sight, Brooks
(1986a,6, 1989, 1991c) developed a distributed architecture for intelligence. The 'sub-
sumption' architecture features individual 'layers' each one supporting a single task-
achieving behaviour in order to optimise computation. Within a layer individual finite-
state-mechanisms are often hardwired to sensors and actuators. Scaling of the system
is envisaged to occur through the addition of new layers, which can suppress or inhibit
their predecessors. Each layer of the architecture is designed to be continuously, and
asynchronously active. In the absence of any form of central control the behaviour
of the system is determined by the sensed environment. Initially, at least, no explicit
representational system was incorporated within the system, although later implemen¬
tations feature non-manipulable, deictic forms of representation (Mataric, 1990, 1991,
1992) or low-level ('endocrine') state (Brooks, 1991a).
The design principles described above were initially hailed as revolutionary. What is the
current status of BB robotics17?; and how does it compare to its classical predecessor?
Embodiment
Brooks (19916) provides two reasons why embodiment is important. The first is for
validation purposes — an architecture for intelligence should be capable of supporting
an embodied agent. In recent years this point has become widely accepted. This latter
consideration makes it doubly strange that out of the 42 implementations discussed by
Brooks (1997), only four were embodied.
The second reason, to provide a solution to the symbol-grounding problem (Harnad,
19906) of the classical stances, is more problematic. Certainly "the world grounds
regress" (Brooks, 19916, p. 16) but for at least the first generation of arepresentational
systems and, arguably, the second generation also, regress of what? Subsumption
systems, like their classical predecessors yet for different reasons, are semantically-
blind.
The tyranny of the flex18
17 A review of current BB research by Brooks (1997) of articles published in 'Adaptive Behaviour'
(MIT Press), "the journal most closely aligned with the behaviour-based approach" (p. 294) will be
referred to a number of times.
18 Or, power cable.
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The explicit aim of BB robotics is to
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"build completely autonomous mobile agents that co-exist in the world with
humans, and are seen by those humans as intelligent beings in their own
right [that are] able to maintain multiple goals [and] have some purpose in
being" (Brooks, 1991c, p. 145).
Despite these laudable aims, and the purposive language used to describe layers within
the subsumption architecture19 autonomy, for BB robotics, is simply autonomy from
the flex. BB systems lack that most vital ingredient of complex biological systems —
internal control. It is claimed that subsumption architectures are "not constrained to
be purely reactive" (Brooks, 19916, p. 17) yet an example of a non-reactive layer of
a subsumption architecture, the second layer of 'Allen' (Brooks, 19866) which 'visits
distant visible places', simply instantiates the rule "if space then move into it".
Subsumption architectures are not autonomous in any non-trivial sense. The state of
the world determines the actions of the system at any given time20 Furthermore, of 31
implementations discussed by Brooks (1997), 29 were capable of only one competence.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that this review could only identify two papers (Tyrrell,
1993, 1994) which strove to deal with action selection — a fundamental control feature
of all complex biological systems (see Lashley, 1951, on the problem of the syntax of
behaviour).
This confusion of autonomy of power and autonomy of control is clearly illustrated




19 For example, "layers can decide on the appropriateness of their goals" (Brooks, 19916).
20 'Pick up soda can', one high level 'non-reactive' competence of 'Herbert' (Connell, 1989), a first
generation BB robot par excellence, was in reality a hand-crafted condition of the absence of body
movement.
21 Specifically those of miniaturisation.
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We saw previously that classical systems were reduced to operating in undynamic 'toy-
worlds'. Situating systems in the real world from the outset ensures that dynamism is
not crippling, allows the system to take advantage of environmental constraints, and to
'offload' computation. Brooks (19916) also states that intelligence should emerge from
the situated interaction of a system and its environment. This 'emergent functionality'
(Steels, 1991) helps the designer to avoid one of the category errors of classical Al —
complexity of behaviour does not directly imply complexity of internal control struc¬
tures (Simon, 1962) hence: "intelligence is in the eye of the observer" (Brooks, 19916,
p. 16).
For BB robotics two levels of interaction, inter-layer and system-environment, are sup¬
posed to give rise to this 'emergent' functionality. However, in reality the behaviour
of such systems does not truly emerge through system-environment interaction but is
rather hand-crafted by the designer at both levels:
Inter-layer interactions "We advocate careful engineering of all the interactions
within the system" (Brooks, 19916).
System-environment interactions "as each layer is built it must be tested exten¬
sively in the real world. The system must interact with the real world over ex¬
tended periods. Its behaviour must be observed and be carefully and thoroughly
debugged' (Brooks, 1991c, italics added)
So we see that the functionality of BB systems lies not in emergence through interaction
but is rather installed in the system by the designer. The final outcome is a system
that exhibits behaviour which is as equally hand-crafted as that of classical robotics.
Scaling-up
The scaling of BB systems to ever more complex levels of adaptation is the mission of
the paradigm. Complex biological systems become progressively more adaptive over
both phylogeny and ontogeny. What kind of scaling does the BB paradigm support?
Ontogenesis BB systems' learning occurs intra-run. No reports of learning across runs
have been provided. Notwithstanding the lack of scope for progressive adaptation
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over the life span of individual agents, what kind of learning can occur in BB sys¬
tems? Currently, learning in first-generation systems is limited to recalibration of
sensor-actuator links (Viola, 1990) or of locomotor interactions (Maes &: Brooks,
1990). The second generation system reported by Mataric (1990, 1991) builds a
deictic map of its surroundings based on local landmarks. This implementation,
however, is an exception for BB systems and it is unclear whether any further
(epistemic) derivations are obtainable from this representational scheme.
The latter example is instructive. The initial mission statement of the BB ap¬
proach was that:
"When we examine a very simple level intelligence we find that explicit
representations and models of the world simply get in the way. It turns
out to be better to use the world as its own model." (Brooks, 1991c,
p. 140, italics added)
Since this seminal article, there has been much confusion over exactly what form
of anti-representationalism BB robotics should adopt, with Brooks stating that his
objection was to explicit and symbolic forms only (1991, 1997). Meanwhile repre¬
sentation, albeit implicit, or deictic (Agre, 1988; Chapman, 1990), has crept back
in — presumably in recognition that complex behaviour requires internal control,
and internal control, state. BB robotics could not even come close to achieving22
its initial target — 'insect level' intelligence — without adopting some form of
internal state. This is unsurprising: 'even' insects possess chemically-based state
and modulate their behaviour according to internal as well as external criteria
— identical stimuli do not always elicit identical responses. Indeed, Brooks' own
extension to the basic subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1991 a), is based on a
characterisation of the hormonal system of the lobster (Kravitz, 1988). Further¬
more, Brooks (19916) concedes that a system "may sometimes need to build and
maintain a map" (p. 19).
The review article of Brooks (1997), a long awaited response to the scepticism of
Kirsh (1991), mentions 'self-adaptation' as an important area of future research.
Even though at this stage Brooks himself, the founding father of BB robotics,
22 No implication that this level has now been attained is intended!
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accepts that it has not achieved the scaling of systems desired and therefore
advocates a hybrid 'cognitive robotics' (p. 296), the 'self-adaptation' advanced
is restricted to sensor-actuator (re)calibration, habituation, and sensitisation (p.
298). The lack of appreciation of the importance of internal control of behaviour,
based on contextual interpretation of explicit knowledge strongly suggests that
subsumption-based approaches, whether redescribed as 'cognitive' or not, are
fundamentally unsuited to the construction of adaptive intelligent systems.
'Phylogenesis' We have seen that BB robotics has not developed systems capable of
scaling-up over ontogenesis, what of incrementing the system through the addi¬
tion of layers, the original path toward complexity proposed by Brooks (1991c)?
A serious constraint on such scaling is that, as we have seen, emergence of be¬
haviour really occurs through . Interactions between layers are unpredictable
making it very difficult to scale the system (Brooks, 19916).
Maybe this is the reason why, after a decade and a half of research, BB systems
still exhibit only very simple behaviours. Brooks' (1997) review of 31 robotic
implementations23 none exhibit behaviour more complex than 'chasing prey' or
'avoiding predators'. Furthermore, only two papers (Tyrrell, 1993, 1994) even
begin to address the issue of action selection. BB robotics still clearly has a long
way to travel on the oxen-trail of evolution.
Summary
Behaviour-based robotics attempted to steer away from the pre-interpreted symbolic
domains characteristic of classical Al by grounding the behaviour of agents directly in
the world, yet the result became equally pre-interpreted behavioural systems. Focusing
on behaviour and eschewing the role of internal control mechanisms and representa¬
tional schemes has meant that little remains to be grounded — these systems are
semantically blind.
The hope was for the emergence of high-level competences through the interaction
of lower-level behavioural modules, yet despite the hand-crafting of such 'emergence'
23
Twenty-seven of which were, in fact, simulated.
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only primitive behaviours such as wall following, pursuit, and avoidance have been
engineered. Higher level behaviours, such as map-building, have been demonstrated
only after hybridisation with some form of representational system. It seems unlikely
that such implementations, which form the minority of BB research will become much
more advanced — partly due to the problems of hand-crafting emergence but also
because the paradigm lacks both an accurate characterisation of the target systems
and a principled path along which to travel toward them.
1.4 An impasse
Classical systems, whilst focussed on goal-directed, internally-driven behaviours are
limited to highly constrained pre-interpreted domains of competence. Even within
these domains, the systems are brittle and unreactive, their behaviour hand-crafted,
and adaptation limited. The meaning of representation is ungrounded, and reflects the
ontology of the designer rather than that of the system. Reactive behaviour-based sys¬
tems feature tightly-coupled, hand-crafted behaviours. But internal control is largely
absent; systems are not goal-directed but rather respond to the local environment.
Whilst the behaviour of such systems is grounded in their environments, they are
semantically-blind.
How should such an impasse be resolved? The most obvious solution to the problem
is hybridisation of the two classes of system within a single architecture. What are the
logical features of such architectures; and do they resolve, in practice, the problems
inherent in either stance alone?
1.5 Hybrid systems
Superficially a hybrid approach appears promising. Classical systems are designed to
mimic the competences of complex biological systems, specifically humans, and are
therefore focussed on issues of representation and reasoning. However such systems
are inherently unreactive and therefore lack robustness. Behaviour-based systems, in
contrast, eschew representation, reasoning, and internal control in favour of tightly-
coupled behaviours which are robust in the face of a noisy dynamic world. Surely
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hybridisation of these two approaches would lead to systems capable of both repre¬
senting and reasoning about the world and behaving robustly within that world24?
What are the logical features of such a classical/behaviour-based hybrid architecture?
The system must have a representational component. This system will be symbolic and
manipulation of symbols will underlie reasoning and planning processes. The semantics
of the representational system will be pre-installed by the designer yet 'grounded'
in the world through the reactive behaviour of atomic units within the architecture.
These atomic units will be hand-crafted25 by the designer in order to achieve optimised
reactive coupling with the world. Such systems should utilise their world model in order
to plan actions within the world; the behaviour-based atoms should overcome noise and
dynamism in order to reliably and robustly carry out the plan.
All well and good. Over the past twenty years a multitude of 'hybrid', or reactive
planning, architectures have been developed. However, such architectures are gen¬
erally not pure classical/behaviour-based hybrids but rather incorporate many new
design features — such novel features were introduced in recognition that the prob¬
lems pertaining to classical and reactive behaviour-based systems were not resolved by
their simple hybridisation.
1.5.1 World models and grounding meaning
We have seen previously that the classical stance encountered innumerable difficulties
through attempting to construct and maintain an exhaustive symbolic model of the
world. Conversely, BB robotics eschewed such representational schemes. An obvious
design feature of a hybrid architecture is a reduced world model, albeit symbol-based.
Such a model should be easier to maintain, and help to overcome the combinatorial
difficulties of the frame problem. Reducing state size in this way, however, raises the
upper limit of behavioural complexity but does not provide a solution to the funda¬
mental problem (Horswill, 1997).
One aim of the designers of hybrid systems is to ground symbolic representational sys-
24 As advocated by Sloman (1998) for example.
25 We have seen previously that the 'emergent' functionality of reactive behaviour-based systems is
really a consequence of careful design.
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tems in the world through reasoning about lower-level behavioural modules (Malcolm,
1997, p. 33). However, this tactic does not overcome the problem of domain prein-
terpretation. For classical systems the meaning of symbols is apparent only through
human interpretation (Quillian, 1968; Winograd & Flores, 1986). Similarly for BB
systems behaviours are hand-crafted to 'mean' something by the designer.
Hybrid systems feature low-level reactive behavioural units which are hand-crafted,
and representations about the world26 and their behaviours (Malcolm, 1997). The
meaning of these representations of behaviours, however, remains pre-installed within
the system. Such representations are no more grounded than those of traditional Al.
1.5.2 Robust execution of plans
So hybrid classical/behaviour-based systems can be no more grounded than their clas¬
sical predecessors — their domain of competence remains pre-interpreted: representa¬
tions are of pre-determined external features of the world and of reactive behaviours
pre-engineered to fit a target niche. But what of robustness? The most promising out¬
come of hybridisation seemed to be augmenting planning with robust plan execution.
Plans would be constructed on the basis of an internal symbolic model of the world
and then implemented by behaviour-based modules which would be able to carry out
their functions reliably, reacting to changing external situations.
The strategy certainly appears to be an improvement over either planning and failing,
or blindly reacting yet, on a priori grounds alone, it is insufficient — context is ignored.
The robust, goal-directed behaviour of biological systems relies on the ability to dis¬
tinguish situations and determine appropriate action. How does the strategy work in
practice?
Although pure classical/BB hybrid systems have met some success in the field of assem¬
bly robotics27 (Malcolm, 1987, 1998, for example) autonomous agent implementations
have adopted an alternative strategy. Indeed the majority of hybrids do not rely on
autonomous reactive behaviour-based modules to provide robustness but rather in-
26 Susceptible to all of the criticisms levelled against classical ai systems.
27 Albeit in domains which are accepted to be of reduced complexity and dynamism (Malcolm, 1997,
1998).
CHAPTER 1. TWO DOGMAS 35
terleave planning and acting in an attempt to reactively respond to changing events
whilst retaining internal control. Unfortunately the lack of success achieved by sys¬
tems such as Schoppers (1987) universal plans28, and McDermott's (1978) NASL29
have led to the development of situated planning implementations (Linney, 1991; Lev-
ison, 1996). Such systems are contextually-informed30. Furthermore, the difficultly
of robustly implementing plans in a dynamic world, despite hybridisation, has led to
implementations which stress rational behaviour sequencing (Firby, 1989; Gat, 19916;
Simmons, 1991; Gat & Dorais, 1994), replanning (Gat, 1991a) and error cognisance
and recovery (Simmons, 1991; Gat, 19916).
1.5.3 Summary
Hybridisation of conventional classical and behaviour-based architectural components
cannot resolve the impasse. Such systems must remain preinterpreted — now at both
representational and behavioural levels. The meaning of representations is preinstalled
within such systems. The problem of grounding meaning has not been resolved —
representations now denote elements of a preinterpreted external world together with
hand-crafted behaviours.
Furthermore such systems are brittle. The most successful implementations of pure
classical/BB hybrids operate in constrained domains such as assembly robotics (Mal¬
colm, 1997, 1998). Indeed, hybrid autonomous agents operating in dynamic domains
remain susceptible to plan failure and consequent system collapse.
Architectures which support more robust behaviour, although described as 'hybrid',
move beyond pure classical/BB elements, incorporating contextual knowledge, be¬
havioural sequencing, and error recovery.
28 The strategy adopted is to construct a plan for every possible world state at compilation and select
between them at run-time. Plans perform conditional tests in an attempt to predict all run-time
contingencies.
29 A characteristic reactive planning implementation. Planning and action are interleaved by a cycle of
sensing, plan generation and execution of one step of the plan. Unfortunately, although robust in the
face of environmental changes, this approach was found to generate many errors due to unforeseen
interactions between steps.
30 Firby's (1987) raps, pengi (Agre & Chapman, 1990a), ItPlanS (Geib, 1992; Geib et al, 1994) and
the situated automata of (Kaelbling & Rosenschein, 1990), for example.
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1.6 Summary: two dogmas
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Neither symbol-based nor behaviour-based approaches adequately characterise intelli¬
gent systems. The classical mischaracterisation of disembodied and unsituated symbol
using systems leads to failure both to root the competences of complex systems in
earlier adaptations, and to account for the origin of meaning for such systems. The
focus of behaviourism on tightly-coupled responses to local events cannot explain the
richness of behaviour of complex systems, nor the processes by which simple systems
become complex over phylogeny and ontogeny.
The consequences for the construction of artificial agents are devastating. Classi¬
cal Al has succeeded in producing only brittle and unreactive systems operating in
pre-interpreted toy worlds. The systems are hand-crafted, non-adaptive and seman-
tically blind. Similarly, reactive BB systems, although robust, are capable only of
tightly-coupled, hand-crafted behaviours. Control of the system resides with the local
environment.
The most obvious solution, hybridisation of conventional classical and BB components,
does not resolve the impasse. Such hybrid systems would remain hand-crafted. Their
domains would be preinterpreted at both representational and behavioural levels. Fi¬
nally, meaning would still be ungrounded. Indeed, such pure classical/BB systems are
rare and successful only within limited domains. The majority of hybrid systems are
fundamentally situated — incorporating elements of contextually-marked non-symbolic
representation. Internal control is achieved through rational sequencing of behaviours
together, in some implementations, with the ability to recognise, and attempt to re¬
cover from, error.
Neither of the traditional stances, nor their conjunction, have supported the develop¬
ment of robust and adaptive artificial intelligent systems. However, their joint failure
has stressed the importance of a characterisation of systems which recognises the con¬
straints provided by embodiment and the situated nature of action and cognition.
Yet without an accurate characterisation of complex biological systems, the targets of
design, what hope can there be for progress?
The next chapter discusses two frameworks which seek to replace the traditional char-
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acterisations of complex systems. Both are inspired by characterisations of biological
systems and have inspired the construction of artificial systems. Do either of these
stances resolve the problems associated with symbolic and behaviour-based positions;
and what are their implications for the construction of adaptive artificial systems?
Chapter 2
Two contenders: dynamic and
situated perspectives
We have seen that neither symbol-based nor behaviour-based stances adequately char¬
acterise intelligent biological systems. Nor does either stance support the development
of robust adaptive artificial intelligent systems. The disembodied reasoning systems
of the symbolic stances are contrasted with the undeliberative reactive systems of the
behaviour-based approaches. We have seen that purely reactive systems are forever
at the mercy of their environments, lacking internal control. Deliberative systems, in
contrast, lack the reactivity required to successfully achieve their internally motivated
goals. Hybridisation assumes that cognition serves to supplant and extend purely re¬
active behaviour yet in the attempt to recombine action, perception and cognition it
is unclear how to make low-level reflexes sensitive to cognitive goals (Laird & Rosen-
bloom, 1990; Lewis et al., 1990).
This chapter introduces the 'emergent' stances, dynamicism and situated theories,
which seek to overcome this impasse by assuming coordination of perception and (sit¬
uated) action, within a given niche, as the basis of higher-level, cognitive competences.
Such higher-level competences are thought to emerge through inter-system and system-
environment1 interactions.
1 Precursors of this position are clear within: biology and ethology where organisms are conceptualised
with respect to their adaptive environment (Haldane, 1917; von Uexkiill, 1928); neurophysiology
where the nervous system is construed as such only when tied to an environment (Bethe, 1931;
Anokhin, 1978); and psychology (Bretano, 1874; Dewey, 1896; Kohler, 1927; Merleau-Ponty, 1962;
Gibson, 1979).
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The implications of these stances for the construction of artificial systems are discussed
later in the chapter. Initially situated robotic implementations are described: where
classical robots centralised control but were unreactive and behaviour-based robots
relied on control exerted from without in the designer's attempt to distance them from
over-centralisation, 'situated' robotics strives to utilise constraints present in environ¬
ment and agent, whilst retaining contextually-informed internal representations. The
designers of such systems strive for both reactivity and appropriate adaptive behaviour,
under some internal control.
Next, 'emergent' computational approaches, connectionism and ALIFE, are briefly re¬
viewed. Finally their conjunction 'evolutionary robotics', which strives to develop
adaptive systems through evolutionary and self-organisational mechanisms, is exam¬
ined.
2.1 The dynamic perspective
"The problem of origins requires an understanding of how new levels of
order emerge from complex patterns of interaction and what the properties
of these emergent structures are in terms of their robustness to perturba¬
tion and their capacity for self-maintenance. Then all levels of order and
organisation are recognised as being of equal importance in understanding
the behaviour of living systems, and the reductionist insistence on some
basic material level of cause and explanation such as molecules and genes
can be recognised for what it is, an unfortunate fashion or prejudice that
is actually bad science" (Goodwin, 1994, p. 168).
Throughout western science and philosophy for more than two thousand years the ten¬
sion between a focus on form or process has remained unresolved. First the Eleatics,
and then rationalism, and finally cognitivism concern themselves with being. Con¬
versely, beginning with Heraclitus and, much later, empiricism and behaviourism the
emphasis is on becoming. Neither stance alone is sufficient to deal with the problems
of complexity. Dynamic systems theory offers itself as the solution by emphasising
the interrelationship of both: becoming through being, and being through becoming
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The empirical success of dynamic systems theory, now the most powerful explanatory
framework within physical science, has naturally led to a desire to apply these explana¬
tory tools to cognition (Turvey & Carello, 1981; Swenson & Turvey, 1991). Indeed,
within cognitive science the dynamic hypothesis has become increasingly popular over
the past decade (Globus, 1992; Robertson et al., 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994; van
Gelder, 1995; van Gelder & Port, 1995, for examples), arising in part from the unre¬
solved problems of, and general dissatisfaction with, both symbolic representat ionalist
and associationist behaviour-based stances (Bechtel & Abrahmsen, 1991).
2.1.1 What is a dynamic system?
A system is defined as a set of interdependent variables, with the state of the system
equating to the value of all variables at a given time, and its behaviour corresponding to
state transitions (von Bertalanffy, 1967). Initially the field of complex dynamic systems
dealt only with closed systems — ones in which there is no transfer of matter or energy
between the system and its environment. Such systems exhibit reversible processes,
in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, ensuring that the system, over
time, reaches a state of maximum entropy — one of maximal homogeneity and minimal
organisation (von Bertalanffy, 1967; Prigogine. 1980). Since closed systems are subject
to the second law of thermodynamics, perturbations of the system tend to result in
self-regulations towards the inevitable maximum entropy state.
Open systems, in contrast, exchange matter or energy with their environment. Such
systems exhibit irreversible processes, and therefore never attain final equilibrium
states, but instead fall into steady-states where the system's functional organisation is
maintained with respect to its environment. Open systems are capable of self-regulation
following disturbances of system processes, this fact explains why similar systems tend
to converge on similar goal states. However, changes in system conditions cannot be
regulated: the set of possible trajectories is altered and the system may settle into
final states very different from those which were initially possible. Final system state
can therefore be seen to be the result of constraints imposed by the initial system
conditions together with environmental influences (Kohler, 1927).
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Organisms are examples of open systems, in continual interaction with their environ¬
ments. The irreversible processes occurring in open systems underly the unidirec-
tionality of growth in organisms. The somewhat paradoxical growth of structure in
biological systems, as opposed to increasing entropy as is predicted by the second law
of thermodynamics, is explained by the fact that open systems and their environments
as a whole tend towards maximum entropy. Such a situation allows for local growth
of structure, simultaneous with a global trend towards homogeneity. The cognitive
system can be regarded as an abstract system implemented by a concrete system at
a lower level (van Gelder, 1998) and can therefore be subjected to a dynamic systems
analysis.
As the universe can be conceived as a hierarchy of dynamic systems the demarcation
point between systems must be conventional and is therefore chosen with a theoretical
question in mind — the level of analysis appropriate to the question determines the
demarcation point. A system should therefore be conceptualised as an arbitrary re¬
striction of the total environment (de Lorenzana & Ward, 1987). For many questions,
including analysis of intelligent systems, a number of interlinked systems may have to
be considered simultaneously. All levels are explanatory to varying degrees in complex
hierarchical systems:
"The theory of boundary conditions recognises the higher levels of life as
forming a hierarchy, each level of which relies for its workings on the prin¬
ciples of the levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to these lower
principles" (Polyani, 1976, p. 136).
Intelligent biological systems consist of many cognitively-relevant dynamical systems
and might also be partially located outside the body (van Gelder, 1998; Clark &
Chalmers, 1998).
2.1.2 The dynamic perspective in cognitive science
A dynamic approach within cognitive science implies that: (1) cognitive systems should
be regarded as nested complex dynamical systems; and (2) cognition should be under¬
stood dynamically, using dynamical models and tools (van Geert, 1994; van Gelder,
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1998).
Dynamic systems theories shift concentration from consideration of structure towards
process. The important property of complex dynamic systems is not their physical
substrate but rather their relational order. Whereas traditional cognitive science fo¬
cuses on state, static internal structure, an input-output metaphor, and a serial view of
what states developing systems pass through using the language of symbolic represen¬
tation and logical coordination, the dynamical perspective emphasises state changes,
continuous internal processes leading to self-organisation, and coupling between agent
and environment employing the terminology of system theory — states, parameters,
attractors, trajectories etc.
Where traditional symbolic approaches tend to disregard the temporal dynamics of cog¬
nition, and behaviour-based stances are limited to change over time in simple systems,
through descriptions in terms of the continuous self-organisation of systems in interac¬
tion with the environment and each other, the dynamic perspective reintroduces time.
The characterisation of disembodied, abstracted, symbol grinding cognitive systems
is replaced by an embodied, coupled, dynamic view of intelligent biological systems.
This characterisation seeks to explain the features of cognition ignored by traditional
accounts: its embodiment in nervous system, body, and environment; its continuous
dynamic nature; and its emergence and stability over time.
The dynamic perspective has been recently criticised for being only metaphorical and
thus lacking explanatory value (Robertson et al., 1993; Barton, 1994, for example).
The central issue is the predictive ability of dynamic models — it has been argued
that the application of rigorous terminology from nonlinear dynamics to often impre¬
cise psychological variables, together with the difficulty of generating simulations of
cognitive systems, is a critical failure for the dynamic model of cognition (Eliasmith,
1996). It is still early days, however, and there have been few attempts to construct
truly dynamic models of cognitive and developmental processes2. Furthermore, this
lack of rigour in newly emerging disciplines is common within science: as Hesse (1988)
suggests, the value of a new model, or a novel application of a trusted model, lies in the
2 See the olfactory bulb model of Skarda & Freeman (1987) and the more recent work of van Geert
(1994) for examples.
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exploitation of a successful and familiar explanatory framework from one domain to de¬
scribe less well characterised phenomena in another. Only time will tell if the dynamic
perspective proves to provide predictive models of (aspects of) the cognitive system,
but at the current time it brings a rich descriptive language to the characterisation of
intelligent systems.
The state space of a system refers to the possible range of variation in system behaviour
and structure over its existence. State space is dually constrained by the lower on-
tological bounds of the system3 and its environment4. Viewing the cognitive system
as one example of such a system leads to an emphasis on the constraints imposed
by 'wetware' (sensory organs, their structure, effectors etc.), 'software' (cognitive and
perceptual primitives), and environment 011 developmental trajectories. Interactive
system-environment processes determine, over the course of epigenesis, the trajectory
taken through state-space. Attractors in state space lead to dynamic stabilisation of
the system — the emergence of a temporary stable state.
System theory provides many possible mechanisms of change over both phylogeny, and
ontogeny. Lorenzana & Ward (1987), for example, postulate two mechanisms which
might underlie the trend toward complexity in evolutionary systems. Combinatorial
expansion is the process by which a core system converts its unrealised potential (given
by its global properties) through a process of progressive differentiation. The ontolog-
ical lower bounds of the system set a limit to the expansion possible hence generative
condensation occurs at the limit stage: the expanded system 'condenses' to form the
ontological lower bound of a new system.
The emergence of detailed structure and refined behaviour through the self-organisation
of systems over ontogenesis can occur through processes of spontaneous pattern gener¬
ation and bifurcation, or symmetry-breaking5, which leads to progressive hierarchical
differentiation. A critical consequence of the dynamic stance is that no end point to de¬
velopment is envisaged. Systems follow open-ended trajectories, becoming increasingly
3 For example, see Goodwin's (1994) discussion of the actions of genes over morphogenesis to select
and stabilise the alternative forms which are available to an organism (p. 16).
4 The generative layer of a system, its ontological lower bounds together with the richness of the
environment, constrains development of evolutionary systems (de Lorenzana & Ward, 1987).
5 Bifurcation from spatial uniformity to pattern occurs in non-linear systems when energy flow through
the system displaces it from equilibrium (Goodwin, 1994).
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differentiated over time.
2.1.3 Implications for the construction of artificial systems
Currently the dynamic perspective has been embraced most wholeheartedly by the
ALIFE, and evolutionary robotics communities. Here, the focus of dynamicism on
coupled systems, changes in system structure over time, and environmental influences
on system development has been translated into a manifesto for synthesising intelligent
artificial systems through the evolution of connectionist networks. Notwithstanding the
paradox of the adoption of a stance which emphasises internal self-organisation as the
key to progressive system development by one which concentrates on blind selective
processes, ALIFE focuses on behavioural adaptation over evolving populations and is
not, it is suggested6, the way forward.
What else does the dynamic perspective suggest? Obviously a key feature of artificial
systems must be their coupling to the environment, we shall see that this plays a
key role in many situated theories (section 2.2) and implementations (section 2.3.1).
It is important, however, that the dynamic perspective is not hijacked as a means of
justifying reactivity in the absence of internal control. The rejection of the explanatory
value of representation in the characterisation of cognition by many dynamic theorists
(Beer, 1995a,6; Freeman & Skarda, 1990; Harvey, 1992; Husbands et al., 1995, for
example) is a worrying example7. Its postulated replacements, shared parameters in
coupled differential equations (van Gelder, 1995) for example, are unlikely to lead to
a clearer understanding of the behaviour of cognitive agents, and provide no clear
guidelines for the construction of artificial systems. Critically the assertion of many
dynamic theorists that representation is not needed to explain cognitive phenomena is
alarmingly reminiscent of behaviour-based stances. Not only do these fail to account
for the behaviour of complex systems but were also inadequate for characterising even
basic animal learning phenomena (Thagard, 1992).
6 See section 2.3.2.
7 "In realistic nets [...] it is not the representations that are changed; it is the self-organising process
that changes via chemical modulation. Indeed it no longer makes sense to talk of 'representations',"
(Globus, 1992, p. 302); "it is the concept of representation which is insufficiently sophisticated" (van
Gelder, 1993, p. 6); "We are not building representations at all!" (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.338).
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The most promising contribution of the dynamic perspective lies in the ideas of con¬
straint, self-organisation, and unbounded development. It suggests that we should
strive to build systems whose lower ontological bounds (system primitives), and envi¬
ronment of application, are sufficiently rich to enable, through interaction and conse¬
quent self-organisation, the development of progressively more adaptive competences.
Critically, it suggests the adoption of a life-historical approach which appreciates the
influence of past experience on present and future competence, and implies that sys¬
tems should be constructed with no pre-determined end-point in sight.
2.1.4 Summary
The dynamic perspective, although still in its infancy within cognitive science, provides
a rich metaphorical language for the characterisation of complex intelligent systems.
Emphasis is shifted from the disembodied reasoning of symbolic stances towards the
dynamic interaction of the coupled system-environment meta-system —- intelligent sys¬
tems are embedded within the real world. Initial system conditions and environmen¬
tal potential dually constrain the developmental trajectories open to systems. Self-
organisation occurs over ontogenesis leading to more highly differentiated systems. No
developmental end-point is specified.
For the construction of artificial systems, the main contribution of the dynamic per¬
spective lies in appreciation of the constraints imposed by system primitives and en¬
vironment on the range of possible self-organised developmental trajectories not in a
rejection of representation and consequent justification of pure reactivity.
2.2 Situated cognition
"Expert-knowledge is comprised of context-dependent, personally constructed,
highly functional but fallible abstractions." (Agnew et al, 1993)
The situated perspective on cognition aims to rectify the abstraction mistake of the
classical symbolic stance. Systems are viewed, as from the dynamic perspective, as
fundamentally and influentially embodied and situated within an adaptive niche. The
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cognitive system is not abstracted away from its physical roots but rather these roots
constrain the nature of intelligent systems, and provide a method of grounding meaning
in experienced reality.
The conflation of external symbolic representations and internal mechanisms charac¬
teristic of traditional cognitive science is eschewed as a category error (Winograd &
Flores, 1986; Clancey, 1991a). Inspired by ideas such as relativity, Heisenburg's un¬
certainty principle, quantum indeterminacy, and Godel's theorem which emphasise the
contingency of 'truth', together with the Kuhnian (1962) view of the contextual in¬
terpretation of 'objective' science, situated stances deny that human cognition can be
accurately modelled by 'objective' context-independent symbolic descriptions since the
validity of inferences derived from such symbolic knowledge varies in differing inter¬
pretative contexts (Dreyfus, 1972, 1992; Menzies, 1996).
Since the influence of the environment is so great, we must characterise systems in terms
of their direct interaction with the environment rather than postulating intermediary
symbolic deliberative devices. Control of systems is passed, therefore, from logical
coordination of internal symbols to direct coordination of perception and action, mod¬
ulated (in some characterisations) by indexical, contextually-informed representations.
According to this view, symbolic descriptions are less important8 than the dynamic
internal deictic representations that are constructed through direct experience of the
world9.
Thus situated stances adopt a constructivist epistemology, where meaning is derived
from system-environment interaction and is valid only within limited domains. Further¬
more, progressive adaption of systems is characterised as 'emerging' through similar
dialectic interactions within a given niche. The implications for the construction of
artificial systems constitute a progression from both classical Al and behaviour-based
robotics. Pure reactivity is rejected, as is internal deliberation, in favour of 'coordina¬
tion' mechanisms which, it is hoped, will produce adaptive behaviour. Representation
8 In fact, post-hoc justifications of a non-symbolic internal coordinative mechanism according to
Clancey (1993).
9 "The neural structures and processes that coordinate perception and action are created during
activity, not retrieved and rotely applied, merely reconstructed, or calculated via stored rules and
pattern descriptions." (Clancey, 1993, p. 94).
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is either absent (implicit in the coordination mechanisms) or indexical-functional (Agre
& Chapman, 19906) — agent-centred.
2.2.1 Embodiment and its constraints
Perception and motor skills, for situated stances, are the 'hard' problems solved by
intelligent systems; their solutions impose constraints on the remaining aspects of nat¬
ural intelligence. Indeed, for situated stances all thoughts are acts, rooted in previous
bodily acts — often cited as a possible reason why so much of language consists of
bodily metaphors and metonymies (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, for example). Where
behaviour-based stances were mind-less, and symbolic stances disembodied, situated
stances emphasise the bodily roots of cognition.
Recognition of the fundamental importance of embodiment is not new to situated
stances of course: although much of western philosophy equated the laws of deductive
logic with those of thought, the naturalistic epistemological tradition, a clear philo¬
sophical predecessor of situated cognition, holds that the cognitive system is a natural
phenomena interacting with other natural phenomena, and that epistemology must be
founded on empirical studies of the human cognitive system (Shimony, 1987, p. 1).
Spencer's 'Principles of psychology' (1855), published only shortly before the 'Origin of
species' (Darwin, 1859), stressed that human mentality should be studied from an evo¬
lutionary perspective. However Spencer, and other early naturalistic epistemologists10,
regarded the process of cognitive adaptation as closed (Capek, 1987, p. 95). The en¬
vironment to which the cognitive system was thought to be adapted was the total
'cosmic' environment and the fundamental concepts of classical science were regarded
as accurate descriptions of the objective features of reality. For these early naturalis¬
tic epistemologists, evolution was complete — a view which paradoxically resulted in
similar conclusions to Kant and other apriorists: a logico-symbolic characterisation of
the cognitive system.
A second school of thought developed through the ideas of Bergson (1944), Piaget
(1971), Popper (1972), and Campbell (1974). For this second group evolutionary
10 Mach (1959), Avenarius (1890), von Helmholtz (1873), Poincare (1946) for examples.
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adaptation was still ongoing with both physical and cognitive structure dependent on
this adaptive process. Popper (1985) makes the distinction between explicit knowledge,
available to the system in terms of thought, language etc., and implicit knowledge,
embedded in the biological machinery of a system (Michalski, 1986; Longo, 1994), such
as homeostatic mechanisms (Belew, 1992). The adaptive process by which both explicit
and implicit forms of knowledge are constructed was thought to be (neo-)Darwinian
evolution.
Analogously, within ethology (Uexkiill, 1864/1944), and psychology (Miller, 1966),
theorists had been considering the possibility of a disembodied mind and reflecting on
the constraints provided by embodiment on cognitive structure. Early appreciation of
how the umwelt, or perceptual world, of a system is highly constrained by architectural
sensorimotor features of the system has been recently supplemented by the work of
Ballard and colleagues (1993, 1997) who emphasise the interaction of the constraints
imposed by the physical structure of a system with cognition.
Computational and power resources, for example, provide a fundamental overarching
constraint on natural cognitive architectures. Systems must be able to process infor¬
mation rapidly in the face of a dynamic world. Computation must be fast, efficient,
and economical. Systems might need to minimise the 'quantity' of working memory at
any given time by utilising constraints provided by their own physical structure (Bal¬
lard et al., 1997) and by 'extending' computation, via natural and engineered niche
constraints, into the environment (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).
Resource constraints suggest that features such as the following might be necessary
features of intelligent systems:
Hierarchy and modularity The physical structure of the brain reflects (at least a
partial) modular structure. It has been suggested that this is an outcome of the
time penalty of conducting neuronal signals across long distances, which would
make local computation, and thus a modular, hierarchical organisation most effi¬
cient (Newell, 1990; Ballard et al., 1997). Furthermore this kind of organisation
would provide robustness (Simon, 1962; McGonigle, 1991; Gat, 1991a).
A need for both rapid processing at low levels in order to cope with a dynamic
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world, in combination with slower, more 'deliberative' processes suggests a hier¬
archy of control structures operating at increasingly slower, and more abstracted
levels (Newell, 1990; Ballard et al., 1997). Furthermore, a modular construction
can be utilised to constrain the potential inductive space, thereby supporting a
'divide and conquer' strategy, which enables systems to solve problems which
might otherwise by inductively intractable (McGonigle, 1991; Luger & Stubble-
field, 19986).
Sequential processing The work of Ballard et al. (1997) on saccadic eye movements
suggests that serial order is a low-level property of (at least the the primate) visual
systems, inherent in perceptual processing rather than a feature of high-level
competences alone. As Lashley (1951) stated, serial competence is a fundamental
feature of the nervous system rather than a novel development consequent upon
a linguistic competence as implicitly assumed by traditional cognitivism.
System-centred representation Computational resource limitations indicate that
an internal rather than external frame of reference is more likely to be utilised by
systems (Ballard, 1991). Representing features of the world dynamically, from an
egocentric viewpoint, rather than in a global reference system reduces memory
load and yields simplifications of algorithmic complexity (Ullman & Richards,
1984; Agre & Chapman, 1987; Jeannerod, 1988; Milner & Goodale, 1995).
2.2.2 The ontogenesis of situated systems
For situated stances, as with the dynamic perspective, interaction between system
and environment is the principle method by which development is thought to occur.
Situated theories are constructivist: dialectic processes are regarded as the key to
system scaffolding, and to grounding systems in their environments. Action is central
to development (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1993; Rutkowska, 1993; Costall, 1994).
Although a multitude of mechanisms have now been proposed for this interactive pro¬
cess, emergent functionality and enaction, representative of the two extremes of situ¬
ated approaches, will be briefly described in order to present the flavour of situated
theories.
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Emergent functionality is currently the major theoretical principle underlying sit¬
uated agent approaches within robotics as it was previously for behaviour-based
robotics. The complex abilities of situated systems are assumed to emerge indi¬
rectly from the operation of independent, simpler components in the absence of
centralised control and (traditional symbolic) representational systems through
inter-system interactions and transactions with the environment (Maes, 1990;
Steels, 1991, for example). It has been argued that emergent functionality is
most suited to situations:
"when there is a lot of dependence on the environment, and it is difficult
to foresee all possible circumstances in advance" (Steels, 1991, p. 459).
Rutkowska (1994, 1997) has applied this framework to human development ar¬
guing that the range of possible motor activities might be selected on the basis of
environmental interaction rather than hardwired into the system, with novel co¬
ordinations established through environmental change. Temporarily engineered
competences might later become permanent adaptive changes.
Emergent functionality is generally applied to coordination of responses to en¬
vironmental stimuli, and motor coordination rather than more complex compe¬
tences: it is hoped that these will emerge over time. It remains unclear, how¬
ever, exactly how emergent functionality might operate, and especially how it
might be incorporated in artificial systems. We saw previously that the reac¬
tive behaviour-based paradigm, although stressing emergent functionality as an
important design principle, resorted to the hand-crafting of behaviour. Further¬
more, this perspective emphasises reactivity through coordinative mechanisms,
what are the roles envisaged, if any, for internal control and representation?
Enaction "The basic notion is that cognitive capacities are inextricably
linked to a history that is lived, much like a path that does not exist
but is laid down in walking. Consequently the view of cognition is
not that of solving problems through representations, but as a creative
bringing forth of a world where the only required condition is that
it is effective action: it permits the continued integrity of the system
involved." (Varela, 1989, pp. 59-60)
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Enaction is the 'bringing forth of the world' through activity (Varela, 1979; Matu-
rana & Varela, 1980; Varela et al., 1993). But whereas for the arch-constructivist
Piaget (1970) action gives rise to explicit representations that model selected as¬
pects of an objective reality from which systems construct ever more abstracted
knowledge structures, from this perspective development is a widening of con¬
straints on action. Increased complexity of behaviour relies not on logical co¬
ordination of knowledge structures, but on action-centred representations of the
preconditions for successful behaviour (Willatts, 1989; Rutkowska, 1993).
Enaction, therefore, emphasises contextual representation of the potential of ac¬
tions as a key factor underlying progressive system development.
Situated stances although clearly rejecting symbolic representations in an attempt to
avoid the associated combinatorial and grounding problems lack unity on its replace¬
ment within a theory of cognition. At one extreme are those who eschew explicit
representation of any kind, and on the other those who push representation out into
the world and, between these two, those who accept some form of egocentric, non-
symbolic pragmatic representation.
The non-representational side of situated theories stresses direct coordination of be¬
haviour — maintenance of an adaptive dynamic relationship between system and envi¬
ronment is critical. Merleau-Ponty's (1962) and Dreyfus' (1996) 'homeostatic' models
fall into this category. The focus on coordination mechanisms leads to a view of sys¬
tems untroubled by representational systems. This view could inspire artificial systems
of only limited improvement over those of reactive BB robotics.
The majority of situated cognition theorists suggest that system-centred, contextually-
informed representations underlie coordination. Motivated by Dretske's (1988) anal¬
ysis of natural systems of representation whose meaning is intrinsic and dependent
on construction rather than objective, these representations establish selective corre¬
spondence with the world; their function is not to express states of (external) affairs
but rather to allow a system to maintain a functional relationship with its external
environment.
Suggestions for representational systems which would support the maintenance of such




- Clancey (1995) stresses that situated cognition researchers claim no internal
representation in the first-person sense — as structures created, interpreted,
and manipulated by a system. Rather representation/symbolising occurs
through behaviour rather than between sensing and acting.
- Rosenfield (1988) discusses 'process memory' which coordinates behaviours
in space and time as they have been previously coordinated.
- Roitblat (1991) maintains that any change internal to a system as a result
of experience which later influences behaviour can be considered to be a
representation.
These stances, therefore, are neutral with respect to the construction of repre¬
sentational schemes in artificial systems.
• Pragmatic representation
- Thornton (1997) suggests that replication of external 'triggers' for behaviours
within a system is critical. Salient structural features of the environment
should be replicated by any number of alternative forms of representation.
- Prem (1997) argues that representation is based upon the affordances (Gib¬
son, 1979) of perceived objects. Representations are inherently functional
and meaningful.
- Chapman k Agre (1987); Agre k Chapman (19906) suggest that represen¬
tations must be both functional and indexical — system centred. Repre¬
sentational systems need not be global nor objective as long as they permit
contextual features to be encoded and allow for adaptive behaviour.
- Ballard (1989, 1993) stresses the importance of deictic representation. These
are inherently egocentric and support contextual interpretation of percep¬
tion and action.
For these stances meaningful structures are not pre-given nor static but rather
arise through interactive processes, and are continually reinterpreted over the
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lifetime of a knowing subject. Meaning enters a system through contextually-
marked activity (Suchman, 1987; Agre, 1988; Clancey, 19916). Continual lifelong
construction, interpretation, and reinterpretation of meaningful contextual rep¬
resentations also avoids both the frame problem, and the combinatorial problems
associated with search through a global symbolic model of the world (Bickhard
& Richie, 1983). The implicit idealism of symbolic stances is also rejected: infor¬
mation is not filtered from a pre-given ontology but rather constructed through
perceptual processes (Maturana, 1983; Reeke & Edelman, 1988). Representation
is best characterised, therefore, as a method of controlling action and percep¬
tion in the environment (Clark, 1994). Situated inference (Barwise, 1987), for
example, involves system exploitation of environmental regularities. Reasoning
in this way depends on the embedding circumstances of the system: if the rele¬
vant external regularities break down any inferences dependent upon them will
become invalid. Dretske (1988) has suggested that infants' avoidance of looming
objects can be interpreted as an example of situated inference — the soundness
of the 'inference' rests on the continuation of natural environmental conditions.
The postulation of this kind of mechanism, based on action contingent trans¬
formation, represents one attempt to demonstrate that rational behaviour can
be generated from action-based internal representation in conjunction with niche
constraints in the absence of a logically-coordinated symbolic model of the world.
This view of 'sub-symbolic' (Smolensky, 1988), pragmatic representation forms
the basis of situated robotics implementations11.
• Extended mind
— "epistemic action demands spread of epistemic credit" (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998, p. 10).
Clark & Chalmers (1998) describe the tendency of human reasoners to rely
on environmental support (McClelland et al., 1986; Clark, 1989; Hutchins,
1995, for example). Delegation of information-processing to both natural
and engineered features of the external world is a means of increasing sys¬
tem capacity. The 'loop' of system and environment plays a causal role in
11 See below section 2.3.1.
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the generation of behaviour and must, therefore, be well characterised. Sys¬
tems take advantage of niche constraints, and their own bodily constraint,
to simplify the solutions to problems. Furthermore, the structure of the
environment plays a crucial role in constraining the way in which systems
can develop.
The emphasis of the situated perspective on contextual representation is supported by
recent neurophysiological evidence which suggests that the activity of even 'low-level'
areas of cortex is highly context-dependent. Activity of neurons in the visual area VI
(Gallant et al., 1995) is dependent on fixation point location which, in turn, depends
on high-level goals. The parietal cortex has been discovered to contain neurons which
are sensitive to exocentric (task-relevant) location in space (Stricanne et al., 1994;
Snyder & Andersen, 1994), and activity of cells in motor cortex suggests the use of
exocentric frames of reference (Helms-Tillery et al., 1991; Tagaris et al., 1994; Pellizzer
et al., 1994), prismatic adaptation has also been found to be context sensitive (Flook
& McGonigle, 1977).
Lifetime learning
Situated stances are clearly influenced by the dynamic perspective. An appreciation
that the designer's ontology should not be pre-installed within the systems at either
representational or behavioural levels (Clancey, 19916, for example) reflects the em¬
phasis of dynamicism on the constraints provided by the lower bounds of a system.
The coordination mechanisms assumed to underly system behaviour and adaptation
are analogous in many respects to the coupled systems of the dynamic perspective.
Although there are areas of convergence between situated and dynamic perspectives,
the relationship of situated theories to the dynamic perspective is rarely made ex¬
plicit12. The reader's attention should be drawn, however, to one critical convergence:
an important implication of the constructivist emphasis of situated stances is that no
end-point to the developmental trajectory is envisaged. Where behaviour-based stances
lacked the capacity for non-trivial adaptation, and traditional cognitivism sought to
12 Although see Clark & Chalmers (1998).
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characterise development towards the ideal logico-mathematical end-point, the situated
perspective allows for open-ended growth. Whereas the majority of implementations
from both symbol-based and behaviour-based approaches are static, situated and dy¬
namic perspectives advocate the progressive reconstruction of systems.
2.2.3 Summary
The situated perspective on cognition emphasises the coordination of perception and
action dually constrained by physical embodiment and environment. Adaptivity oc¬
curs through coordination in the absence of explicit representation for some theorists.
Others regard the function of representation as the provision of contextual informa¬
tion rather than enablement of action through logical manipulation of symbols. It is
hoped that the meaning of representations for such systems will be grounded in direct
experience of the world and that consequently the frame problem of classical AI can be
avoided.
The major implications for the design of artificial systems are that structural and
niche constraints should be utilised to coordinate perception and action. Represen¬
tation, if present, should be restricted to non-manipulable, contextual, agent-centred
information.
2.3 Situated and emergent artificial systems
2.3.1 Situated robotics
Situated robotics seeks to retain the reactivity of purely behaviour-based systems whilst
reintroducing elements of representation and internal control. Representation becomes,
once more, an element of robotic architectures yet the symbolicism of classical AI is
replaced by a pragmatism which emphasises egocentric, contextual representation. As
characterised herein, 'situated robotics' encompasses situated agent, and some animat
approaches. In order to give a flavour of the nature of these systems several will now
be briefly described.
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PENGI (Agre & Chapman, 1987; Chapman & Agre, 1987) although not a robotic im¬
plementation is important for popularising a situated approach within AI. Agre
(1988) had come to the conclusion that everyday activity is more accurately char¬
acterised as routine, rather than newly deliberated. He maintained that many
goal-directed behaviours are improvised on the spot based on current environ¬
mental features. PENGI is an implementation inspired by this view of activity.
PENGO is a simulated computer game played on a two-dimensional maze of ice-
blocks. The player navigates a penguin through this environment which dies
if it is hit by either an ice block or a bee. PENGI is a control system whose
action derives from interactive routines based on 'indexical-functional', rather
than global symbolic, representation. The behaviour of the system, therefore, is
contextually-informed — situation specific.
PENGI demonstrated, albeit within a simplified and simulated domain, that repre¬
sentation needs neither to be global nor objective to support adaptive behaviour
but can be restricted to primitives which relate perception of the world to activity.
AARON (Cohen, 1988; McCormick, 1991) again, is not a robotic implementation but
a drawing program capable of producing an infinite number of different pictures of
garden scenes. The system draws on-line; its behaviour is not planned in advance
but is rather generated through matching current world state with a desired
end state. Representations are indexical-functional, reflecting the immediate
dynamics of the drawing process (perception and action) rather than objective
states of the world. The system's ontology characterises the relationship of system
states and perceived world states.
Although the system is categorically bound (its performance is constrained by
a pre-determined ontology of trees, and a small number of people) it is again
important for demonstrating effective on-line control based on non-symbolic rep¬
resentation and improvised action.
Situated automata The 'situated automata' of Rosenschein k. Kaelbling (1986, 1990)
represent an engineering approach to robot construction. They possess no sym¬
bolic knowledge of the world, rather contextual 'knowledge' is pre-programmed
into the agent by the designer. Agents are specified in terms of perception and
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action components by two programs. RULER specifies the perception component
based on the semantics of the agent's inputs, a set of static facts, and the state
transitions possible within the world. The designer specifies the semantics for the
output of the agent, and then the compiler synthesises a circuit whose output
will have the desired semantics. Declarative knowledge is therefore reduced to a
pre-programmed circuit (Kaelbling, 1991). GAPPS accepts a set of goal reduction
rules (which encode information about how goals can be achieved) and a top level
goal, and then generates a program that can be translated into a digital circuit
to achieve the goal.
For these systems knowledge is not incorporated as data structures but is replaced
by a description of how the state of the machine should relate to the state of the
world. The generated circuit neither represents nor manipulates symbols as all
knowledge is installed at compilation time. Knowledge becomes a theoretical
construct of the designer used to construct a circuit with the interactive features
required. Although the systems which derive from this approach are capable of
contextually appropriate action, the ontology of the system is that of the designer.
Toto (Mataric, 1990; Mataric & Brooks, 1990) is a robotic 'dog' that learns about the
relative location of landmarks and constructs a map of its environment. The map
is not globally available but is accessible only in the context of moving through
the environment. This implementation, therefore, dynamically constructs a map
of the environment through action.
However the system possesses predefined categories for modelling the world (walls,
obstacles, etc.) which are stored as landmark descriptions. Learning of novel
landmarks occurs through comparison of the current landmark to the stored de¬
scriptions of known landmarks. The matching process uses a predefined calculus
for manipulating the representation, as in classical systems. This calculus, for
example, represents the equivalence of a right wall when heading north, and a
left wall when heading south (Mataric & Brooks, 1990).
Situated robotics is based on an alternative to logical Ai, procedural or functional
semantics (McDermott, 1987; Birnbaum, 1991). These implementations eschew the
objective, global, symbolic representations of classical AI, replacing them with sub-
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jective descriptions of the inter-relationship of perception and action. Whilst striving
to retain the reactivity of BB systems, situated systems hope to add an element of
contextual relevancy to behaviour. Memory becomes less important to the system,
being replaced by a 'knowledge' of how to do the right thing at the right time. The
designers of these systems seek to move away from the pre-installed competences and
representations of classical Al.
Situated robotic implementations lag far behind situated theories. This is unsurprising
as situated stances provide guidelines rather than principles for design. Although one
strong feature of the situated approach is the grounding of the meaning of represen¬
tations through action, implementations are overly preconstrained by their designer's
ontology: meaning is still installed rather than derived. Furthermore a number of
important design questions remain unanswered: should systems be provided with on-
tological primitives or 'grammars' for representation construction; what should be the
role of goals and internal control; how should 'coordination' be achieved13; how can
learning be extended from 'filling-in' pre-installed categories to the construction of
novel categories; should system structure change over time through reorganisation;
how should scaling14 of systems be achieved?
Summary
The field of 'situated robotics' is disparate and still young. Compared with the plethora
of theorising from situated stances implementations are sparse. Part of the reason for
this disparity is that the major emphases of situated theories, the contextual relevancy
of behaviour grounded in subjective, agent-centred representations and coordination of
perception and action, are not easily translated into clear prescriptions for design. The
lack of clarity of the situated perspective on the correct role, if any, for representations
only serves to aggravate the problem. Situated robotics, however, does demonstrate
that augmentation of purely reactive behaviour-based systems by local, agent-centred
representation can support more contextually relevant adaptive behaviour without risk-
13 Clancey (1995) has recently attacked situated robotic implementations for using stored representa¬
tions rather than reconstruction of coordination processes. In his view these should involve reacti¬
vation of neural networks that coordinate sensing and acting.
14 As with bb robotics, the aim of the approach is to work incrementally from simple to complex
artificial systems: to recapitulate evolution.
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ing the combinatorial explosions characteristic of classical Al.
However, many problems remain. How can such systems move from being generally
reactive towards internal control? Doing the right thing at the right time involves
internal as well as environmental criteria and the assessment of whether what has been
done is, in fact, right, requires interpretation of action in context. So far, situated
robotics has not begun to address this issue. Furthermore, systems should be able to
construct their own ontological categories through experience, and undergo internal
reorganisation throughout the life span. If the goal of artificial intelligence is the con¬
struction of complex artificial systems an adequate, and prescriptive, characterisation
of the biological targets is required.
We turn now to emergent approaches which strive to embody the arepresentational
coordination of perception and action suggested by some situated theorists, and the
internal reorganisational features of dynamic stances.
2.3.2 'Emergent' computation
The 'emergent' approaches — connectionism, artificial life and their conjunction, evo¬
lutionary robotics — share an interest in developmental questions, stress system-
environment interaction, and claim some biological plausibility. Although elements
lacking in either symbol-based or behaviour-based approaches, for example the capac¬
ity for change in system structure over time, are present, it is suggested that none
of these stances can, as currently instantiated, support the development of artificial
intelligent systems.
Connectionism
The connectionist approach originated with the analogy between the all-or-none rule
of neuronal firing and the binary logical units of computers which led to the descrip¬
tion (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) of a hypothetical artificial 'neural network' (henceforth
ANN). More recently coherent criticisms of the capacity of purely symbolic systems to
support complex (human-like) forms of cognition (Dreyfus, 1972; Winograd & Flores,
1986; Clancey, 1987; Rommetveit, 1987, for example) have led to explicit opposition
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to the dominant symbolic approach exemplified by Newell & Simon (1976) and a mo¬
tivation to demonstrate intelligent behaviour arising within a situated system with a
distributed system of representation.
Connectionism is often depicted by its advocates as a significant advance over the tra¬
ditional symbolic stance within Al. ANNS can be viewed analytically for their powers
of abstraction and regarded solely as devices for pattern extraction and classification
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943; Minsky & Papert, 1969; Marr, 1982) and also, more signifi¬
cantly, from a synthetic standpoint — as capable of mimicking some essential qualities
of human cognition such as generalisation, ambiguity tolerance, graceful degradation,
and content addressable memory (Smolensky, 1988; Clark, 1989) as well as providing
a more plausible biologically-rooted model of intelligence.
Connectionism moves the focus of interest within AI away from symbol systems and
heuristic search methods towards issues of adaptation. Unlike traditional forms of ar¬
chitecture within Al, ANNS do not construct a more or less detailed symbolic model of
the world but rather adapt directly to the world through experience (Luger & Stub-
blefield, 19986).
Implementation
A traditional neural network consists of a number of interlinked units ('neurones').
The connectivity of the network is generally instantiated randomly; the 'weights' of
excitatory or inhibitory links between units are modified in the light of experience
in accordance with a number of different learning functions. A unit becomes active
('fires') if the sum of its weights exceeds its activation threshold.
Traditional neural network architectures possess a number of layers: an input layer,
often a series of binary inputs to a number of units; one or more 'hidden' layers;
and an output layer, often directly connected to actuators, with binary output. The
performance of a standard neural network clearly depends upon two factors: (1) the
properties of the individual units within the network; and (2) the overall architecture
— connectivity, whether a given connection is inhibitory or excitatory, and choice of
learning algorithm. More recently, ANNS have been developed which constitute an
explicit attempt to incorporate ideas from dynamic systems theories (Beer & Gal-
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lagher, 1992; Cliff et al., 1993a; Harvey et al., 1993; Yamauchi & Beer, 1993), with
the assumption that the dynamic profiles of biological neural networks might be es¬
sential in the explanation of cognitive phenomena. These dynamical neural networks
possess features such as time-delays on connections between units, recurrent and direc-
tionally unrestricted connectivity, non-uniform activation functions, and deliberately
introduced noise. These kinds of networks are consequently capable of much richer
dynamics than those produced by traditional connectionist systems.
Networks are exposed to a training set of data (or experience in the world in the
case of robotic implementations) and produce an output. An error function deter¬
mines how weights should be altered and the process is repeated. Over the course of
training the network converges on its 'target' output. Typical learning algorithms are
back-propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986), reinforcement learning (Barto et al., 1995),
classifier systems (Booker et al., 1989), and self-organised maps (Kohonen, 1982). The
algorithm chosen imposes constraints on the nature of the architecture and the type
of supervision provided by the designer.
Analysis
The distributed form of representation peculiar to connectionist systems has been
argued (Harnad, 19905) to be one solution to the symbol grounding problem — through
grounding meaning in direct experience of the world. But is there a need for grounding
within connectionist architectures? ANN systems are capable of only implicit meaning
— the network is the system. Without modularising the system how can meaning be
made explicit? Incorporation of ANNS within a larger, hybridised architecture is one
solution. This would allow the implicit meaning lurking within the network to be made
explicit to the system at large.
A further consequence of this holistic structure is that, as for many classical symbolic
architectures, experiential domains cannot be segmented — systems are acontextual.
In the absence of explicit, contextual knowledge such systems lack the capacity for
both hierarchical and serial control. Although the structure of the network derives
from past experience, the behaviour of a network at a given time depends purely on
current environmental features. Such systems should be characterised, therefore, as
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reactive — behaviour is driven by changing external stimulation.
A further difficulty inherent within the connectionist approach is that the lack of sys¬
tem primitives to constrain growth trajectories means that novel behaviours cannot
be predicted in advance, restricting the explanatory role of connectionist models to a
posteriori modelling of behaviour (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a). Furthermore al¬
though connectionist theories aspire towards extendibility, the problem of the origin
of high-level (epistemic) competences remains (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Clark, 1989).
McGonigle & Chalmers (1996) argue that this is because ann models reflect a phylo-
genetically older and more simple form of neural inductive machinery which does not
scale up to more complex epistemic forms of adaptation that appear to rely on explicit
knowledge.
Summary
Connectionism constitutes an advance over traditional stances in its emphasis on
change in system structure over time through developmental and interactional pro¬
cesses. This frees the designer from exact specification of the system. However as
currently instantiated anns cannot support the kinds of explicit, contextual repre¬
sentation which underly adaptive internal control and their behaviour, therefore, is
determined by local environmental contingencies — they are reactive. The future of
connectionist architectures is within hybrid systems where, as encapsulated modules,
their implicit representations can come to mean for the remainder of the system.
Artificial life
The philosophical background of alife lies in evolutionary epistemology (Popper, 1959;
Campbell, 1974). Popper (1959) suggested that systems incorporate both explicit
and implicit knowledge and should be regarded as conjectures to be falsified against
their adaptive domains. The mechanism by which systems become progressively more
adaptive was, for Popper, neo-Darwinian evolution. So the evolution of the adaptive
knowledge embedded within a system occurs through a process of trial (mutation) and
error elimination (selection) — via a blind process of mutation and selection systems
become progressively more adaptive over time, alife seeks to simulate this process
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with the eventual goal of the emulation of complex competences.
von Neumann (1958) was the first to capture the essence of ALIFE in his attempt to
abstract the logical form of self-reproduction and subsequently demonstrate artificial
self-reproduction in cellular automata. Early ALIFE research which attempted to em¬
pirically investigate the functioning of random mutation and selection within simulated
artificial 'organisms' (Barricelli, 1962, 1979) was ignored until very recently (Dyson,
1998). More recently still genetic programming techniques have led to a vast area of
study with the explicit motivation of synthesising life ('strong ALIFE') within digital
computers (Langton, 1987, 1995) with the further aims of the construction of a general
theoretical biology, and the application of evolutionary methods to the development of
artificial intelligent systems.
The dominant methodology is based on the genetic programming algorithm (Holland,
1975; Koza, 1990). Initially a fitness function is determined. A random population
of artificial programs ('genes') is generated which code for 'phenotype' (for example,
sensor-actuator wiring). Next, iteration through program execution, assignment of
fitness value, generation of a new population and mutation leads to the target solution,
or termination after a pre-determined number of iterations. The implicit focus of ALIFE
is behavioural adaptation (Langton, 1995) as can be seen in the resulting systems which
are currently at a primitive stage; complex competences remain on the distant horizon.
ALIFE is often characterised as avoiding the problems of preinterpretation inherent
within symbol-based and behaviour-based stances. Prior knowledge is assumed not
to be present in genetic models although a critical implicit assumption, as with all of
western science, is the presence of environmental regularity (Christianini, 1995). A
more serious criticism concerns the design of fitness functions. The particular function
chosen determines which individuals will survive and evolve and consequently controls
the direction of the evolutionary process. At present there are few guidelines for the
choice of such functions which reflect the chosen target of the evolutionary process and,
therefore, the designer's desires.
Of course, synthesising artificial intelligent systems through emulation of neo-Darwinian
processes might be successful only if such processes are the driving force behind in-
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creased system complexity over time. This is a great area of controversy within contem¬
porary evolutionary biology. The difficulties15 of explaining the general trend towards
increasingly complexity in biological systems through neo-Darwinistic processes alone
(Barricelli, 1979; Goodwin, 1994, for examples) have led more recently to suggestions
for a number of supplementary mechanisms such as co-evolution16, and co-adaptation
and symbiogenesis17. Furthermore, one consequence of adopting a dynamic systems
perspective is that evolutionary mechanisms might merely serve to increase the rich¬
ness of the ontological lower bounds of the system with the critical force behind system
complexity being self-organisational processes over ontogenesis. Suggested mechanisms
include conflicting constraints18, meta-system transitions19, and combinatorial expan¬
sion and generative condensation20.
It is clearly critical that the trend towards complexity over phylogenesis is adequately
characterised for biological systems before attempts at its replication as a means of
developing complex artificial systems. Currently, with the exception of a small number
of studies (Cliff & Miller, 1996, for example), ALIFE has focussed on neo-Darwinistic
processes in isolation. The emphasis of the dynamic perspective on inherent self-
organisational processes as a critical force underlying progressive system development
over both phylogeny and ontogeny has yet to be influential within ALIFE. This must
be rectified if it is to make progress in its task.
Summary
10 Although see Bonner (1988) for a denial of the existence of any such difficulties.
16 The unpredictable results of interactions between systems, both within and across species, together
with the effects of the actions of systems on both their own, and others' niches has been suggested to
imply that any increase of complexity in one species (through neo-Darwinistic processes) will tend
to increase the complexity of the niches of others who will be forced to evolve more complex control
structures themselves in order to cope (Casti, 1979, for example). By repeated iterations of such a
process, systems might 'bootstrap' each other towards complexity.
17 Wimsatt (1972) has suggested that co-adaptation of internal mechanisms might lead to increased
complexity. Symbiogenesis (originally proposed by Merezhovsky in 1909, and developed by Kozo-
Polyansky in 1924) ascribes the complexity of cellular structure to a series of symbiotic associations
between simpler systems. This idea was extended by Barricelli (1962) who formulated a theory of
'symbioorganisms': self-reproducing structures constructed through symbiotic association of several
self-reproducing systems of any kind (Dyson, 1998).
18 Kauffman (1993) suggested that self-organisation depends critically upon the complexity of conflict¬
ing constraints over lower-level interactions.
19 Heylighen (1991) suggested that the complexity of organisms increases through the emergence of
meta-levels.
20 See section 2.1
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ALIFE represents, along with some connectionist models, an important advance. Devel¬
opment and environmental interaction are both fundamental. In principle at least the
designer is absolved from exact specification of design, and of end-point specification:
different primitives can be combined in order to see what emerges. This allows for
the development of unexpected (and arguably impossible to pre-design) adaptations.
However, although it strives for dynamism, subscribing to an emergent view of develop¬
ment at both ontogenetic (interaction of units leads to more complex behaviour) and,
of course, phylogenetic levels an exclusive focus on the behavioural adaptation of whole
systems may prove to be a serious weakness. Furthermore, exclusive concentration 011
neo-Darwinian processes might be found to lack biological plausibility.
It might be that a switch in focus from population-based phylogenetic adaptation to¬
ward individual ontogenetic adaptation would be the most promising future direction
for this stance. It is possible that, as argued by Mithen (1996), the evolution of inde¬
pendent domain specific modules is much more likely than a whole mind. Over millions
of years such intercommunicating units could be constructed which could cooperate to
perform increasingly more complex tasks21. Such an approach might also enable the
incorporation of representational elements within systems thus allowing ALIFE to avoid
many of the pitfalls of other behaviour-based approaches.
Evolutionary robotics
"Insects first, people later." (Cliff, 1991a)
As we saw in section 2.3.1, robotics inspired by situated theories constitutes a progres¬
sion from either behaviour-based or classical Al through its emphases on pragmatic
representation and situated action. However, work in robotics remains focussed on
systems whose processes exhibit stable organisation over time. Natural complex sys¬
tems, in contrast, self-organise over time, becoming increasingly more complex and
more adaptive. The major research area which seeks to embrace dynamicism within
the system is evolutionary robotics. To what extent might this methodology enable
the construction of artificial intelligent systems?
21 This view of mind is reminiscent of that of Minsky (1986).
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Evolutionary robotics seeks to apply artificial evolution to the control systems of au¬
tonomous mobile robots (Cliff et al., 19936; Harvey et al., 1994; Nolfi et al., 1994). The
'genotype' which is subject to evolution specifies the dynamical neural network con¬
troller (Kodjabachian & Meyer, 1998) and also sometimes physical structure such as
sensor and actuator characteristics (Cliff & Miller, 1996) and robot morphology (Lund
et al., 1997). Initially a random population of genotypes is generated, a pre-determined
fitness function selects the more successful controllers which then have a proportion¬
ally greater opportunity to contribute genetic material to subsequent generations. It
is hoped that adaptive behaviour will develop through a dual process of selection of
successful controllers over phylogeny, and by emergence over ontogeny through interac¬
tions both internal to the system, and between system and environment. The evolved
controller, therefore, coordinates perception and action, without representation as de¬
manded by situated cognition theorists such as Clancey (1995), to generate adaptive
behaviour (Cliff, 19916; Chiel k Beer, 1997).
The approach attempts to free the designer from specification of all system features
except task and fitness function. It is hoped that the problems associated with ex¬
plicit design of adaptive and appropriate coordination of behaviour will be overcome
by adoption of evolutionary and self-organising processes (Urzelai et al., 1998). The
behaviour of the system, as characterised by an observer, reflects the dynamic interac¬
tion of the coupled agent-environment system. Complexity of behaviour does not imply
corresponding complexity of internal control structures (see Simon 1962, Braitenburg
1984). Evolutionary robotics, it is argued (Nolfi, 1998, for example) frees the designer
from both behavioural decomposition by relying on evaluation of the whole system
and its global behaviour, and the problems inherent in designing appropriate system-
environment interactions. The system, it is hoped, will consequently be untainted by
the preinstalled ontology of its designer.
What kind of competences have been developed using this methodology? Some exam¬
ple implementations will now be briefly described.
• Harvey et al. (1994) evolved the control system for a robot which was trained
to visually discriminate between triangular and rectangular targets. The suc¬
cessful controller solved the task using information from only two pixels of the
CHAPTER 2. TWO CONTENDERS 67
camera. Presumably such a strategy was effective only through sensory-motor
coordination.
• Nolfi (1997) evolved the control system for a Khepera mobile robot with the
task being to discriminate walls and cylinders in the environment. It was found
that all evolved individuals solved the task by moving back and forth in front of
a perceived object. This was interpreted as problem solution through sensory-
motor coupling.
• Nolfi & Miglino (In press) evolved robots capable of reaching the upper right hand
and bottom left hand corner of a rectangular box starting from eight different
positions22. The evolved robots solved the task by differing the speed of the two
wheels which ensured that long and short walls were encountered at different
angles allowing the robot to reach the corners by either following or avoiding a
wall dependent on angle of incidence. Again sensory-motor coupling appeared to
enable solution of the task.
• Yamauchi &; Beer (1993) showed that evolved dynamical neural networks are
capable of successfully performing relatively abstract tasks involving sequential
behaviour. Their system generated a fixed sequence of outputs in response to a
series of external triggers.
Design
Evolutionary roboticists claim to have removed themselves almost entirely from the
design process. As few restrictions as possible are placed on the structure of a given
network; the designer simply computes a fitness function and retires. In practice, how¬
ever, in the vast majority of cases the designer determines the genotype to phenotype
mapping, the number of individuals in a population, mutation and crossover rates and,
in some cases, even the architecture of the controller. It has been argued (Nolfi, 1998,
for example) that since all these parameters might, in theory, be subject to the evolu¬
tionary process it is sufficient merely to modulate the selection criteria. Indeed, by only
modifying these criteria whilst holding all other parameters constant varying forms of
22 Modelled on an experimental task of Gallistel (1990) with rats.
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behaviour have been evolved from the same base system: obstacle avoidance (Floreano
& Mondada, 1994), exploration (Lund, 1996), navigation (Nolfi & Miglino, In press),
discrimination of different objects (Nolfi, 1997) and predator avoidance (Nolfi k Flo¬
reano, In press). All these competences are, however, relatively simple. We shall see
in the next section that in the attempt to construct systems capable of more complex
competences the designer often becomes more rather than less involved.
Scaling
Researchers within evolutionary robotics stress that through system-environment in¬
teraction agents evolve which exhibit adaptive behaviour. All these competences, how¬
ever, are both simple and under direct control of the environment. Even the most
advanced (Yamauchi k Beer, 1993) which demonstrates sequential behaviour, does so
only on the provision of appropriate environmental stimulation. How are such systems
to be scaled up to exhibit more complex behaviours?
Evolutionary roboticists (see Nolfi, 1998, for example) envisage three paths towards
increased complexity. The first is incremental development over phylogeny. Harvey
et al. (1997) suggest that selection criteria should be progressively modified by the
designer to impose increasing task requirements on the system and consequently, it
is hoped, produce more complex competences23. However, this solution demands the
supervision of the designer and risks reintroducing inappropriate constraints on the
solutions to tasks — something that this approach prides itself in avoiding.
A second solution is based on co-evolution (Casti, 1979; Dawkins k Krebs, 1979) which
leads, through self-organisation, to an evolutionary 'arms race': populations bootstrap¬
ping each other towards complexity. Preliminary investigations (Nolfi k Floreano, In
press) have shown that co-evolution of populations can generate solutions impossible to
evolve with one population. The task studied, however, was again simple: a predator
and prey scenario.
Evolutionary robotics, though, unlike ALIFE as a whole, also emphasises self-organisation
over the life-span as a critical driving force behind increased complexity. Where phy-
23 This concept is based on shaping (Skinner, 1938), and was applied to classifier systems by Dorigo &
Colombetti (1994, 1997). It is also analogous to the paradigm employed by McGonigle & Chalmers
(1998a) to motivate increasingly complex behaviours over ontogeny in primate.
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logenetic scaling relies on selection of the whole system, once, according to relatively
gross criteria, ontogenetic development can, in theory, take advantage of the rich in¬
formation available in the environment to provide feedback on the effectiveness of
behaviour leading ultimately to increased adaptiveness.
Preliminary studies (Ackley & Littman, 1991; Nolfi &; Parisi, 1997, for example) used a
fixed architecture split into two sub-networks. The first determined how to respond to
a given sensory state; the second generated a teaching signal for the first. The weights
of the two sub-networks were subjected to an evolutionary process. Results seemed
to indicate that systems were able to learn over ontogenesis by translating sensory
information into useful teaching signals. Similar results were found for networks with
evolving topologies but which learn over ontogenesis through unsupervised learning
(Miller & Todd, 1990) and architectures in which the evolutionary mechanism selects
different learning rules for different connections (Floreano & Mondada, 1996).
Again however, the competences learned through such processes were limited to sensory-
motor coordination. Complex competences were neither evolved nor learned. A serious
problem with this approach for evolutionary robotics is that systems are incapable of
determining for themselves using internal criteria the utility of their actions yet the
information present in the environment only indirectly specifies how successful given
actions are. Indeed at the present time no evidence has been presented to indicate that
the addition of learning mechanisms to evolved robot control systems results in more
complex competences than evolution alone (Nolfi, 1998).
A third approach is to attempt to mimic the developmental (morphogenetic) prop¬
erties of biological systems. The implicit assumption appears to be a view that this
might hold the key to developing more complex competences through increasing the
interactional complexity within the system: richer system dynamics might provide the
scope for increased self-organisation leading to more adaptive systems. Natural biolog¬
ical systems are evolvable — random variations can sometimes produce improvement.
Evolvability depends on the mapping of the variation within the genotype to that in
the phenotype (Wagner & Altenberg, 1996). The most simple mapping is one-to-one
where one gene codes for one feature of the system. Evolutionary robotics includes:
one-many mappings (Floreano & Mondada, 1994, for example); recursive instructions
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for growth which are applied to their own results, analogous to cell duplication and
differentiation (Kodjabachian & Meyer, 1998); and genotypes which can vary in length
(Harvey, 1992). These attempts to more accurately model the workings of biological
evolution are still in their infancy but little indication that more accurate modelling
of biological evolution in this way leads to the development of more complex systems
has been reported.
Currently the competences evolved within this paradigm remain low-level. Maybe this
is partly to do with the time involved in conducting such experiments on real robots
(Mataric & Cliff, 1996) and, indeed, Nolfi (1998) suggests that ultimately this might
prevent the paradigm ever scaling up to more complex behaviours. Notwithstanding
this pragmatic difficulty more serious problems exist. As with alife it remains unclear
how to select effective evaluative criteria for the whole system, and whether progres¬
sive system development can be achieved through evolutionary mechanisms alone. A
tacit recognition of this problem has inspired hybrid systems designed to also allow
ontogenetic development but currently the competences learned by such systems re¬
main low-level. Furthermore, the reliance of evolutionary robotics on dynamic neural
network architectures renders it susceptible to the same criticism levelled against con-
nectionism: lack of explicit, contextual knowledge makes the system reliant on external
triggers rather than internal control.
Summary
Evolutionary robotics strives to develop adaptive artificial systems through evolution¬
ary and ontogenetic, neural network based, self-organisational mechanisms. As such it
shares the benefits of connectionism and alife: a focus on developmental and interac¬
tive processes. However, it is also subject to the same criticisms: excessive reactivity
and an inability to scale.
Summary of emergent approaches
Connectionism, alife, and their conjunction evolutionary robotics, all share an impor¬
tant emphasis on system reorganisation over time through processes of environmental
interaction which was lacking within both classical and behaviour-based al. Connec-
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tionist systems adapt directly to the world through experience and may indeed be one
method of resolving the symbol-grounding problem as Harnad (19906, 1995) suggests.
However such systems lack explicit, contextual knowledge and therefore the means for
adaptive internal control. Within ALIFE the focus on the evolution of reactive behaviour
neglects the importance of control exerted from within the system. Furthermore, the
ability of neo-Darwinistic processes, in isolation, to support the progressive adaptation
of whole systems, as opposed to domain specific sub-systems, is unclear. Evolution¬
ary robotics combines the best and worse of both prior approaches yet despite initial
optimism systems remain at a primitive level of adaptation.
Some of these difficulties, however, might be surmounted by incorporation within hy¬
bridised systems. The scenario might include evolutionary methods being used for be¬
havioural adaption, search, and perceptuo-motor coupling; ANNS could ground knowl¬
edge within limited domains that could be made explicit to the remainder of the system.
2.4 Summary: two contenders
We saw in chapter one that the symbol-based stances attempted to characterise and
replicate the competences of complex biological systems. Many problems arose how¬
ever, due to the mischaracterisation of a logical, symbolic competence. The artificial
systems inspired by this mischaracterisation were slow and unreactive. Behaviour-
based approaches attempted to rectify this problem by focusing on tightly-coupled,
'emergent' reactive competences with the aim of eventually scaling-up to complexity.
Serious problems arose: these emergent competences had to be engineered after appro¬
priate and accurate decomposition; and attempts to scale systems were unsuccessful.
Attempts to hybridise these two approaches provided little extra headway.
The emergent stances have become popular as possible solutions to these problems.
Maybe focusing on system-environment, and internal system interactions might pro¬
vide a way out of the impasse. Systems became characterised as fundamentally coupled
to their environments; representation was reduced to non-manipulable system-centred
information or discarded altogether in favour of direct transactions between system
and environment. Situated robots seemed to demonstrate that low-level adaptive be-
CHAPTER 2. TWO CONTENDERS 72
haviours could be achieved in the absence of global, symbolic, manipulable represen¬
tations; their behaviour, however, remained highly reactive. Connectionist, alife, and
evolutionary robotic approaches stressed the dynamics of inter-system and system-
environment interaction leading to self-organisation of competences over time. These
approaches, though, have currently supported only relatively simple competences and
are finding it difficult to scale to more complex abilities.
It seems that in the desperation to escape from the lumbering systems of classical Al
the headlong rush into a-representational, reactive systems, albeit well coordinated and
coupled to adaptive niches, has served primarily to lead us away from both character¬
ising, through synthesising, the complex intelligent systems that are, or should be, the
research targets of psychology and artificial intelligence. As we shall see in the next
chapter such systems are well-coupled to their environments and do self-organise over
the life-span, they are also, however, capable of high-levels of internal control and not
merely reactive.
The next chapter describes a research programme which strives to characterise intelli¬
gent biological systems as they self-organise towards ever-more complex competences
over the life span. This analysis reveals a number of important properties of such





We have seen that both symbol-based and behaviour-based characterisations have
failed to deliver intelligent artificial systems, and that neither dynamic nor situated
perspectives provide clear design principles for artificial systems, and have consequently
failed to resolve the impasse. It appears that in the attempt to develop artificial sys¬
tems which are robust, reactive and behaviourally adaptive we have lost sight of the
complex biological systems which should be our experimental targets.
If we are to construct artificial intelligent systems characterisations of the diversity of
natural systems are required. Where should we look for such biological characterisa¬
tions? This chapter briefly examines comparative research. Here, again, an impasse
has been reached between symbol-based and behaviour-based characterisations which
suggests that new approaches towards fractionating biological systems are required.
Next, a characterisation of complex biological systems informed by situated and dy¬
namic perspectives is described. Central to the characterisation is the notion of the
self-organisation of competences by agents on open-ended growth trajectories toward
maximally economic information-handling strategies. Although the behaviour of these
systems can be well characterised in the absence of logical or symbolic competences,
their behaviour is not reactive but is rather generated by rational principles.
The characterisation suggests a number of critical design features for artificial systems.
Following this description a number of implementations inspired by the biological char-
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acterisation, precursors of the architecture presented in chapter 4. are reviewed.
3.1 Biological characterisation
3.1.1 Characterising adaptive behaviour and fractionating biological
systems
Reverse engineering of intelligence manifestly requires good characterisation of our bi¬
ological targets. Comparative research should lead to descriptions of the diversity of
biological systems allowing us to fractionate their differing capabilities and potential:
which design features distinguish systems which remain at purely reactive behavioural
levels of adaptation over the lifespan and those capable of epistemic growth over onto¬
genesis? The past century of comparative research, however, has failed to adequately
fractionate systems. Why?
An impasse
Comparative study of biological systems grew from the evolutionary approach of Spencer
(1855) and Darwin (1859, 1871) who both maintained that the search for the origins of
human intelligence must involve attempting to find its precursors and analogues within
the animal kingdom. Early researchers (Romanes, 1882; Yerkes, 1916, for example) as¬
sumed a continuity of adaptation from the lowest organisms to humans. A range of
species were observed to exhibit intelligent behaviour but such characterisations were
anecdotal and attributive; few paradigms existed within which to experimentally assay
the capacities of species.
Criticisms of the method of early researchers (Morgan, 1894; Thorndike, 1898, for
example) combined with a desire for repeated observation and objective methods of
experimentation set the scene for the rise of behaviourism. We have already seen (sec¬
tion 1.3.1) that, for the behaviourists, tightly-coupled reflexes, trial and error learning,
and operant conditioning became the indexical system competences. Associative learn¬
ing was thought to underly adaptation in all species, in all contexts (Hull, 1945). Be¬
haviourism culminated in the assertion of Skinner (1957) that even the ontogenesis of
human language, the epitome of intelligent behaviour, could be explained through be-
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haviour shaping, and that 'verbal behaviour' constituted the only significant difference
between humans and other animals.
We have also seen (section 1.1.1) that cognitivism arose motivated by the inability
of behaviourism to characterise high-level human competence — especially language.
Few psychologists accepted Skinner's (1957) analysis. Surely the richness of the human
mind could not have arisen entirely through incremental additions of primitive reflexes?
Cognitivism, instead, inspired by the failure of behaviourism to satisfactorily account
for linguistic competence, adopted language as the indexical system competence and a
key explanatory concept. Humans were qualitatively different from other animals: the
logical manipulation of language-like stored representations underlay the complexities
of human thought and behaviour.
Threatened by this cognitive revolution, behaviourism retreated and became 'ani¬
mal learning' still essentially behaviourist in methodology and outlook (see Macphail,
1982, and Mackintosh, 1983, for example) but making no claim to adequately charac¬
terise human competence. Although the possession of language distinguished humans
from other animals, no real differences pertained between these others (Warren, 1965;
Macphail, 1982, for example). The indexical system competence remained a highly op¬
timised (Gallistel, 1995) associationistic learning mechanism, its operation dependent
on the tight spatio-temporal contiguity of events (McGonigle &; Chalmers, 1996) —
despite early criticisms (Lashley, 1929; Maier &; Schneirla, 1935) that such a mecha¬
nism, in isolation, could not underly the variety of adaptive behaviours. Focus on this
mechanism alone, rooted in phylogenetically more ancient areas of the nervous system
(Mishkin & Petri, 1984), meant that the range of inductive mechanisms utilised by
systems were left ignored. Furthermore, the abstraction of system behaviour to unnat-
uralistic laboratory settings meant that the contextual operation and predictive qual¬
ities of reinforcing stimuli (Rescorla, 1971) have also been relatively under-examined.
So, as mentioned previously (section 1.3.1), the narrowing of the inductive space char¬
acteristic of behaviourist paradigms, and their focus on tightly-coupled, easily modi¬
fiable behaviours abstracted away from their ecological setting, meant that they were
incapable, in principle, of capturing the richness of situated adaptive behaviour and
consequently of fractionating the varying capacities of different species.
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So currently we have an impasse: on one hand symbol grinding humans imbued with
the capacity for thought and language, and on the other the levelling of the remainder
of the animal kingdom, differing only quantitatively in the speed of, and potential for,
association formation. And between these two 'an unbridgeable gap' (McGonigle &
Chalmers, 1996). Within the vast majority of contemporary psychology the impasse
remains: the focus of cognitivism is abstract, disembodied, ruleful manipulation of
symbolic representations, and that of animal learning the associative principles of be¬
havioural modification. Cognitivism1 ignores the origins of cognition; animal learning
paradigms cannot fractionate species, nor explain the ontogenesis of intelligence.
3.1.2 The view from biology
How are we to adequately characterise the adaptiveness of biological systems; and
where should we look for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins of adaptive intelligent
behaviour? Cognitivism rarely motivates such inquiry yet behaviourism is incapable of
characterising the richness of adaptive behaviour, and consequently cannot fractionate
non-human species, nor explain the ontogenesis of cognition.
The alternative comparative paradigm, ethology, founded on the observation of species
within their natural habitats, had identified both commonalities and differences among
species. Biological systems were observed to differ both in their endowment of instincts
(Tinbergen, 1951, for example) and their capacity for learning (Tinbergen, 1951, 1960;
Bateson, 1990). Associationistic mechanisms were observed to form part of the com¬
plement of the adaptive machinery of systems yet even these, when operating in their
ecological setting, were non-arbitrary2 — dependent on the existing behavioural reper¬
toire of a system (Lorenz, 1935; Bateson & Klopfer, 1982; Hinde, 1982), and influenced
by both internal and external contextual factors (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1973).
Systems seemed to be in possession of a range of learning mechanisms, optimised for
a variety of contexts, and in operation at differing parts of their life-cycle (Tinbergen,
1952). Adaptive behaviour was seen to be inherently sequential, from locomotor be¬
haviour to courtship, nest building and ultimately language. Instinctive behaviours
1 With, of course, the notable exception of Piaget (1971).
2 Behaviourist research was predominantly concerned with the learning of arbitrary relations between
stimuli and reinforcers (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996).
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seemed to be 'triggered1 by both internal and external 'releasers', and varied in their
susceptibility to modification through learning. Yet although ethologists had con¬
cluded that systems avail of a multitude of learning mechanisms, recruited as and
when needed, and characterised the richness of sequential adaptive behaviour, their
lack of both clearly prescriptive theories and rigorous experimental method meant
that each of their findings could be met with post-hoc, counter arguments from the
behaviourists.
More recently, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuroethology, situated within an
evolutionary perspective and computationally informed, have once again begun to chal¬
lenge the prevalent associationism of psychology and animal learning. Although neu¬
roscience has been dominated by an incremental view of species differences based,
essentially, on a 'bigger is better' characterisation of the evolution of the nervous sys¬
tem (Geschwind & Levitsky, 1968; Passingham, 1982, for example), this is beginning
to give way before an onslaught of evidence which suggests that phylogeny results in
neuronal reconstruction and specialisation (Williamson et al., 1993; Gazzaniga et al.,
1998, for example). Furthermore, Lashley's (1951) focus on the serial order of be¬
haviour, and its underlying neural substrate(s) is once again receiving more interest
within the neurosciences (Berridge & Wishaw. 1992; Aldridge et al., 1993; Colombo
et al., 1993, for example).
The origins of adaptive behaviour
Within the neurosciences, the incremental view of the phylogeny of intelligence is being
replaced by an appreciation of the range of adaptive specialisations (Gazzaniga et al.,
1998) which underly species differences. Learning across the animal kingdom cannot
be reduced to the operation of a small number of highly optimised associationistic
principles, as maintained by the behaviourists. Rather, species possess a range of prob¬
lem specific learning mechanisms (Marler, 1991), each computationally specialised for
solving particular problems, and applicable in some contexts but not others (Gallistel,
1995).
We can now begin to fractionate biological systems. All animals are not equal; rather
they possess different adaptive specialisations subserved by functionally distinct neu-
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ronal regions (Gazzaniga et al., 1998). Qualitative differences between human and the
remainder of the animal kingdom certainly exist; as they do between different members
of that kingdom, reflecting their varying evolutionary histories. As Waddington (1969)
maintained:
"The main issue of evolution is how populations deal with unknown fu¬
tures." (Waddington, 1969, p. 278)
The maintenance of life over successive generations is a problem of induction. The so¬
lution of the problem requires systems to be adaptive in the face of an uncertain world.
Species differ because their different evolutionary histories present differing evidential
bases from which to 'induce1 the future. Unfolding of systems over morphogenesis is
sensitive to environmental conditions (Dobzhansky, 1947) providing a little flexibility
in the construction of the ontological lower bounds of the system. This lower bound
consists of a set of reactive, system-preserving instincts, together with a complement of
learning mechanisms3 which, through epigenetic and intra-system interactions, allow
the system to adapt to an unpredictable world.
The adaptive value of learning
Biological systems must deal with uncertain futures. To this end, evolution has pro¬
vided them with both 'instinctive' system-preserving reflexes and a variety of inductive
mechanisms. These inductive mechanisms range from those optimised for associating
stimuli linked closely in space and time, to more abstract and, critically, productive
mechanisms (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988).
A fundamental difference between simple and complex biological systems is that they
possess qualitatively different inductive mechanisms (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1996).
Whereas the ability of simple systems to manage the future is highly limited, complex
systems possess inductive mechanisms whose operation does not merely support the
recapitulation of acquired knowledge and competence, but is generative — allowing
3 Plotkin (1988) speculates that approximately five percent of species possess adaptive learning mech¬
anisms in addition to instincts.
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generalisation of acquired skills and experiences to related phenomenon and into new
domains of competence.
So we see that systems differ in respect of their lower bounds. These lower bounds
reflect the differing evolutionary histories of species: they are 'designed' both to reflect
future environmental conditions 'induced' by the evolutionary mechanism whilst mak¬
ing a provision for flexibility in the face of uncertainty. The outcome of these learning
mechanisms, associative and non-associative, over ontogenesis critically depends on the
experience of the individual system.
The seriality of adaptive behaviour
"I have devoted so much time to [...] the problem of syntax [...] because
the problems raised by the organization of language seem to me to be
characteristic of almost all other cerebral activity [...] Not only speech,
but all skilled acts seem to involve the same problems of serial ordering,
even down to the temporal coordination [of] such a movement as reaching
and grasping. Analysis of the nervous mechanisms underlying order in the
more primitive acts may contribute ultimately to the solution even of the
physiology of logic." (Lasldey, 1951, p. 122)
The rich observational data provided by ethology clearly demonstrates that many, if not
the majority of, serial behaviours are not dependent on moment to moment response
to a serially ordered environment, nor blindly consequent upon previous actions, but
rather depend upon organising principles by which systems are capable of internal
control of behaviour. All systems with any degree of parallel perceptual input, or
of commonly 'triggered' behaviours face the problem of response scheduling: how to
determine which, of a range of possible actions, to immediately perform and which to
hold in abeyance. Serial order is therefore not unique to language but rather many
systems must be in possession of mechanisms which select and schedule responses
activated in parallel.
What are the mechanisms underlying such serial control; how do systems syntactically
recombine their behaviours to achieve their goals; what mechanisms underly selection
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and arbitration of different behaviours; and how are behavioural sequences learned?
Despite the ubiquity of serial behaviours throughout the animal kingdom, the majority
of research on serial competence has focused on human language and other cognitive
processes such as memory. What kind of explanations have been provided for such
serial competences?
Skinner's 'Verbal behaviour' (1957) attempted to account for linguistic competence
using standard behaviourist chaining mechanisms, where each element in a series of
actions provides the excitation for the next. Although initial formulations were crit¬
icised by Lashley (1951) for being context-insensitive, current behaviourist-inspired
research, including animal learning, remains entrenched in an associationistic view of
serial behaviour, albeit with the addition of some contextual features to basic associa¬
tive mechanisms (Wickelgren, 1969, for example)4. Despite these elaborations it has
become increasingly clear that association chaining does not accurately characterise
serial system performance, especially in cognitive domains (Rosenbaum, 1991; Henson
et a/., 1996, for example). Furthermore, associationistic mechanisms do not address
a number of fundamental features of systems' serial competence such as their ability
for syntactic recombination of behaviours and their mechanisms of internal arbitration
which require contextual interpretation of behavioural success and default.
Cognitivist accounts, on the other hand, tend to rely on symbolic primitives to explain
serial, grammatical linguistic competence. Theoretical linguistics, primarily concerned
with the internal representation of serial order ('competence') rather than its execution
('performance'), relies on primitives such as strings, and ordered sets, which are used to
construct descriptions of grammars (Houghton & Hartley, 1995)°. Unfortunately, when
symbolic primitives are abandoned, the problems of serial order once more become
intractable (Houghton, 1990; Shallice et al., 1995). Consequently cognitive science
remains without a grounded theory of serial competence at a neuropsychological level.
Cognitively inspired neuropsychological accounts, when advanced, focus on specialised
linguistic circuitry (Chomsky, 1957, for example) which have no purchase on serial
4 Which have more recently inspired neural network models of serial control (Jordan, 1986; Rumelhart
et al., 1986; Seidenberg k McClelland, 1989; Elman, 1990, for example).
5 Analogously, classical Al utilises similar symbolic primitives in conjunction with techniques of recur¬
sive serial processing.
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behaviour per se. The cognitive focus on serial competence as a distinctly linguistic
phenomena together with its linguistically-biased experimental methodology makes it
extremely difficult for cognitive accounts to disentangle ordering from language.
More recently parallel activation models, as initially proposed by Lashley (1951), have
become popular once again. Lashley (1951) had considered a hierarchy of internal
mechanisms capable of restructuring behaviour at multiple levels of abstraction. He
suggested that the production of serial behaviour involves the parallel activation of a
set of actions which together comprise some 'chunk' of possible actions. Responses are
therefore internally activated before being externally triggered; a 'schema for action'
serves to select which responses from a 'chunk' are produced at a given time — to
serially order behaviour. A range of models, have been inspired by Lashley's views, in¬
cluding simple response competition with associated 'strengths' (Shallice, 1972) and ac¬
tivation gradients (Estes, 1972; Grossberg, 1978; Mackay, 1987); response competition
under internal modulation such as competitive queueing (Glasspool, 1985; Houghton,
1990; Burgess & Hitch, 1992), and other parallel models (Houghton & Hartley, 1995,
for a review). These models, however, remain primarily linguistic in focus.
We see that serial behaviours are ubiquitous — how can they be disentangled from
language; is the ability to syntactically recombine action pre-linguistic and, if so, what
are the precursors of 'grammar'; does seriality of behaviour rest on a unique order¬
ing mechanism or do task-specific, specialised mechanisms underly different ordering
competences as suggested by recent cognitive neuropsychological accounts (Gazzaniga
et ai, 1998, for example); and how do systems select between competing responses?
Summary
In order to replicate the intelligent systems we see around us we need both:
• Accurate characterisations of adaptive behaviour in its ecological setting:
— which competences are open to modification?
— what are the effects of internal and external contexts?
— how are behaviours sequenced?
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• Accurate characterisations of differences in the ontological lower bounds of bio¬
logical systems:
- what kinds of reflexive, or 'instinctive' behaviours do systems possess; what
are their functions?
- what kind of inductive mechanisms do species possess?
• Accurate assays of the ontogenesis of biological systems:
- in what internal and external contexts do inductive mechanisms operate?
- how do species' inductive mechanisms interact with environments of differing
complexity in order to scaffold the system?
We have seen that the behaviourist focus, now exemplified in contemporary animal
learning paradigms, 011 an optimised inductive mechanism effective only for events
closely linked in space and time has resulted in a relative neglect of complex adap¬
tive behaviour. Associationistic mechanisms alone do not underlie progressive system
adaptation over ontogenesis, but rather form only part of a complement of adaptive
specialisations. The focus of cognitivism on linguistic competence tends to neglect the
origins of intelligence and, relies on symbolic primitives, preinterpretation, or pecu¬
liarly human neurolinguistic machinery to account for such abilities. In-between we
appear to have an "unbridgeable gap' (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996).
Turning to biology we find rich characterisations of the varieties of adaptive behaviour
originating from ethological research. System behaviour is inherently ordered in space
and time, 'grammatical' sequencing of productions exists throughout the animal king¬
dom and is not a peculiarly linguistic phenomenon. Systems differ in the range of
inductive mechanisms at their disposal. Learning mechanisms are many and var¬
ied; computationally optimised for different contexts, internal and external. Cogni¬
tive neuroscience informs us that these adaptive specialisations are subserved by spe¬
cialised neuronal circuitry: phylogeny primarily results in qualitative changes in system
lower bounds rather than progressive incrementation of existing circuitry. These lower
bounds constrain the developmental trajectories open to systems through both inter-
system, and system-environment interactions.
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Only when the questions above have been answered will we able to begin to address the
fundamental issue: which differences in ontological lower bounds allow some systems
to become increasingly more adaptive over ontogenesis, culminating for some in ab¬
stract knowledge, whilst others remain limited to the refinement of tight sensory-motor
couplings.
The next section outlines an experimental paradigm, unique in both theoretical motiva¬
tion and success, which strives to address the comparative and developmental questions
outlined above. As a result this paradigm provides the potential for much richer char¬
acterisations of intelligent biological systems with which to inspire reverse engineering
than both the mischaracterised logico-deductive end-state of traditional cognitivism
and the one-mechanism associationism of behaviour-based approaches.
3.1.3 A new perspective on the origins of complex systems
The research programme of McGonigle and Chalmers at Edinburgh constitutes the
most comprehensive current attempt to address the phylogenetic and ontogenetic ori¬
gins of complex systems. The research, now in its third decade, conjoins develop¬
mental and comparative assays of species, from a dynamic perspective which stresses
longitudinal observation of individual systems over ontogenesis. The experimental
paradigms developed within this programme seek to assess the capacity of systems
to self-regulate their behaviour, in essence scaffolding themselves, "learning to learn',
in the face of incrementation of task difficulty. Their findings allow us to fraction¬
ate different species, individual systems over ontogenesis, and to assess the generative
benefits of non-associative, non-arbitrary inductive mechanisms.
Methodology and perspectives
Tasks and subjects
McGonigle & Chalmers' research programme centres on the relational abilities of sys¬
tems. They speculate (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996) that there may be at least two
fundamental types of learning mechanism: (1) a phylogenetically more ancient asso¬
ciative inductive mechanism — such a mechanism is inductively weak as it requires
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events to be closely linked in both space and tixne and is unable to distinguish arbi¬
trary from non-arbitrary connectives; and (2) a phylogenetically more recent relational
mechanism that allows systems to perceive the non-arbitrary links between events, and
enables generative strategies.
Initially research centred around reinterpretation of system performance on the stan¬
dard five term transitive inference task (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977; Chalmers &
McGonigle, 1984; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984, for example) but has since diversified
to investigate the seriation and categorisation skills of systems (McGonigle & Chalmers,
1993; McGonigle et al., 1994, for example). The results of these studies have prompted
reviews of the fundamental operating assumptions, conclusions, and implications of tra¬
ditional cognitive, developmental, and comparative research (McGonigle & Chalmers,
1996, 1998a, In press6, for example).
The systems assayed over the course of this research include human, brown capuchin
monkey (Cebus apella), squirrel monkey (Gen. SAlMIRl), and pigeon (Colurnba livid).
A dynamic, life-historical approach
It was suggested above (section 2.1.3) that one of the most critical contributions of
the dynamic perspective is the emphasis on the constraints imposed by the ontological
lower bounds of a system on its potential ontogenetic trajectories. We have seen that
part of the endowment of biological systems is a complement of inductive mechanisms,
;design primitives', which provide flexibility for an unpredictable future. This ontolog¬
ical lower bound ultimately constrains the kind of growth trajectories available to a
system through inter-system and system-environment interactions.
The richness of this lower bound is a critical feature for fractionating different bio¬
logical systems. William James (1981) speculated that humans possess more instincts
than other animals and indeed this turns out to be close to the truth — as McGonigle
& Chalmers (1996) suggest, the richness of that part of the ontological lower bounds of
a system that is its complement of adaptive, inductive mechanisms determines its on¬
togenetic growth potential. The greater the number of inductive mechanisms a system
possesses the greater its scope for development. This analysis enables us to relate the
ontogenesis of systems to their lower bound condition and thus allows fractionation of
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systems at multiple levels of analysis.
This approach, then, necessitates a life-historical, longitudinal characterisation of sys¬
tems. Furthermore, unlike traditional learning paradigms which demand only that
systems learn arbitrary connections between events separated only by short spatio-
temporal intervals, and take little account of the experiential history of a system, this
paradigm strives to determine how the inductive mechanisms of a system interact over
ontogenesis with tasks of increasing difficulty to result in progressive adaptation. The
ancestry of this approach can be traced back to Harlow (1949) who had realised that
performance even on classic behaviourist tasks was to some extent dependent on the
life history of a subject. He speculated that trial and error learning might lead over
ontogenesis to 'insightful' behaviour; his work on learning sets seemed to indicate pro¬
gressive improvements in performance which led him to speculate that his subjects
were, in fact, •'learning how to learn" (Harlow, 1949, p. 53).
Ontogenesis involves interaction: both within a system and between that system and
its environment. Growth is dually constrained by the richness of the lower bounds
of a system, and the richness of the environment to which it is exposed. In order,
therefore, to fractionate systems over ontogenesis a rich, and increasingly complex,
environment must be provided. Only then will it be possible to accurately assay what
inductive mechanisms 'buy' a system. McGonigle & Chalmers' paradigm achieves what
Harlow (1949) could not manage: a hierarchy of tasks of progressive difficulty to which
systems are exposed over ontogenesis and, therefore, provides a rigorous methodology
for observing the generative (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) benefits of adaptive mechanisms.
Self-regulation
We have seen that over ontogenesis interactions both internal to a system, and be¬
tween system and environment underly growth. The research reported here depicts
the development of systems in the absence of selective reward (McGonigle & Chalmers,
1998a). This is a critical point for it implies that the driving force behind growth for
these systems is internal.
Presented with tasks that feature items to be ordered where some orderings are inher¬
ently more 'rational' than others, such as monotonic versus arbitrary colour sequences,
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both human and non-human primate systems appear to very rapidly avail themselves of
these constraining features. The sole advantage of doing so is economical: by utilising
ruleful constraints present within a data set a system achieves the "most behaviour for
the least effort". The knowledge trajectory for epistemic agents (human and monkey)
seems to be based on the degree of constraint present within a given decision space,
rather than with the construction, and manipulation of ever more abstract levels of
input (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a, p. 514). Evaluation of behaviour based on an
economy criterion appears to constitute part of the ontological lower bounds of sys¬
tems providing, as McGonigle & Chalmers (1998a) suggest, a means of surviving, and
maximally exploiting, their formative learning experiences.
Evidence strongly suggests, therefore, that systems are internally regulating, using an
inbuilt rather than externally imposed performance metric, towards maximally eco¬
nomic, generative, information handling strategies for dealing with ever-larger search
spaces.
Rational constraints on development
"The number of non-trivial solutions to the problem of complexity may be
finite and may, indeed, reduce to one." (McGonigle, 1987)
It was mentioned above that systems appear to utilise whatever information-reducing
constraints are present within a search space whenever possible. Such a fact reinforces
one of the underlying operating assumptions of McGonigle & Chalmers' research pro¬
gramme: that the dynamics of (epistemic) growth possess an inherent rationale.
In common with a growing movement in favour of rational analysis of task constraints
on the nature of their solution (Oaksford & Chater, 19986, is a recent collection),
McGonigle &: Chalmers argue that analysis of system performance must be informed
by appreciation of the informatic demands of tasks.
Findings and interpretations
A relational primitive?
CHAPTER 3. THE SYNTHETIC STANCE 87
Evidence that a perceptual relational ability might form part of the lower bound arma¬
ment of non-human primate was discovered by McGonigle & Jones (1978). They found
that performance on relational discrimination tasks was superior to that on those re¬
quiring absolute discrimination. Furthermore, this finding was robust in the the face of
introduced contextual variation leading them to conclude that a perceptual relational
ability was irreducible to any lower level of competence.
More recently McGonigle & Chalmers have argued for the primacy of relational skills
on a priori grounds. A relational competence is logically, and must be ontogenetically,
prior to absolute discrimination since:
"Only by comparing and contrasting stimuli from a known set can the
defining features logically and inductively be determined." (McGonigle &
Chalmers, 1998 a)
Relational primitives, therefore, can be seen as contextual learning devices which enable
object definition in a given location by supporting active comparative and contrastive
interrogation in order to extract the logically defining features of a set of objects
(Garner, 1962; McGonigle & Jones, 1978; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a).
A relational competence, then, might be fundamental to intelligent systems. Against
the grain of much psychological research over the past century (Spence, 1949; Inhelder
& Piaget, 1964; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971, for example) which conflated relational with
linguistic ability6, evidence suggests that relational skills are pre-linguistic reflecting
a rational design primitive of intelligent systems which supports later ordinal, serial,
and classificatory competences (Tversky, 1969; McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1998a). A
relational competence appears to be a rational, adaptive mechanism utilised by systems
in the context of certain problems. How much of seemingly 'logical' competence can
be explained through operation of this primitive, and to what extent can multiple
relational codes be derived?
Reinterpreting transitivity: rationality vs. logic
6 Which, of course, begs the question of the origin of meaning for relational linguistic terms (Lashley,
1951; Bryant, 1974; Haugeland, 1985; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a).
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The transitive inference task has been widely accepted as a measure of the under¬
standing of necessity (Piaget, 1953, 1955) through the logical coordination of internal
symbolic representations (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971, for example). How then are we
to interpret evidence which suggests that four year old children (Lawrenson & Bryant,
1972), squirrel monkey (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977) and even pigeon (Terrace &
McGonigle, 1994) are capable of solving transitive inference problems?
Rather than ascribing a logical competence to such subject groups, McGonigle &
Chalmers (1996) concluded that the ability to order items transitively must be pre-
logical and, in fact, reflects the operation of the relational primitive mentioned above.
Solution of the standard "transitive inference' task is possible through a strategy which
generates rational, seemingly truly transitive choice, yet which does not depend on the
logical coordination of premises. This conclusion is supported by evidence that the
production system model developed by Harris & McGonigle (1994) developed, after a
short learning curve, perfect 'transitivity'.
In addition to 'transitive' abilities, hierarchical competences traditionally indexed by
class inclusion (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964) and use of quantifiers (Johnson-Laird, 1983)
are generally interpreted as linguistically based reflecting a subject's understanding,
through coordinative mechanisms, of the task demands. However evidence suggests
that this competence, too, is based on the system's generation of economic, informa¬
tion management procedures (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a) which presuppose no
logical abilities on the part of the agent whatsoever. Hierarchical structure underlies
rational, efficient information storage and manipulation by helping to minimise the
combinatorial problem (Newell et al., 1958; Sokal, 1974).
The dominant characterisation of representation within psychology is, as we have seen
(section 1.1.1) that of language-like internal symbols. Phenomena such as the symbolic
distance effect (Potts, 1972) have been widely interpreted as evidence for a logically-
coordinated seriated internal structure (Paivio, 1975; Trabasso et al., 1975, for exam¬
ple). Contrary to such interpretations, McGonigle k. Chalmers' (1984, 1994) findings of
binary transitive choice in non-human primate, and of differing effects of presentation
mode in human (1984) suggest that such competences might not be based in internal
logical coordination mechanisms. Again it seems that a relational competence under-
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lies representation construction, through integration of pairwise comparisons between
items into an internal representation of series.
In fact, however, an even more elegant possibility suggests itself. Strong directional
effects in performance on five term series problems indicate that the two end-items
possess privileged status. It seems that systems do not construct a bidirectional ma-
nipulable representation of a known series but rather possess a ranking mechanism
with unidirectional properties (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1994). Evidence to support
this conclusion is again provided by the production system model of transitive choice
developed by Harris & McGonigle (1994) which was capable of accounting for the co¬
existence of binary transitive choice and the symbolic distance effect in the absence
of logical coordination mechanisms and, with only a small subset of rules (16 out of
a possible 1920), accurately modelled both binary and triadic phases of the transitive
inference data. Furthermore, all rule stacks that performed correctly with the initial
training pairs extended to remote binary comparisons without the addition of further
assumptions or expansion of the rule stack.
So transitive data from both human and non-human primate indicates that operation
of a relational primitive is fundamental. Systems appear to utilise a unidirectional
ranking mechanism in order to construct a representation of the serial order of a known
set of items. What would happen when task complexity was increased towards explicit
seriation, hierarchical search, and categorisation?
Linear seriation
The ten-item monotonic seriation task developed by Piaget and Szeminska (Inhelder
& Piaget, 1964) is commonly used as an index of human cognitive growth. Instead
of requiring a binary choice as in the transitive inference task, monotonic ordering
of all ten items is demanded. This expansion of set size demands effective on-line
serial control because of the massive combinatorial problem — insurmountable unless
a system is capable of taking advantage of the inherent monotonic constraint within
the set. How would performance differ between sets featuring arbitrary (e.g. colour)
and non-arbitrary (classically, size) connectives?
Biological systems, both human and non-human primate, seem to automatically take
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advantage of constraints, when present in the data set. A large corpus of evidence
has now been gathered which demonstrates that performance on tasks requiring non-
arbitrary monotonic size ordering is far superior to that on those demanding non¬
monotonic size, or arbitrary connectives, as indexed by both acquisition measures and
error profiles (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992, 1993, 1996).
Faced with this combinatorial problem the system has two options: reliance on brute
force memory strategies; or reduction of cognitive load. The relational primitive, once
more, becomes critical. What appears to be happening is that the system utilises the
monotonic constraint present in the data set — success is possible simply by iteration
of a relational rule: take biggest, take biggest etc. Such a mechanism is maximally
economic for data sets featuring this kind of monotonic constraint as it provides the
potential for generation and prediction of successor items following seriation of a few
antecedent elements. Such strategies are generalisable to sets of any size, eliminating
the problem of combinatorial expansion and therefore serve a data-reducing purpose
for resource limited biological agents (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a).
Hierarchical classification
Given that systems' performance in the face of non-arbitrary connectives far exceeds
that when arbitrary connections are required, reflecting use of a relational, genera¬
tive mechanism based on iteration of a simple rule to provide a path through a large
search space, what would happen when task difficulty was once again incremented by
introducing a further demand: hierarchical classification?
The experimental task required systems to exhaustively search increasingly large sets,
with subsequent decomposition of the set into categories, within which items must be
further ordered (see figure 3.1). The task provides a rich scenario within which to
assess system competences as its allows conflation of both arbitrary and non-arbitrary
connectives at different levels of the search hierarchy. Furthermore search sets can be
extended in both breadth (addition of novel categories) and depth. Once more efficient
and generative serial control is required. Would systems again exploit data-reducing
constraints within the target data set in order to reduce cognitive load?
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Hierarchical Level
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Figure 3.1: From seriation to categorisation (after McGonigle et. al., in preparation)
Indeed results suggest that non-human primate, after a training period, is capable
of ordered productions of up to twelve item sequences, in a two-level hierarchy using
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data-reducing classification and chunking strategies in conjunction with generative,
relationally-based, mechanisms (McGonigle & Jaswal, 1993; Dickinson, 1997; McGo-
nigle & Chalmers, 1998a). Figure 3.2 depicts data obtained from three adult Cebus
apella. ''Within classes" refers to a condition where the only constraint within the data
set is monotonic variation in size; '"between classes" refers to a condition where such
monotonic size variation is augmented with different stimuli types7. The figure shows
clearly that subjects are availing themselves of the added constraint provided by the
different categories — demonstrating the adaptive value of their generative inductive
mechanisms. As McGonigle & Chalmers (1992) suggested, in the face of increasingly
complex and difficult tasks presented over a protracted period, systems would avail
of constraints present within the data set to produce progressively economic organisa¬
tional structures.
Furthermore, both supervised and unsupervised phases of research, together with pre¬
liminary evidence from a study involving simultaneous learning of arbitrary and non-
arbitrary connectives (McGonigle & Ravenscroft, pers. comm.), indicate that these
data-reducing strategies emerge through internal processes of self-regulation, moti¬
vated by economy. The benefit of a longitudinal analysis can be clearly seen: pro¬
gressive increases in task difficulty stimulate the emergence of increasingly effective
information-handling strategies on the part of the system.
Self-organisation: economical arbitration
Tasks demanding exhaustive free search of a data set with the only requirement being
a non-reiterative path provide rich opportunities for assessing system self-organisation
over time. Using this experimental paradigm the first evidence of spontaneous self
regulation in both human and non-human primate has been reported (McGonigle et al.,
1992; de Lillo, 1994). Despite differences in the discriminable features of items, and
no requirement for a particular path through the search space, systems appeared to
utilise a spatial strategy to generate a unique path through the space.
7 The subjects have previously been trained to order the different stimuli.
Figure 3.2: Utility function: categorical vs. linear constraints
Ontogenetic and comparative fractionation of systems has been achieved within this
paradigm. By incrementing set size towards a maximum of nine both the largest set
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manageable and the solution strategy can be measured. In human, a path based on
item adjacency was found to become both more common and more consistent with
age and was clearly correlated with task success (McGonigle et a/., 1992). A similar
developmental profile was observed in adult Cebus apella following exposure to increas¬
ing set sizes (McGonigle et al., 1992; de Lillo, 1994). Although the paths generated
by these latter systems were neither as consistent nor as economical as those of four
year old children, their behaviour was clearly self-regulated and based upon internal
factors rather than any environmental contingency. The behaviour of pigeon, however,
when confronted with this task is clearly divergent: these systems did not self-regulate
towards economic generative strategies and could not, in fact, manage sets of greater
than three items.
a) Shape (arbitrary) b) Size (non-arbitrary) c) Hierarchical (non-arbitrary)
trial I trial I trial I
trial 2 trial 2 trial 2
Figure 3.3: The free search paradigm. Feedback (climbing man graphic for
child/peanut for monkey) is given to reward any and all exhaustive and non-reiterative
searches through the set (After McGonigle, in press)
What would happen when task difficulty was incremented by repositioning stimuli be¬
tween trials (see figure 3.3)? In the absence of both spatial cues and non-arbitrary con¬
nectives systems have been found to spontaneously generate and maintain a privileged
path through the search space. In both cases success is achieved through imposition of
ordered structure on an otherwise arbitrary set.









PHASE B PHASE C
A1A2A3B1B2B3C1C2C3
Figure 3.4: Self-organisation in action — increase in task difficulty is compensated by
utilisation of constraints (after McGonigle et. ai, in preparation)
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Figure 3.4 depicts a generic utility function. As task difficulty is incremented, the
performance of three adult Cebus apella clearly diverges from that expected by chance.
Moreover, we can see that as phase C is entered performance actually improves —
and in the absence of selective reward. McGonigle & Chalmers have developed a
paradigm which allows us to observe the adaptive value of learning. Here systems are
self-organising towards efficient information-handling strategies. Internal arbitration
based on economy results in refinement of performance and generation of ever more
successful cognitive strategies. By taking advantage of the constraints present in the
data set, these subjects can learn strategies which are predictive and generative — and
thus equally as successful as set size is incremented.
Section 5.2 describes an experiment in robotic navigation motivated by these findings.
Over ontogenesis the operation of installed design primitives (sets of very simple loco¬
motor behaviours in this case) is arbitrated by inbuilt economy metrics which enable
the system, with experience, to develop system-centred representations of the environ¬
ment which could support later, more complex, derivations.
Although currently at a preliminary stage, this new extension of the paradigm (Mc¬
Gonigle & Ravenscroft, pers. comm.) provides the potential for detailed fractionation
of species. Systems can be assessed on arbitrary, non-arbitrary and hierarchical con¬
ditions, with clear predictions of their performance, based on a relational competence
constrained by economic data reducing principles.
Summary
Studies of epistemic growth in human and non-human primate suggest a novel char¬
acterisation of intelligent biological systems, and a number of important prescriptions
for the design of artificial systems. Critically, conjoining comparative and developmen¬
tal perspectives has overcome the problems of the interdependence of language and
thought, and of the origins of meaning for linguistic agents, which have contaminated
previous characterisations of cognitive growth.
We have seen that these experimental paradigms reveal agents self-regulating toward
maximally economic information handling strategies, utilising whatever constraints are
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present in task to construct generative and predictive search mechanisms and, in the
absence of external constraint, imposing organisation on search sets. The resulting
characterisation shows the epistemic agent on an open-ended growth trajectory, from
a number of rational design primitives which form the ontological lower bounds of the
system, developing ever-more powerful information handling strategies in the face of
cognitive challenge through internal self-regulation based on economy. Serial control of
behaviour reflects an internal hierarchical organisation at multiple levels of abstraction
as suggested by Lashley (1951) and does not depend, as implicitly assumed throughout
much of psychology, on the possession of language, nor on immediate environmental
contingencies.
This characterisation is inherently dynamic and situated, sharing with these perspec¬
tives an emphasis on development through intra-system and system environment in¬
teractions, but diverging from both in the characterisation of the key feature of adap¬
tation. Where, as we saw in the previous chapter (sections 2.1 & 2.2), both dynamic
and situated perspectives characterise progressive adaptation as a refinement of the
coordination of primarily sensory-motor behaviour, here we have a view of systems self-
regulating and becoming increasingly more episternically adaptive through processes of
internal arbitration of their behaviours according to inbuilt and learned utility metrics.
Grounded in behavioural assays of system competence, from this perspective we can
characterise progressive system adaptation at both behavioural and epistemic levels,
where these levels are viewed as fundamentally intertwined: systems are both embod¬
ied and situated. Their ontological lower bounds, and their resulting developmental
trajectories are observable and, critically, measurable.
Finally, this developmental and comparative paradigm, allows us to bridge the gap be¬
tween cognitive accounts focusing on a mischaracterised logico-deductive competence,
and traditional behaviour-based accounts which emphasise associationistic modifica¬
tion of tightly-coupled behaviours. The origin of high-level competences is no longer
a miracle: we can see their precursors in the variety of specialised inductive mecha¬
nisms which form the ontological lower bounds of systems and, furthermore, gather
rich data (see figures 3.2 & 3.4) which allows us to characterise the adaptive value of
these mechanisms.




The biological characterisation outlined in the previous section (3.1.3) suggests that
our attempts to construct intelligent artificial systems must incorporate a number of
critical design features. The following features obviously do not constitute an ex¬
haustive list but rather embody a number of principles which have emerged from our
analysis and which must be incorporated within any artificial architecture which as¬
pires to ontogenetic extendibility — the critical feature of intelligent biological systems
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a; McFarland, 1999), and one of the central problems
facing contemporary Al (Kirsh, 1991, for example).
The system should be both embodied and situated. Its ontological lower bounds should
be sufficiently rich, both in hardware and software (e.g. inductive primitives, arbitra¬
tion criteria) to enable development of the system, both through self-organisation and
designer incrementation, towards its design goals. The system should possess memory
enabling progressive adaptation over ontogenesis: it should have a life-history. The
system should be state-based, modular and both hierarchically and serially organised.
Lower bounds The ontogenetic lower bounds of biological systems ultimately deter¬
mine their ontogenetic potential. The richness of both hardware and wetware
distinguishes systems stuck at primitive levels of adaptation from those capable
of progressive adaptation.
Embodiment An architecture should be implemented on a robotic platform.
Although simulation certainly has its place in the quest to synthesise intel¬
ligence, the ultimate testing ground is the real-world. Whether simulated
or embodied, relevant structural properties of systems should be utilised to
constrain inductive problems where possible (Ballard, 1993; Ballard et al.,
1997, for example).
Although engineering accurate sensors and actuators is not the sticking
point8 systems should be endowed with sensors rich enough to deliver per-
8 Disregarding the apologia of some roboticists!
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ceptual data of sufficient quality to enable task solution. They must also
ideally be able to act upon the world: action scaffolds development (Miller,
1966, for example).
Situatedness Systems should be implemented in real, rather than simplified
'toy', worlds. Niches should be sufficiently dynamic to provide a rich error
space, and to challenge the system to develop over time. Ideally the meaning
of representations to the system should emerge through self-organisation and
environmental interaction not from the ontological stance of the designer.
Limited niche engineering, as ubiquitous in human societies, has an im¬
portant role to play in constraining computation. Furthermore, specific
features of the niche can be utilised to constrain the solutions to problems
which might otherwise be intractable (Donnett & McGonigle, 1991; Ballard,
1993: Horswill, 1995).
Behavioural and cognitive primitives Biological systems possess a range of
reflexes and 'instincts', often system-preserving behaviours, critical at early
developmental stages. There should be no objection, therefore, to installing
reactive system-preserving behaviours in our artificial systems.
Many biological systems appear to be endowed with relational primitives
which underlie later sequential competences, and inbuilt judgement crite¬
ria, such as economy principles, to support arbitration between behaviours
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996, 1998a). Artificial systems' dependence on
limited computational and power resources make economy particularly vi¬
tal. Our artificial systems should be supplied with such mechanisms in order
to constrain induction, and thereby enable development.
As we have seen, biological systems possess a range of adaptive speciali¬
sations: neural inductive machinery optimised for particular internal and
external contexts. These range from optimised associationistic mechanisms
to much slower abstracted inductive devices. Similarly our artificial sys¬
tems should be endowed with a variety of inductive mechanisms optimised
for operation in different contexts, at different time scales, and at different
levels of abstraction.
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Modular Modularity of design provides robustness, but also allows a system to pos¬
sess multiple encapsulated, and sometimes logically incompatible, competences
simultaneously (Fodor, 1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; McGonigle, 1991). Fur¬
thermore, ensuring that low-level behaviours are encapsulated, with clearly de¬
fined initialisation, success and failure conditions, provides the potential for syn¬
tactic recombination by controllers at higher levels.
Hierarchical Hierarchical organisation underlies systems' ability to recombine be¬
haviours (the 'keyboard metaphor' of serial control — McGonigle & St Johnston,
1995) at multiple levels to achieve goals. Furthermore, an hierarchical organisa¬
tion allows for multiple mechanisms (control, inductive, monitoring etc.), operat¬
ing simultaneously at multiple time scales and levels of abstraction, providing the
potential for abstraction of statistical regularities invisible to modules at lower
levels.
Serial The problem of serial control inheres to all actions of systems (Lashley, 1951).
A serial controller capable of accessing modular behaviours provides the oppor¬
tunity for the development of artificial systems with a true behavioural syntax.
Furthermore, a serial architecture based on state transitions immediately con¬
fers contextuality upon a system. Behaviours can be instigated and interpreted
within specific contexts indexed by both internal and external features.
Autonomous Systems should not merely be "flexless' in the sense of autonomy used
by Brooks (1991c) but should rather be able to self-select, and ultimately self-
regulate, at initially behavioural, and later epistemic, levels. Systems should
not be entirely reactive but should be capable of self-determining appropriate
behaviour(s) given environmental and task demands. Furthermore, behaviours
should be arbitrated by internal criteria as well as the local environment.
Such autonomy requires systems to be capable of recombining behaviours to
achieve goals (and hence an hierarchical organisation), and to interpret the ef¬
fects of behaviours within given contexts (provided by seriality and state). Self-
selection, implementation, termination, and arbitration of behaviour requires rep¬
resentation. A pragmatic view of state should be adopted which incorporates ex¬
ternal (niche engineered) and internal (endocrine, distributed, or symbolic) forms
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of representation according to task demands. The critical adaptive role of state
is regarded as the provision of contextual information vital for internal control,
and interpretation, and reinterpretation of internal and external phenomena as
demonstrated throughout the biological realm (Hinde, 1982).
Systems must therefore be innately endowed with, or acquire, arbitration crite¬
ria, and be cognisant of both behavioural success and default. Learning from
error is the prime motor of abduction and fundamental to internal arbitration.
Without cognisance of error there can be no scope for progressive adaptation
and, particularly, epistemic growth over the life span.
Self-organisation through inter-system, and system-environment interactions over
the course of ontogenesis should lead to progressive system adaptations based on
installed cognitive primitives, recombination of, and arbitration between different
behaviours.
Life history As with all complex biological systems, artificial systems should possess
memory allowing progressive adaptation such that later behaviours rest on earlier
achievements (McGonigle, 1995), not merely recapitulating previous successes
but also allowing the generative benefits (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) to emerge,and
so that epistemic derivations of initially purely behavioural competences can
emerge.
3.2.2 Robotic implementations
The biological characterisation outlined in section 3.1.3 and the design features it sug¬
gests, together with the mission statement of McGonigle (1991), are the the inspira¬
tion behind a number of robotic implementations within the Laboratory for Cognitive
Neuroscience and Intelligent Systems at the University of Edinburgh. All of these ex¬
periments are motivated by adoption of a 'logical hierarchy of design' (first detailed
by McGonigle 1991 — see figure 3.5) which has grown out of a priori consideration of
a design strategy, in conjunction with appreciation of the rational constraints on the
solutions to robotic tasks.













E.g. see any city map
Non-penetrable
Figure 3.5: The logical hierarchy (after McGonigle, 1990).
Several of these implementations will be briefly described in order to demonstrate
implementation of some of the design features outlined in section 3.2.1 and to depict
the history of architectures motivated by our synthetic stance. 'Incrementing by design'
(McGonigle, 1991) is a core feature of this approach.
The hearing robot
Donnet & McGonigle's (1991) hearing robot was the first from this perspective. It was
designed to navigate through an office environment using a distant sound source for
orientational and contextual cues.
Agent movement creates a demand, not merely for avoidance, but also for a locative
competence in order to allow the system to return to a previously occupied location.
Donnett & McGonigle (1991) developed a navigational algorithm for the hearing robot
using an acoustic beacon and the resulting phase and intensity differences characteristic
of various parts of the niche combined with robotic tropotaxis. Exploitation of niche
constraints was therefore a key element of the navigational strategy adopted.
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Loss of signal might arise either due to a failure of the system, or due to baffling from
objects. This implementation was invested with an interpreter, essentially a set of
failure diagnosis procedures (McGonigle, 1998) which enabled it to interpret absence of
signal and take appropriate remedial action: check acoustic sensors; move at random
'hunting' for sound; or check acoustic bins. The value of an on-board state-based
interpreter in helping to solve critical control problems is clearly demonstrated by this
implementation. Furthermore, the state based interpreter allowed reinterpretation of
infra-red readings: on approach to the sound source the tightly-coupled avoidance
behaviour was overridden by an approach behaviour.
Control of the system swung between target approach and obstacle avoidance be¬
haviours, especially in areas of high object density. Prospective control was achieved
through constructing a map of 'clutter' in the environment by logging the frequency
of interrupt between goal seeking and local obstacle avoidance. A cumulative record
of the distributions of objects along the route allowed the robot to gear its speed us¬
ing a look-up table. Assumptions concerning stability of initial position (a 'home' or
'base' location) and the locative invariance of objects in the environment were made
to simplify the task.
Behaviour shaping
The Edinburgh R2, a compact autonomous robot, was used for the next phase of
research (Nehmzow, 1991; Nemhzow et a/., 1993; Nehmzow & McGonigle, 1995). A
neural network controller mapped sensors to actuators and received feedback from a
human supervisor. Light sensors provided orientational information; infra-red detec¬
tors sensed object proximity. The system was designed to examine whether multiple
competences could be supported by a single NN architecture, and to determine if mul¬
tiple competences could be synthesised to form newer and more complex behaviours
— currently a major problem facing Al (Brooks, 1986a; Malcolm et al., 1989).
Through external supervision the R2 was rapidly taught competences of obstacle avoid¬
ance, contour following, phototaxis and (simple) route learning. Learning typically
took around 10 minutes even for the most complex combined competence. Sensor
fusion formed a necessary precondition for success on a maze learning task which com-
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bined object avoidance, wall following, and phototaxis.
Although competence acquisition was very rapid, training was still necessary for the
controller to switch between tasks — a consequence of the adoption of a neural net¬
work controller, although rapid learning of fundamental robotic competences through
external shaping was demonstrated.
Light compass navigation and pole sorting
Using a distant light source algorithms were developed (Nehmzow & McGonigle, 1992,
1993; McGonigle & St Johnston, 1995) to allow the robot to return to near a base
location and exploit the structure of the environment in order to get to base by means
of local landmarks. The R2's task was to search for, retrieve, and order a set of targets
upon a workbench of known location.
Figure 3.6: The R2 ordering poles
Navigation
The navigational algorithm relied on two sources of information: light gradients through-
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out the niche which provided a general orientational frame of reference; and on-board
odometric information based on wheel actuators which supported dead reckoning. Each
run started from a fixed point against the workbench where the poles were to be sorted.
The distance from workbench to light source was preinstalled in the robot to provide
a means of eliminating the cumulative odometric error inevitably consequent on move¬
ment. Between sorties, the R2 pushed against the workbench, and all odometric in¬
formation was recalibrated. Target search was decomposed into two stages differing in
their level of granularity — greatly helping to constrain the solution to the navigation
problem. Initially the R2 attempted to attain proximity to the target site, upon which
a fine grained search for targets began.
The task illustrates the importance of mapping task stages to internal robot states
to enable it to do the right thing at the right time — once the target region had
been attained, object signals could be reinterpreted: the targets were to be lifted not
avoided.
Active vision
Each target was returned to the workbench thereby establishing a set of targets in
close proximity to each other. This strategy greatly reduced the time spent identifying
and sorting the targets. Active vision could now commence based 011 a compare-and-
contrast mechanism identified within both rodent and primate (McGonigle & Jones,
1975, 1978). Now the set of targets had been locatively encoded, the defining features
of the targets were extracted on the basis of comparing and contrasting them with
others from the set (see figure 3.6).
Rational economic principles were used to reduce data load. Selective attention was
achieved by peripheral blocking (McGonigle, 1998): high level vision was only insti¬
gated when a target was present in the gripper. This strategy helped to overcome
the fixed focus limitation of the Imputer camera, varying illumination directions, and
ensured that only the centre of the obtained image had to be processed — overcoming
the figure-ground problem. Once each target had been successfully discriminated and
identified a bubble sort algorithm was used to order them.
Summary
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The implementation highlights the importance of a state-based system. Mapping of
different task stages to internal state allows for signal reinterpretation in different
contexts. The task grammar allows recombination of behaviours to meet adaptive
needs.
3.2.3 Summary
Following the hierarchy of design (McGonigle, 1991), based on the logical dependencies
between competences, the systems described above have become increasingly more
adaptive — first reactive behaviours were developed, followed by a locative competence
supported by navigation, and only then vision. Throughout a criterion of adequacy
has been used — the implementations are designed not to 'solve' particular engineering
problems, but rather to support the progressive development of the system.
Some of the critical design features outlined in section 3.2.1 have been implemented
and demonstrated to be a key engineering feature of these successful implementations.
Critical elements include:
Exploitation of niche constraints Engineering of a system to its niche, and the
niche to the system (niche engineering) helps to simplify problems which might
otherwise be intractable (Donnett & McGonigle, 1991: Ballard, 1993; Horswill,
1995).
• Donnett & McGonigle (1991) developed a navigational algorithm for a 'hear¬
ing' robot using an acoustic beacon and the resulting phase and intensity
differences characteristic of various parts of the niche combined with robotic
tropotaxis.
• Nehmzow & McGonigle (1992, 1993) and McGonigle & St Johnston (1995)
provided an interlinked series of implementations which utilised a distant
light source in conjunction with niche constraints to allow a robot to navi¬
gate to base by means of local landmarks.
Prospective control Was achieved as a derivation of Donnett & McGonigle's (1991)
implementation through building a map of obstacle density based on signal in¬
terrupt.
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State A feature of these synthetic approaches is the importance of context both for
behaviour initialisation, and signal (re-)interpretation.
• Donnett & McGonigle's (1991) hearing robot reinterpreted signals based on
internal context allowing both object avoidance, and docking, within the
same implementation.
• McGonigle & St Johnstons' (1995) light compass navigation system fea¬
tured a task grammar. Decomposition of the task into segments with vary¬
ing granularity, and consequent mapping of task stages to internal robot
states, constrained, and thus simplified, the navigational problem allowing
the robot to 'do the right thing at the right time'.
Learning An example of an early learning approach was provided by Nemhzow et al.
(1993) and Nehmzow & McGonigle (1995) who applied a method analogous to
'shaping' through external supervision to teach multiple competences to a neural-
network controlled mobile robot. Unfortunately training was still necessary for
the controller to switch between tasks, although external shaping of fundamental
robotic competences was demonstrated.
Rationality and economy McGonigle & St Johnstons' (1995) active vision imple¬
mentation, heavily informed by characterisation of primate visual competence
(McGonigle & Jones, 1975, 1978), followed logically in the design hierarchy from
earlier navigational competences. Visual identification and ordering of targets
was achieved using an active compare-and-contrast principle. Furthermore eco¬
nomic principles were utilised in order to reduce computational load.
With a history of implementations incorporating a number of important design fea¬
tures, and a prototype state-based, functional architecture capable of supporting mul¬
tiple competences within the same system together with the concept of task grammars
which allowed recruitment and recombination of modularised behaviours, the task be¬
came twofold:
• To more fully incorporate these design features within a single architecture, con¬
structed to be easily extendible by the designer. This architecture should also be
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state based and hierarchically and serially motivated whilst incorporating greater
potential for selection and arbitration of behaviour.
• To introduce self-organisation into the architecture, both to more accurately
model our biological targets, but also in order to circumvent some of the problems
of the hand-crafting of behaviour.
The next chapter outlines an architecture which strives to meet these objectives, before
a description is provided in chapter 5 of some experiments in self-organised navigation.
3.3 Summary: the synthetic stance
This chapter initially considered some requirements for the reverse engineering of bio¬
logical systems. Comparative research suffers from an impasse: cognitive accounts are
focussed on primarily linguistic achievements, and consequently ignore phylogeny, on¬
togeny, and the range of adaptive behaviours found across many systems; behaviourist
accounts tend to focus exclusively on an optimised associationistic inductive mechanism
which, although certainly part of the complement of learning mechanisms at systems'
disposal, cannot in isolation account for the complexity of adaptive behaviours, nor
explain their ontogenetic origins.
Ethological research depicts the richness of adaptive behaviours. Systems possess both
evolutionary engineered instinctive behaviours, plus a variety of specialised induc¬
tive mechanisms, optimised for use in particular contexts. Adaptive behaviours are
inherently serial in nature — a factor unaddressed by the traditional behaviourist,
animal learning, and cognitivist perspectives on systems. Evidence from cognitive
neuroscience indicates that phylogeny results in qualitative changes in neural struc¬
ture. Systems possess a range of adaptive specialisations as their ontological lower
bound which constrain their ontogenetic growth through processes of inter-system and
system-environment interaction.
Determining the interaction of lower bounds and environment over epigenesis, par¬
ticularly with respect to serial competences, requires comparative and developmental
paradigms untainted by language. The research programme of McGonigle & Chalmers,
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is an exemplary example of such a paradigm. Their evidence suggests that relational
primitives might form part of the ontological lower bounds of many complex systems,
both human and non-human primate, which in interaction with environments of in¬
creasing complexity result, over ontogeny, in increasingly complex serial, and categori¬
cal skills. Furthermore, their comprehensive longitudinal studies indicate that complex
systems self-organise by internally arbitrating their behaviours according to metrics
such as economy principles, which might also be built in to systems. They suggest
that the associationist inductive mechanism might be supplemented by a more power¬
ful relational mechanism in complex systems.
Their detailed comparative and developmental evidence suggests that artificial sys¬
tems should be designed with rich ontological lower bounds, consisting of reactive,
system-preserving behaviours, specialised inductive mechanisms, and arbitration crite¬
ria. Their analysis suggests that artificial systems should be state based and both hier¬
archically and serially organised. These systems should be able to select, and arbitrate
between behaviours, becoming more adaptive over time through self-organisational
processes.
Finally, a number of implementations inspired by this characterisation, incremented
over the past decade through a logical hierarchy of design, were described. Between
them these implementations incorporate a number of key design features including,
particularly, state-based interpreters which allow signal reinterpretation in differing
contexts and, in combination with task grammars allow for selection and recombina¬
tion of behaviours from a core repertoire, and rational design primitives which reduce
computational load and enable simplification of the solutions to complex problems.
The next chapter describes an architecture designed to supplement these precursors
by introducing some more key design features, whilst striving for easy extendibility.
Chapter 4
A synthetic architecture
We saw in the last chapter that the extensive research programme of McGonigle &
Chalmers at the Laboratory for Cognitive Neuroscience and Intelligent Systems has
inspired a number of implementations of artificial systems. This chapter describes an
extension of these architectures which strives to incorporate many of the key design
features outlined in section 3.2.1 within a modular construction designed for easy
extendibility.
4.1 Introduction and aims
Arguably the most critical problem currently facing robotics is that of extendibility
(McGonigle, 1991; Kirsh, 1991) — how to design a robotic control architecture which
can scale, either through design, or by learning? This implementation has grown out
of a research programme at the Laboratory for Cognitive Neuroscience and Intelligent
Systems at Edinburgh, whose fundamental tenets were set out in a mission statement
by McGonigle (1991). A critical feature of the position here adopted is that design is
critical in the attempt to develop complex artificial agents. Furthermore there exists
a logical hierarchy of design which helps to provide constraints on how an artificial
system should be constructed. Our dynamic perspective suggests that systems should
also scale themselves over ontogenesis. Scaling of our systems, therefore, is envisaged to
occur through both explicit hand-design and self-organisat ion over ontogenesis through
interaction of its complement of design primitives with its environment.
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Just as the forms and processes of complex biological agents do not derive purely from
random mutation coupled with local environmental selection and arbitration but also
from the capacity for self-organisation over ontogenesis, artificial systems should be
designed to become progressively more adaptive over the course of their lifetime. An
important, and unique, part of our research programme is that its target is epistemic
rather than purely behavioural adaptation over the long term. We strive to construct
our artificial systems such that their capabilities are extendible so that complete re¬
design is not required in order to achieve progressively greater levels of adaptation.
Artificial cognitive systems should be viewed as dynamical systems in continuous in¬
teraction with their dynamic environments. Taking such a systems view indicates that
the ontological lower bound of a system (specifically in terms of perceptual and cog¬
nitive primitives) should be sufficiently rich to allow the development of the desired
behaviours. A system's behaviour should always be viewed as the result of environ¬
mental interactions, where categorisation falls naturally out of correlating internal
and external variables, where cross-modal associations are a logical consequence of
interaction, and where categorisation and concepts are immediately grounded in the
experienced environment. Such considerations also help to reduce; the computational
load of a system (cf. Ballard 1989; Ballard et al. 1997; McGonigle fc St Johnston 1995;
McGonigle &; Chalmers 19986).
4.1.1 Design primitives
The artificial systems constructed as part of the research programme so far are all
embodied and situated within a non-trivialised environment in an attempt to avoid
the problems consequent upon environmental simplificat ion which afflicted much early
robotic research (Nilsson, 1984, for example). Critically, our systems are not designed
with some abstract generalised environment in mind - till biological organisms exist
within, and are adapted to, ecological niches. Tailoring an agent to its environment,
and the niche to the agent (niche engineering) often enables an agent to exploit con¬
straints embedded within the niche in order to solve prohl<>nis which might otherwise
be intractable (Donnett & McGonigle, 1991; Ballard. 199:!: fforswill, 1995; Pfeifer,
1997).
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Artificial systems should also be autonomous — able to select, maintain and, criti¬
cally, evaluate their own behaviours. Parallel research with children and brown ca¬
puchin monkeys (Cebus apella) within the research group (McGonigle & Chalmers,
1996; Chalmers & McGonigle, 1997; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a, for reviews) indi¬
cates that economy acts as a fundamental constraint on both the solutions to a variety
of problems relating to the serial control of action, and to internal arbitration between
behaviours (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996; Chalmers & McGonigle, 1997; McGonigle
& Chalmers, 1998a) helping an agent to become progressively inductively more pow¬
erful over the course of its existence. Such arbitration criteria must therefore be a core
feature of our systems, whether preinstalled (as with the economy criterion adopted
herein) or acquired through experience. A further critical point is that agents should
be studied over a period of time, in order to allow development to occur, later be¬
haviours resting on earlier achievements. Agents, therefore, should have a life-history
(McGonigle, 1995).
Systems should be hierarchical, serial and state-dependent. Ethological research clearly
demonstrates that context modulates behaviour throughout the biological world (Hinde,
1982). By progressively adding greater constraint, and further interpretation at suc¬
cessive levels, an hierarchical design allows an agent to break free from tightly-coupled
behaviours subject only to local environmental arbitration into a new realm of self-
selection and internal arbitration of behaviour which is the most striking characteristic
of intelligent systems.
Modularity of information-processing is the clearest result of neuropsychological work
to date, both empirically and theoretically (Kandel et al., 1991; Gazzaniga et al., 1998).
Furthermore a modular system, as well as making a system more robust supports mul¬
tiple behavioural capacities some of which might potentially be logically inconsistent
with one another (Fodor, 1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; McGonigle, 1991). This ev¬
idence contrasts strongly with the traditional Al view of a central organisation of the
representation of knowledge and the production of behaviour as a sense-think-act cycle
(Luger & Stubblefield, 1998a).
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The aim of this research is to provide a control architecture which supports recom¬
bination of action and behaviour primitives without necessitating redesign and which
is capable of supporting competences in such a way that new competences can easily
be designed from lower level atoms, acts, and behaviours without requiring re¬
design of the system. The system should support multiple competences and, critically,
the system should possess memory, enabling development of competences across its
life-span. Along with incrementation through design, the system should be capable
of self-organisation over the life span (see chapter 5), arbitrating between behaviours
according to criteria such as economy, resulting in progressive adaptation over time.
4.2 A brief description
Hardware
The robot used throughout these experiments was a Nomad 200 (see Figure 4.1), sup¬
plied by Nomadic Technologies Inc., California. It is equipped with sixteen infrared
detectors, and sixteen sonars (see Figure 4.2), located around the periphery of the chas¬
sis, along with base-mounted odometry and a magnetic compass (KVH C100 Compass
Engine). The on-board computer is a 80486 DX2 processor running at 66MHz, with a
fully suspended 1 Gb hard disk, floppy disk drive, and 20Mb of RAM. Remote control
of the Nomad is achieved via a radio ethernet card, allowing programme and data
transfer from any one of a number of machines situated throughout the niche.
The niche
All of the experiments detailed herein took place within the Laboratory for Cogni¬
tive Neuroscience and Intelligent Systems, Level 8 Appleton Tower, Edinburgh — a
network of rooms and corridors all of which contain desks, chairs, machinery, and of
course humans, providing a rich niche (see Figure 4.3) in which to develop navigational
competences.
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The sonar ring The infra-red ring
snO ... snl5 irO ... ir 15
Figure 4.2: Sonar and IR numbering
about 26 metres
Figure 4.3: The Nomad's niche.
Software
The Nomad was programmed in a mixture of the C/C++ and Perl (release 5.003)
programming languages, running under the Linux (Red Hat 4.2) operating system.
Each language provides its own benefits. C/C++ was used to communicate with the
on-board robot control system, and is particularly useful in the control of time-critical
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processes. Since Perl is an interpreted programming language it need not be pre¬
compiled and can therefore be debugged dynamically thereby helping to shorten the
development-test-debug cycle. The strength of Perl running under Linux lies in the
control of concurrent processes, and the dynamic construction of both programs and
data structures.
State arrays
Contextually appropriate behaviour is impossible without some form of state. This
architecture utilises two arrays of data, one referring to external factors, and the other




























Figure 4.4: Internal and external states.
Each behaviour on start-up and, critically, 011 completion modifies relevant state vari¬
ables.
Behaviours
Each behaviour, although not an object in the strict programming sense, was treated as
a distinguishable data structure (see Figure 4.5) sharing a range of routines and relevant
data which was invisible to other behaviours. Data stored refers to a behaviour's name,
class, number of times called, and success rate. Local procedures test initialisation and
default conditions, as well as actually executing the behaviour and altering relevant
internal and external state variables on completion. A list is maintained of relevant
recovery procedures.













Figure 4.5: Components of a behaviour.
Recovery procedures can be regarded as less elaborate behaviours storing informa¬
tion about their name, success and default conditions, status on completion, and the
recovery procedure itself.
Controller
The central routine of the architecture (see figure 4.6) selects a behaviour according to
current whereabouts in task space, and then monitors its progress using the behaviour's
own default detection routine. As the Nomad uses the Linux operating system it
is possible to mimic concurrence by using the system call 'fork', and then run the
behaviour as a 'child' process with monitoring of default occurring within the 'parent'
process.
Following the fork, a copy of the original program is made and the two essentially
identical processes begin to diverge. As a child process cannot access data structures
within the parent a signal handling system allows the monitoring parent process to
'kill' its child if a default or timeout occurs, and for the child to send a success signal
to the parent on completion.
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Figure 4.6: Controller.
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For biological agents development is crucial — early stages constrain later ones. The
history of an organism, its experiences and how these influence its developmental tra¬
jectory is critical. Any attempt to develop a complex artificial system must take this
fundamental property of biological agents into account. Giving a life history (see Mc-
Gonigle, 1991) to a robot is imperative if we want to obtain development of the system
not just within individual runs but across the entire life-span of the agent.
This architecture uses the module 'Storable', available from the Comprehensive Perl
Archive Network (CPAN)1, to recursively store all information relating to behaviours,
tasks, and the state arrays. At any point in time information from earlier in the current
run or from any point in the past can be re-obtained. The Nomad is therefore freed
from the short-termism characteristic of many artificial agents!
Summary
The Nomad has access to data structures and programs which are arranged hierarchi¬
cally. The foundation of the hierarchy is a set of atomic action units, atoms, such
as vm(translation, base, turret) [0,1] (moves the Nomad according to the three
parameters, returning 1 on success, 0 on failure), gs()[0,l] (reads all sensor data,
returning 1 on success, 0 on failure), tk(speech-stream) [0,1] (sends speech-stream
to the Nomad's voice synthesiser, returning 1 on success and 0 on failure). These atoms
come pre-installed (see section 4.3.1).
Above this level the atoms are combined into sequences of actions: acts. A familiar
example of such an act is avoid(distance) [0,1], which combines movement and
sensing atoms. See section 4.3.4 for a comprehensive list of available acts.
The next level of the hierarchy consists of combinations of actions into more meaningful,
or rather non-trivial, sequences: behaviours (section 4.3.5). Behaviours are complex
data structures (see Figure 4.5). Each behaviour includes information concerning:
the number of times it has been called; the number of successful calls; initialisation
1
ftp . fuiiet. f i .
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conditions (both external and internal criteria); the actual running of the behaviour;
constraints operating on the behaviour; a list of implementable recovery procedures
(each containing information about the number of times they have been called and
their success rate); and finally procedures for modifying relevant state variables.
The final layer of the action hierarchy consists of tasks (section 4.3.6). These are essen¬
tially meaningful sequences of behaviours, where initialisation conditions of behaviours
determine lawful sequences. Each defined task maintains its own set of internal vari¬
ables. An example of a complex task involves running the three behaviours learn,
retrace, and dead-rec (section 4.3.6).
The complete architecture is divided into a controller (see Figure 4.6), a memory, and
lists of tasks and behaviours. Upon start-up the Nomad picks its task and updates the
appropriate state variable accordingly. Next, the behaviours in the current task will be
run sequentially, with simultaneous logging of constraint status (default and success).
Upon successful completion of the current behaviour, transition to the next becomes
possible. Hence a sequence of behaviours is implemented, default being dealt with by
(currently pre-installed2) recovery procedures.
4.3 A more detailed description
4.3.1 Pre-installed behavioural atoms
The Nomad comes with a range of functions which allow communication with the
on-board robot motor controllers, and sensor boards3.
Configuration
ac (trans , steer .turret) [0,1] Sets the translation, steering and rotational acceler¬
ations of the robot (in units of yj, inch and ^ degree per second squared). Returns 1
2 It is proposed to extend self organising principles to error recovery itself, by having the system
establish its own error typology which would then support expert abductive diagnosis — see sec¬
tion 6.3.2.
3 Throughout this chapter functions are defined using the following convention:
function-name(parameters)[return values].
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upon success, 0 upon failure.
connect-robot(id) [0,id] Requests a connection to the robot with id. Returns the
id of the robot upon success, 0 upon failure.
conf-cp(status) [0,1] Configures the compass system (0 =off, 1 = on, 2 = self-
calibrate). Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
conf-ir(dependency,order) [0,1] Configures the infra-red sensor system (dependency
is the percentage dependency of the current returned reading on the previous returned
reading, between 0 and 10; order is a list specifying which sensors are to be switched
on, and in what order). Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
conf-sn(f iring-rate .order) [0,1] Configures the sonar sensing system (firing-rate
specifies the interval in ms between the firing of sonars; order is a list specifying which
sensors are to be switched on, and in what order). Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon
failure.
conf-tm(timeout) [0,1] Sets the timeout period of the robot in seconds such that
if no command has been received for longer than timeout all current motion will be
aborted.
da(9steer turret") [0,1] Sets external state variables to the value of 6steer and dturret-
Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
disconnect-robot(id) [0,1] Requests the connection with the robot with id to be
closed. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
dp(x,y) [0,1] Sets external state variables to the values of x and y. Returns 1 upon
success, 0 upon failure.
sp (trans, steer .turret) [0,1] Sets the translation, steering and rotational velocities
of the robot (in units of inch within the range 0 to 200, and yg degree per second
within the range 0 to 450). Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
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get-cpQ [0,1] Updates external state with the current compass reading of the robot
in units of ^ of a degree. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
get-irQ [0,1] Updates external state with the values of the active infra-red sensors.
Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
get-rcO [0,1] Updates external state with the current configuration of the robot (x,
V, 0steer, 9turret)- Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
get-rv() [0,1] Updates external state with the current translation, steering and turret
velocities of the robot. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
get-sn() [0,1] Updates external state with the values of the active sonar sensors.
Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
gs()[0,l] Updates external state with the current x, y, Qsteer, 9turret, translation
velocity, steering velocity, turret velocity, CPU voltage, motor voltage, infra-red, sonar
and compass values. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
Acting
lp() [0,1] Stops all the motors of the robot. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
pa(tpa, spa,rpa) [0,1] Moves the motors of the robot to the absolute positions spec¬
ified (tpa is a translational step, spa and rpa are steering and rotational steps respec¬
tively) at the speed specified by sp at the acceleration specified by ac. Depending on
the value of timeout motion may terminate before the motors have moved the specified
distances. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
pr(tpr,spr,rpr) [0,1] Moves the motors of the robot by the distances specified (tpr
is a translational step in units of ^ in. within the range -32000 to 32000, spr and
rpr are steering and rotational steps respectively, in units of yg degree within the
range -32000 to 32000) at the speed specified by sp at the acceleration specified by
ac. Depending on the value of timeout motion may terminate before the motors have
moved the specified distances. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
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st () [0,1] Brings the robot to a controlled stop with appropriate accelerations. Re¬
turns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
tk(speech-stream) [0,1] Sends the character string speech-stream to the robot's
voice synthesiser. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
vm(tv, sv ,tv) [0,1] Moves the robot at the velocities specified (tv is the desired trans¬
lation velocity in units of ^ inch per second within the range -240 to 240, sv and rv
are the desired steering and turret velocities respectively, in units of ^ degrees per
second within the range -450 to 450). Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
ws (trans, steer .turret .timeout) [0,1] Waits for the specified motor(s) to stop within
the given timeout period. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
zrO [0,1] Aligns the steering and turret motors with the front of the robot, and sets
external state variables x, y, 9steer, and 9turret to zero. Returns 1 upon success, 0 upon
failure.
4.3.2 Controller functions
The following functions execute and monitor behaviours.
constrain(behaviour .constraint .timeout) [0,1] This routine (see Figure 4.7) func¬
tions as the central control process of the architecture. It is called with references to a
behaviour (the behaviour's activate routine), a constraint (the behaviour's execution
function), and a timeout.
It instigates a fork system call, running the constraint function, monitoring timeout,
and handling all signals within the parent, and running the behaviour itself within the
child.
At all times the parent process must check timeout, default, and signal conditions. If
default or timeout occurs, the parent sends a signal to the child process, and waits for
the child to die before continuing (allowing for safe termination of the current behaviour
before a new one starting). If the child process terminates successfully before this time,
it sends a 'success' signal to the parent, if it recognises default internally it sends a
'failure' signal.
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Figure 4.7: constrain(behaviour,constraint,timeout) [0,1]
timeout (behaviour .timeout) [] A general-purpose timeout function (see Figure 4.8)
designed to operate within the parent of a fork process, which takes the name of a
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mem: : save (filename, data-list) [0,1] Writes the selected data-list to filename
returning 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
mem: :retrieve(f ilename) [0,reference] Attempts to load all the data from filename
into a reference to a data-list returning 0 on failure.
4.3.4 Acts
The low-level commands listed above (section 4.3.1) were combined into acts which
could be recruited to form more complex behaviours.
Sensing
clean-cpQ [theta] This routine simply divides the compass reading (given in yjj
degree by get-cp) by 10, and returns the value (theta) as an integer.
compass-discrepancy (desired) [theta] This function (see Figure A.l) calculates
and returns the discrepancy (theta) between the current bearing and a desired bear¬
ing.
det-progress(x,y,frequency) [£] This function determines whether over a period
of time (frequency), the Nomad is approaching or receding from the coordinates x,y.
Using the equations:
distancei — \/^rjn^Q/--m/lome) 2 -I- (yinitiai Uhome) 2
distancej — yj\xjinai x^ome) 2 -)- {yfinal Uhome) 2
A = distancej — distancei
It returns A, which is negative if the Nomad is approaching x,y.
get-angle (x ,y) [0] This routine (see Figure A.2) calculates and returns a new steering
angle (#), based on the current position, and the position of the target (x,y). The
external state variables max-theta and min-theta are used in the case where 9 falls
outside the range min-theta < 9 < max-theta.
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get-speed(stopping-distance) [speed] Returns a value for translational velocity
using the equation:
sni5 + sn0 + sni .
speed = ( stoppmgdistance) * 5
O
stopping-distance is an optional parameter, the default value is 20 inches.
The external state variables max-speed and min-speed were adopted in the case of
speed falling outside the range: min-speed < speed < max-speed.
get-swerve () [0] Returns a steering angle based on proximity to lateral objects (see
Figure A.3). This routine causes the Nomad to gently swerve away from objects visible
by the sonar sensors to either side.
ir-object-leftQ [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the left-side IR
sensors. Returns 1 if an object is present, otherwise returns 0 (see Figure A.4).
ir-object-right() [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the right-side
IR sensors. Returns 1 if an object is present, otherwise returns 0 (see Figure A.5).
object-left (threshold) [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the left¬
side sonar sensors (see Figure A.6). Returns 1 if an object is below threshold distance,
otherwise returns 0.
object-right (threshold) [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the
right-side sonar sensors (see Figure A.7). Returns 1 if an object is below threshold
distance, otherwise returns 0.
obstacle (threshold) [0,1] Returns 1 if an obstacle is detected within (optional
threshold) distance or the default value of 20 inches, 0 otherwise (see Figure A.8).
powerQ [0,1] Determines current power levels cpuvolt, and motorvolt, returning 0
when low, and 1 otherwise.
recovery-crit(x,y,range) [0,1] This function assesses whether the Nomad is near
(default is 50 inches, but can be modified using the optional parameter ra^0se) the
defined position x,y, using the equation:
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It returns 1 when distance < range, 0 otherwise.
smooth-cp () [mean] This function eliminates spikes in the reading of the magnetic
compass by calling get-cp ten times and eliminating any reading which differs from
the previous or subsequent readings by more than 5 degrees, and then returns the mean
of the remaining values as an integer. It does not update external state.
Orientation and alignment
align-left (distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a rear surface (see Figure A.9), re¬
turning 1 on completion.
align-rear(distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a rear surface (see Figure A.10),
returning 1 on completion.
align-right (distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a right-hand surface (see Figure A.11),
returning 1 on completion.
conv-to-degrees (rads) [theta] This function (see Figure A.12) is passed a value in
radians (rads) and returns the equivalent value in degrees (theta).
conv-to-radians (theta) [rads] This function (see Figure A.13) is passed a value in
degrees (theta) and returns the equivalent value in radians (rads).
fine-align (bearing) [1] This function (see Figure A. 14) is called subsequently to
turn-to-bearing (bearing) [disc] and rotates base and turret very slowly (1 Seconrf)
towards the desired bearing, returning 1 on completion.
orient-ahead() [1] Aligns the front sonar (sno) to the greatest amount of free space.
The function returns 1 on completion.
orient-left (distance) [1] Moves the Nomad to a position distance inches away
from a left-side surface (see Figure A.15), returning 1 on completion.
orient-rear (distance) [1] Moves the Nomad to a position distance inches away
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from a rear surface (see Figure A.16), returning 1 on completion.
orient-right (distance) [1] Moves the Nomad to a position distance inches away
from a right-side surface (see Figure A. 17), returning 1 on completion.
turn-to-bearing (bearing) [disc] This function (see Figure A.18) rotates turret and
base to ± 1 degree of the supplied bearing, returning the final discrepancy (disc) on
completion.
Avoidance
avoid (threshold) [] threshold is an optional parameter, the default value is 20
inches. This function is designed to run as a child process and implements (see Fig¬
ure A. 19) an eternal avoid loop unless killed.
rotate() [] Rotates to left or right whilst an obstacle is detected (see Figure A.20).
The function exits when sensor readings indicate that no object is within a range of
15 inches from an arc of the front three sonar sensors (snis, sno, sni).
Wall-following
follow-left (distance) [] A wall-following loop for use as a child process (see Fig¬
ure A.21). Allows the Nomad to shadow obstacles at a range of distance (an optional
parameter, the default is 22 inches).
follow-right (distance) [] A wall-following loop for use as a child process (see Fig¬
ure A.22). Allows the Nomad to shadow obstacles at a range of distance (an optional
parameter, the default is 22 inches).
get-adjustl(distance) [0s«eer] Returns the steering angle for following a right-side
object, distance is an optional parameter, the default is 22 inches (see Figure A.23).
The external state variables max-adjustl and min-adjustl are used in the case of
dsteer falling outside the range min-adjustl < 9steer < max-adjustl.
get-adjustr (distance) [0steer] Returns the steering angle for following a left-side
object (see Figure A.24). distance is an optional parameter, the default is 22 inches.
The external state variables max-adjustr and min-adjustr are used in the case of
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9steer falling outside the range min-adjustr < 9steer < max-adjustr.
wall-monitor (x ,y .frequency) [0,1] This function is used when wall following is
invoked as a recovery procedure for navigation. It accepts the x and y coordinates of
a goal location, checks current x and y over a period of frequency and determines
whether either Ax or Ay are increasing. If both are increasing 1 is returned, otherwise
0.
Navigation
go(,x,y,range) [0,1] A navigation routine (see Figure A.25) designed for use inde¬
pendently or as a child process. The algorithm moves the Nomad directly from its
current position to within the specified range of (m,y).
go-monitor(m,y,timeout,range,frequency)[0,1] This function (see Figure A.26)
serves to constrain go when invoked as a parent process. It accepts five compulsory
arguments: x and y are the goal coordinates; timeout is the function's timeout period
in seconds; range within which recovery is possible; frequency is that of checking
progress towards the goal position. It returns 1 if the child process exits successfully
before timeout has expired, or if upon timeout the Nomad is within recovery distance
(range), 0 is returned in any other case.
Learning and retracing vector routes
The first learning implementation The following routines (the corridor and
direction objects) were designed as part of the first attempt to allow the Nomad to
learn a privileged vector in a corridor environment (see section 5.2.3 for a description
of this attempt).
The direction object
Each bearing which the Nomad attempts is instantiated as an independent program¬
ming object — a direction (see Figure 4.9) which stores information relating to
theta, inverse-theta, and the time spent moving along that bearing.
Initialisation
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A direction is instantiated by invocation of new Direction(theta) [reference], which
creates a new direction object with bearing theta and returns a reference to the object.






Figure 4.9: Initialisation of a direction object
dir: : init (theta) [] Initialises the new object with theta, inverse-theta, and
time which is initialised as 0.
Functions
dir: :run() [] Runs the direction object (see Figure 4.10) and updates the private
state variable time on completion. The general library function obstacle() [0,1] is
used to check for obstructions.
The corridor object
Upon start-up a corridor object was created by invocation of the command new
Corridor which stored all data relating to the environment, in combination with rou¬
tines for creating, modifying, and running directions.
Initialisation
new Corridor (theta) [reference] Creates a corridor object, with an initial bear¬
ing of theta, and returns a reference to the new object. The routine automatically
initialises the new object using corridor: : init (theta) [].
corridor: : init (theta) [] Is called by new Corridor (theta) [reference] and cre¬
ates the private state variables depicted in Figure 4.11. A new corridor is initialised
with the current compass reading theta which is a seed for the creation of a set of
potential-dirs — a list of references to direction objects, initialised with bear-
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Figure 4.10: dir::run()[]
ings of theta, ul, u2, dl, and d2, which vary from theta by ± 30 and 60 degrees
respectively. The list of references to directions experienced-dirs, and the variable
best-dir are initially undefined.
Functions
The following functions can be invoked by a corridor-object, and relate to function
activation, and modification of data within the object.
corridor: : create-var (theta, variation) [] This function accepts a bearing theta,
and an integer value variation, it then updates the private list potential-dirs by
creating three new directions with bearings of theta, theta + variation and theta
- variation.
corridor: :get-dir() [0 ,reference-to-dir] This function selects a direction at ran¬
dom from the list potential-dirs, returning a reference to that direction or 0 if no
unexperienced directions remain.
corridor: :get-best-dir() [] Updates the privates state variable best-dir with the
bearing in which most time has currently been spent. This becomes the seed for a new
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Figure 4.11: Initialisation of a corridor object
set of potential-dirs.
corridor: :run() [] Looks up the private state variable potential-dirs, runs each
one in a random order using the routine dir: :run() [], and updates the private state
variable experienced-dirs.
The final learning implementation The following programming objects were de¬
veloped from those described above and were designed as part of the final vector
learning implementation (described in section 5.2.4). They are an integral part of the
behaviours learn (see section 4.3.5) and retrace (section 4.3.5) and deal with the cre¬
ation and usage of representations of regions of physical space (sectors), and different
compass bearings (vectors) within those regions.
The vector object
Each vector which the Nomad has experienced, or will attempt, is instantiated as a
programming object, possessing encapsulated functions and data relating to its specific
bearing, success rate, and x and y coordinates.
Initialisation
A vector is instantiated and initialised with a set of private state variables (see Fig¬
ure 4.12), by a sector object invoking the 'new Vector' command.
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Figure 4.12: Initialisation variables for a vector object.
new Vector (theta) [reference-to-vec] This function creates a new vector object
with angle theta within the calling package, and returns a reference to the new object.
The routine automatically initialises the new object using vec: :init (theta) [].
vec: :init (theta) [] Is called by new Vector (theta) [reference-to-vec] and ini¬
tialises the new object with the variables depicted in Figure 4.12.
The following functions can be invoked by a vector-object, and relate to activation,
and modification of data within the object.
vec: : invert (theta) [inverse] Accepts an angle (theta) as an argument, and returns
the inverse of the angle.
vec: : am-i-centeredQ [0,1] Determines whether Nomad position falls within the
range:
Functions
(*£initial BITOT) <C %current ^ (*Tinitial T error)
and,
{Vinitial error) < Ucurrent (Uinitial 4" error)
where error equals 1 inch. If so 1 is returned, otherwise 0. This function updates the
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Figure 4.13: vec::run()[time]
private state variable centered accordingly.
vec: :near-obj-det() [0,1] Determines whether any object can be detected at close
range by either an arc of the front five sonars (snu (15in.), sriis (20in.), sno (20in.),
sni (20in.), sri2 (15in.)) or an arc of the front three IR detectors (ir15, iro, ir\) and
returns 1 if this is the case and 0 otherwise. The private state variable object is
updated accordingly.
vec: :near-behind-det() [0,1] Determines whether an object can be detected to the
rear of the Nomad at very close range using an arc of the three rear IR detectors (ir?,
irg, irg), and returns 1 if an object is detected and 0 otherwise. The private state
variable near-obj-behind is updated accordingly.
vec: :run() [time] Activates the behaviour: the Nomad moves along vector(0) until
either an object is detected or the success criterion is met (see Figure 4.13) .The
function returns the total time spent moving along the vector and update the private
state variables initial-x, initial-y, final-x, final-y, final-theta, calls,
and time.
vec::go-back() [0,1] Returns the Nomad to the origin of the vector (see Fig-
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Figure 4.14: vec::go-back()[0,l]
ure 4.14), returning 1 on success, 0 otherwise. This function update the private state
variable centered accordingly.
vec: : success!) [0,1] Determines whether the current vector has met the success
criteria. If the current compass reading differs from the angle (theta) with which
the vector was initialised by ± 15 degrees, the function returns 1, otherwise 0. The
function update the private state variable success accordingly.
vec : : go-to-edge () [0,1] This function moves the Nomad to the furthest point achieved
by the vector (see Figure 4.15). It updates the private state variable reached-edge
and returns 1 on success, otherwise 0 is returned.
vec : :out-of-range!) [0,1] Assesses whether the current position of the Nomad falls
outside the range: initial-x < current-x < final-x and initial-y < current-y < final-y,
returning 1 if this is the case and 0 otherwise. The private state variable reached-edge
is updated accordingly.
vec: :print!) □ Prints all private state variables to a file for debugging purposes.
The sector object












Every novel, separable region of physical space which the Nomad encounters is instan¬
tiated as a programming object, possessing encapsulated functions combined with data
(see Figure 4.16) relating to all relevant information about that sector (e.g. vectors,
coordinates etc).
Initialisation
A sector is instantiated and initialised with a set of private state variables (see Fig¬
ure 4.16), by the controller invoking the 'new Sector' command:
new Sector(theta) [reference-to-sec] This function creates a new sector object,
with an initial bearing of theta, and returns a reference to the new object. The routine
automatically initialises the new object using sec: :init(theta) [].
sec: rinit (theta) [] Is called by new Sector (theta) [reference-to-sec] and cre¬
ates the private state variables depicted in Figure 4.16. A new sector is initialised
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The Sector object
Variables Functions
min-x = undef init(theta)[reference-to-sec]
min-y = undef bin-sonars()[]
max-x = undef select-vec()[vec-ref,0]
max-y = undef
learn ()[0.1 ]
reached-edge = undef det-suc-vec-list()[]
tolerance = undef ord-suc-vec()[]
variation = 30 get-best-fail()[]
get-best-vec ()[]
current-compass (cur-cp) dimensions!)!]
initial-theta = theta go-to-edge-state()[0,1 ]
initial-theta + variation (u 1) nav-origin()[0,1]
initial-theta + (2*variation) (u2)
initial-theta - variation (dl)
initial-theta -(2*variation) (d2)









sonar-bin = (snO ... sn!5)
Figure 4.16: Initialisation variables for a Sector object
with the current compass reading (theta) which is a seed for the creation of a set
of potential-vecs — a list of references to vector objects with bearings of ul, u2,
dl, and d2, which vary from theta by ± variation and ± 2 * variation. The list
of references to experienced-vecs and the variables best-fail, and best-vec are
initially undefined, as are min-x, min-y, max-x, max-y and reached-edge. The list
sonar-bin is initialised with the values of all 16 sonars.
Functions
The following functions can be invoked by a sector-object, and relate to function acti¬
vation, and modification of data within the object.
sec : : bin-sonars () [] Is used at initialisation of the new sector. Five calls are made
to get-snQ [0,1] the values are averaged and stored in the private state variable
sonar-bin.
sec : : select-vec () [0, vec-ref ] Selects a vector at random from the private list
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potential-vecs returning either a reference to the selected vector, or 0 if no unat-
tempted vectors remain.
sec: :learn() [0,1] Is the central learning algorithm (see Figure 4.17), it cycles through
the list of potential-vecs updating experienced-vecs on each iteration. If all vec¬
tors are attempted without an unrecoverable error occurring sec: :dimensions() [] is
used to update min-x, min-y, max-x, and max-y, the routines sec : : det-suc-vec-list,
sec::ord-suc-vec,
sec: :get-best-fail, and sec: :get-best-vec are used to determine which is the
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sec: :det-suc-vec-list() [] Constructs a private state variable (successful-vecs)
which is a list of references to vectors which have met the success criterion.
sec: :ord-suc-vec() [] Modifies the private state variable successful-vecs by or¬
dering the successful directions in terms of the total time spent moving along that
vector.
sec: :get-best-fail() [] Is called if no vectors have met the success criteria. In this
eventuality the routine constructs a private state variable best-fail which is a list of
references to all experienced vectors in order of locomotion time on each.
sec: : get-best-vec () [] Consults the private state variables successful-vecs or
best-fail and updates the variable best-vec with a reference to the most successful
experienced vector.
sec : : dimensions () [] Calculates the extremities of the sector in Cartesian space by
querying each of the vectors listed in experienced-vecs for their initial and final x
and y coordinates. The function updates the private state variables min-x, min-y,
max-x, max-y.
sec: :go-to-edge-state() [0,1] Moves the Nomad to the edge of the sector along
the most successful vector, using the vector's own routine vec: :go-to-edge() [0,1],
returning 1 on success, and 0 otherwise. The private state variable reached-edge is
updated accordingly.
sec: :nav-origin() [0,1] Is used to move the Nomad from any point in space within
the current state to the initial position within that state. The function returns 1 on
success, and 0 otherwise.
4.3.5 Behaviours
Behaviours functions are classified in terms of: initialisation, constraint, activation,
state modification, and data storage (printing).
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This behaviour is an orthotaxic mechanism designed for use near the home position
and ensures that the Nomad is positioned at exactly the same position in physical
space at the beginning of all runs, and also sometimes between consecutive behaviours
within a task.
Initialisation align: :init() [0,1] Align may only be run if the internal state vari¬
able near-home is true in which case 1 is returned, otherwise 0.
Constraint align: :constraint() [0,1] The only constraint acting on align con¬
cerns battery power. If cpuvolt or motorvolt fall too low during execution of
the behaviour 0 is returned, otherwise 1.
Activation align: :run(distance) [] Utilises the library routines orient-ahead() [1] ,
orient-rear(distance)[1], orient-left(distance)[1] ,
orient-right (distance) [1] , align-rear (distance) [1] , align-left (distance) [1],
and align-right (distance) [1] to position the Nomad an exact distance from
surrounding surfaces.
State modification align: :mod-state(status,time .timeout) [] updates the in¬
ternal state variables home, last-behaviour, last-behaviour-status,
last-behaviour-timeout and last-behaviour-time-taken along with all ex¬
ternal state variables.
Print align: :print() [] Writes all positional and temporal information to a file for
debugging purposes.
Navigate
Initialisation navigate:: init () [1] The behaviour navigate can be run subse¬
quently to any other behaviour whether it exited successfully or not, ensuring
that it can be used both to navigate outward from home, and then back again.
This function currently returns 1 at all times.
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Constraint navigate::constraint(x,y,timeout,range,frequency)[0,1] The gen¬
eral constraint function for navigate runs as the parent component of a fork sys¬
tem call and consists of the go-monitor (x,y .timeout, range .frequency) [0,1]
function called with the parameters of (x,y) of the desired position, a timeout
which is varied depending on the distance to be navigated (default 400 sec¬
onds), a recovery range of 130 inches, and a checking frequency of 1 second,
in combination with the powerO [0,1] library function. If either powerO [0,1]
or go-monitor(x,y .timeout .range,frequency,) [0,1] return 0, then this is
passed on by navigate::constraint(x,y,timeout.range.frequency)[0,1] .
Activation navigate: : run (x.y, range) [0,1] The function which executes navigate
operates as a child process, using the library function go(x.y.range) [0,1]. The
default value of range is 10 inches.
State modification navigate: :mod-state(status,time,timeout) [] On comple¬
tion navigate updates the internal state variables last-behaviour,
last-behaviour-status, last-behaviour-time-taken,
and last-behaviour-timeout, and all external state variables.
Print navigate: :print() [] This routine prints all coordinate and time information
to a file for debugging purposes.
Dead-reckon
This behaviour (referred to as dead-rec) is used for dead-reckoning back to the home
position after invocation of retrace.
Initialisation dead-rec: :init() [1] The behaviour dead-rec can only be run sub¬
sequently to retrace whether it was successful or not. This function currently
returns 1 at all times.
Constraint dead-rec: : constraint (x.y, timeout) [0,1] The constraint function for
dead-rec runs as the parent component of a fork system call and consists of the
go-monitor (x ,y .timeout .range .frequency) [0,1] function called with the pa¬
rameters of (x,y) of the desired position, and timeout with the default values of
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range and frequency, in combination with the powerQ [0,1] library function.
If either
go-monitor(x,y,timeout,range.frequency,)[0,1] or power() [0,1] return
0, then this is passed on by dead-rec: :constraint(x,y,timeout) [0,1].
Activation dead-rec: :run(x,y,range) [0,1] The function which runs dead-rec
operates as a child process, using the library function go(x,y,range) [0,1]. The
default value of range is 10 inches.
State modification dead-rec: :mod-state(status,time,timeout) [] On comple¬
tion dead-rec updates the internal state variables last-behaviour,
last-behaviour-status, last-behaviour-time-taken, last-behaviour-timeout,
near-home, and sector, and all external state variables.
Print dead-rec: :print() [] This routine prints all coordinate and time information
to a file for debugging purposes.
Axis
This behaviour uses the objects corridor and direction (section 4.3.4 in an attempt
to get the Nomad to learn the long axis of a corridor environment (see section 5.2.3
for a full description).
Initialisation axis: :init() [0,1] The behaviour axis can be run only if the pre¬
vious behaviour was align and it exited successfully. In this case the function
returns 1, otherwise 0.
Constraint axis: : constraint () [0,1] Only two constraints are imposed on axis —
this function returns 1 if timeout has been exceeded or power () [0,1] indicates
that the batteries are running low, otherwise 0 is returned.
Activation axis: :run() [] Is a complex function (see Figure 4.18) designed to enable
the Nomad to discover the long axis of its corridor environment. It iterates 4 times
using the corridor: :run() [] routine, narrowing down towards the privileged
vector within the environment through use of the corridor: : get-best-dir and
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corridor: : create-var (theta, variation) [] routines with the value of variation
becoming progressively smaller (30, 10, 5, and finally 2 degrees).
Figure 4.18: axis::run()[]
State modification axis: :mod-state (status , time, timeout) [] Updates internal
state variables last-behaviour, last-behaviour-status,
last-behaviour-time-taken, last-behaviour-timeout, private variable
privileged-dir, and all external state variables.
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Print axis: :print() [] Writes all time, corridor, and direction related information
to a file for debugging purposes.
Learn-route
This behaviour (referred to as learn) uses the objects sector and vector (sec¬
tion 4.3.4) and causes the Nomad to learn about its physical environment through
a combination of low-level sensing and trial and error (see section 5.2.4).
Initialisation learn: : init () [0,1] The behaviour learn can only be run if the pre¬
vious behaviour was align and it exited successfully. In this eventuality the
function returns 1, otherwise 0.
Constraint learn: :constraint() [0,1] As much of the monitoring of the success
and default conditions of learn is accomplished within the behaviour itself only
two constraints are imposed by the controller. This function returns 1 if timeout
has been exceeded or power() [0,1] indicates that the batteries are running low.
Otherwise 0 is returned.
Activation learn: :run(number) [0,1] Is a complex function (see Figure 4.19) en¬
abling the Nomad to learn about number of discrete physical spaces within its
environment. It iterates number of times calling the sec: :learn() [0,1] and
sec: :go-to-edge-state() [0,1] functions on each iteration. The function re¬
turns 1 if all iterations have been completed successfully, 0 otherwise.
State modification learn: :mod-state(status ,time,timeout) [] Updates internal
(last-behaviour, last-behaviour-status,last-behaviour-time-taken,
last-behaviour-timeout, current-sector, and sector-list) and all exter¬
nal state variables (rather than the private state variables belonging to its com¬
ponent sectors and vectors).
Print learn: :print() [] Writes all coordinate, time, sector, and vector related
information to a file for debugging purposes.
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Figure 4.19: learn::run(number)[0,l]
Retrace-route
This behaviour (referred to as retrace) allows the Nomad to retrace a previously
learned route, following each sector on its outward journey, but using dead-reckoning
to return to its home position. The result looks very much like the navigation of the
desert ant (Cataglyphis).
Initialisation retrace: :init() [0,1] The behaviour retrace can run at any time
as long as the internal state variable home indicates that the Nomad is positioned
CHAPTER 4. A SYNTHETIC ARCHITECTURE 145
Figure 4.20: retrace::run(sector-number)[0,l]
at the base location.
Constraint retrace: : constraint O [0,1] The only constraints operating over retrace
are a timeout, and battery power (power() [0,1]). If the timeout has not been
exceeded and power is sufficient the routine returns 0, otherwise 1.
Activation retrace: : run (sector-number) [0,1] This function (see Figure 4.20) queries
the user for sector-number (keyboard input) and causes the Nomad to move to
the origin of sector-number through all previously learned sectors on the route.
The function returns 1 on successful completion, 0 otherwise.
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State modification retrace : :mod-state (status , time .timeout) [] Updates the in¬
ternal state variables last-behaviour, last-behaviour-status,
last-behaviour-time-taken, last-behaviour-timeout, and sector.
Print retrace : : print () [] Prints all coordinate and time information for each sector
to a file for debugging purposes.
4.3.6 An example task
A task is a sequence of behaviours, designed to achieve some non-trivial aim. The ex¬
ample here (see Figure 4.21) runs the three behaviours align, learn(4), dead-rec,
align, retrace(3), dead-rec, and align in sequence (see sections 5.3 8z 5.4 for a
full exposition).
Upon start-up the Nomad aligns to its home position, providing a fixed point in phys¬
ical space from which all subsequent sectors will be defined. If this behaviour exits
successfully, the next behaviour learn(4) is invoked and the Nomad begins to try
different vectors, creating 4 sectors of physical space, each characterised by a different
set of possible vectors and one privileged vector determined by trial and error. Suc¬
cessful execution of learn(4) is followed by dead-rec, the Nomad uses its on-board
odometry to navigate back to near its starting position. If this is successful align is
invoked to position the Nomad exactly at home.
The next stage of the sequence involves retrace (3) which causes the Nomad to re¬
trace its previously learned route up to the origin of the third sector it has learned,
whereupon once more dead-rec is called to navigate back to the region of home, and
align once more positions the Nomad exactly at the origin of the task.
4.4 Summary: a synthetic architecture
The architecture described herein is designed to be a platform for further development.
As stated earlier, 'incrementing by design1 (McGonigle. 1991), is a core feature of the
stance adopted herein. The potential for the refinement of a number of critical control
elements has been provided, facilitated by the modular and hierarchical organisation
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Figure 4.21: An example task: align, learn, dead-rec, align, retrace, dead-rec, align
of the system. Scope exists for much greater development of the architecture than
was possible in the current research. The following design features have been incorpo¬
rated within the architecture; most, if not all, have been constructed to allow further
development.
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Long-term development of the system is envisaged to involve the extension of learning
and self-organisation to action selection and error interpretation and recovery (see
section 6.3).
Embodiment and situatedness The architecture controls a Nomad 200 mobile robot
in a real world niche4. As with all such control architectures the sensory-motor
capacities of the robot, and features of the niche, constrain the implementation
of behaviours.
Embodiment constraints The clearest example of the use of such constraints
was the utilisation of compass error to facilitate the self-selected navigation
described in section 5.2.4.
Niche constraints and niche engineering The geometrical structure of the
niche suggested, and served to constrain, the method of navigation finally
chosen for the system. A 'home' location was provided by construction of a
position at one end of a corridor with a unique sensory signature.
Meaning through action The only competence examined in depth — learning
to navigate — involves the system segmenting physical space into distinct,
internally-represented 'sectors' based on situated action (see section 5.2.4).
The meaning of such sectors is therefore derived from the interaction of the
system's capabilities and its environment.
Self organisation The navigational implementation described above (section 5.2.4) is
inherently self-organised. From a design primitive which is essentially a relatively
simple algorithm specifying movement on the basis of current orientation, and
an inbuilt economy metric, the system learns about distinct regions of space.
Economy The in-built economy metric is used to choose between experienced
'vectors'. Choosing those which permit the most movement for the least
compass error ensures that the system maximises distance travelled whilst
simultaneously minimising the scope for navigational error.
4 Although a suite of simulation software exists for this platform, provided by Nomadic Technologies
Inc., it was not used in the present research — largely because of technical difficulties.
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State based interpretation Two levels of state-based interpretation are possible
within the system as currently implemented.
• Task state space, allows for varying interpretations of signals, events, error,
and differential ordering of recovery procedures etc. depending on internal
context.
• Segmentation of physical space into discrete internally represented sectors
(section 5.2.4) based on behavioural capacity, means that the system 'knows'
about different areas of the external world. Interpretation of objects and
events within these different areas can then occur. Error interpretation and
recovery, and later object identification, will depend on an internal context
which reflects the external environment.
Hierarchical organisation Although the system is inherently hierarchical, the ad¬
vantages of this structure are at present only exploited by the designer. Addition
of novel, more abstracted and less time-critical control, is envisaged to occur
through design. Recombination of behaviours, and interpretation of behavioural
default and success should ultimately be subjected to a self-organised learning
process.
Serial control The initialisation conditions of each behaviour specify when it can
be implemented. These refer to both internal and external criteria. The serial
organisation of system behaviour is specified by task demands yet reactivity
is retained: specification of default conditions ensures interruptibility and thus
general reactivity to changing situations. Again this is an area in need of further
investigation. Currently the behavioural syntax (specification of initialisation
and default conditions) is pre-installed but learning such a syntax should be a
long-range goal.
Error cognisance and recovery Each behaviour's default conditions specify error
occurrence. An associated stack of recovery procedures can be implemented in
order to recover from error. This aspect of the system has currently received
little attention, but preliminary investigations demonstrate that the architecture
supports error cognisance and recovery (see section 5.1.4).
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Autonomy The system is not merely flexless, but has the capacity to select behaviours
based on task demands, implement them and recover from error if necessary.
The ability to categorise, and learn to avoid, error could be added to the current
system. Extending system autonomy to both the serial organisation of behaviour,
and to hierarchical control is a long-range goal of the project.
Life history The system possesses a memory allowing storage of, and later access to,
all state information across runs. This provides the potential for the system to
become progressively more adaptive over time. Currently memory functions have
been exploited only for self-organised navigation, and preliminary examination
of error recovery. In the long term, this aspect of the system will be critical,
underlying developments in all areas.
As should be clear from the summary above, the architecture strives to incorporate
many of the essential features suggested by our synthetic stance and is easily extendible
both horizontally (addition and modification of behaviours) and vertically (progressive
addition of more abstracted control and learning algorithms).
Chapter 5
Navigation
Navigation was chosen as a suitable competence to engineer for three reasons:
1. It is sufficiently complex to allow testing of the overall architecture in a non-trivial
environment.
2. A locative competence is absolutely critical to a locomoting system forming the
next layer of the logical hierarchy of design suggested by McGonigle (1991).
3. There exists a history of navigational implementations within the research group
on which to build, and with which to compare the current implementation.
This chapter initially describes some preliminary research targeted at navigation with¬
out learning — in this case a computationally cheap dead-reckoning competence util¬
ising on-board odometry. The ability to get back home from distant parts of the niche
is a vital competence for a locomoting organism. The aim of this part of the imple¬
mentation was to design a simple and reliable navigational algorithm to achieve this.
Odometric information alone was used in order to determine a steering angle back
home, this angle was fed into the motors and the Nomad steered, more or less directly,
toward home. Detection of obstacles in the path led to navigation being temporarily
interrupted by avoidance. No planning was involved in this algorithm. However, as
dead-reckoning is notoriously error-prone the task was divided into two stages: naviga¬
tion toward home, followed by alignment to local landmarks. The combination of these
two strategies allowed robust navigation over distances of tens of metres. A corollary to
this part of the research was a preliminary investigation of error recovery procedures.
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The next phase of research concerned learning to navigate. Using only short range
sensing and compass information the task was for the Nomad to learn routes through
the niche based on vector information derived from the magnetic compass together with
odometry through trial and error learning arbitrated by an inbuilt economy criterion.
Two methods were investigated.
A global niche Initially the entire niche space (for this stage the long corridor) was
treated as a single entity. Through movement along selected vectors, and their
inverse, would the Nomad determine the privileged vector (corresponding to the
long axis of the niche) by logging time and distance travelled? Unlawful com¬
pass error made this approach impossible and inspired the next phase of the
investigation.
Niche segmentation For this phase compass error was utilised to index distance
travelled. Now movement along an attempted vector was terminated not only if
an obstacle was detected but also once compass error exceeded 15%. Once all
vectors had been attempted, the Nomad moved to the final point of the most
successful vector and the process was repeated. In this manner segmentation
of physical space into discrete internally represented sectors was achieved based
dually on compass error and obstacle distribution.
5.1 Navigation without learning
Biological organisms have been shown to utilise a vast range of information sources,
both internal and external, for short, middle, and long-range navigation (see McFar-
land, 1999, for a review). Examples of such strategies are:
Taxes which involve tightly-coupled movement toward, at an angle to, or away from a
stimulus source, for example the use of pheromone trails by many insect species
(Shorey, 1976).
Compass orientation which involves movement on a particular vector using only
idiothetic information (McFarland. 1999).
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Dead reckoning (path integration) which requires maintenance of a cumulative record
of time spent moving on given vectors. A steering vector towards goal is derived
by vector addition. Such a strategy is widespread (Wehner & Srinivasan, 1981;
Mittelstaedt & Mittelstaedt, 1982; Etienne et al., 1994, for examples).
Piloting which involves the use of known stimuli located proximally to a goal (Gallis-
tel, 1990), or a sequence of known stimuli for progressive goal approach (Deutsch,
1960).
Homing which involves the use of landmarks with known geometric relationship to a
goal to determine a steering course (McFarland, 1999). It is often claimed that
this form of navigation requires some form of 'cognitive map'.
The type of navigation initially demanded of the Nomad was a form of dead reckon¬
ing, or path integration. In fact, vector addition is not explicitly involved. Rather
the system logs starting position in Cartesian coordinates, on-board odometry later
provides the current updated position from which a steering vector can be obtained.
Cumulative odometric error means that following runs of some 10s of metres, the goal
location can be shifted by as much as 2 metres. In order to circumvent this difficulty,
orthokinesis was used to accurately relocate the Nomad at the goal position.
5.1.1 The task
The first navigational competence developed was an odometrically-based routine for
dead-reckoning towards a given (x,y) position, in more or less a straight line. In fact,
navigation was always toward the niche-engineered home location at this stage, as the
Nomad possessed no routines for accurately distinguishing other parts of the niche.
At the beginning of a run alignment routines (align see section 4.3.5) were used to
position the Nomad exactly at home so that it was straightforward to determine how
successful navigation had been over a series of runs. After a period of time spent
avoiding, or wall-following the navigation routine navigate (see section 4.3.5)
would be called. Now the task was to get back home using onboard odometric data to
determine desired heading.
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Figure 5.1: The navigation task: align, avoid, navigate, align
Routines and behaviours recruited
Library functions Behaviours
avoid(distance) [] (sec. 4.3.4) align (sec. 4.3.5)
navigate (sec. 4.3.5)
5.1.2 State and the granularity of navigation
As odometric error tends to increase with distance travelled, onboard records of posi¬
tion are generally not sufficiently accurate to allow precise navigation back to a point.
Within the biological realm, path integration is often combined with local landmark
recognition. The honey bee (Apis mellifera), and desert ants (Formica aquilonia) both
utilise a strategy of dead-reckoning near to home, and then matching current retinal
image with a stored representation of landmarks (Wehner &: Raber, 1979; Cartwright
& Collett, 1982, 1983). The desert ant has also been observed to implement a strategy
of nest area approach followed by spiralling in circles of ever widening radius until the
nest has been located (Gallistel, 1990, p. 61).
Navigation was therefore analogously split into two phases with differing granularity
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(see Donnett & McGonigle (1991) and McGonigle & St Johnston (1995) for earlier
implementations of such a strategy). This served to simplify the development of the
main navigation algorithm, and allowed aspects of the niche to aid location finding,
rather than depending purely on error-prone odometry. The state-based nature of the
architecture greatly facilitated this approach. By defining a task (figure 5.1) as, for
example:
align => avoid => navigate =>■ align
once navigation to the area (defined as a radius of 2 metres) of home had been achieved,
the controller switched internal state. The initialisation conditions of align ensured
that it could be executed only if there was no previous behaviour, or if the previous
behaviour was navigate and it had exited successfully. This updating of state is
critical: whereas during navigation sensor readings are interpreted as objects to be
avoided, during the second orientation phase (align section 4.3.5) sensor readings are
interpreted as objects to which the Nomad must approach and orient itself.
5.1.3 The algorithms
Navigation stage
The first implementation of navigation on the Nomad (the behaviour navigate de¬
scribed in section 4.3.5) utilised a simple algorithm which calculated desired heading
from the disparity between the Nomad's current position in Euclidean space, and the
target position (get-angle (x ,y) [theta] section 4.3.4). This calculation was repeated
twice a second and the new value of 9 fed into the motors.
The controller assessed default and timeout conditions terminating or suspending the
navigation behaviour when, or if, appropriate. If the sensor readings indicated that
an object was blocking the desired path, navigate was temporarily suspended and
avoid took control. The Nomad could not get stuck in an avoid loop as avoid itself
would timeout after 20 seconds, at which point the Nomad would attempt to continue
to navigate.
Repeated interruptions of navigate by align inevitably lead to the occurrence of a
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timeout. For this development stage the time regarded as reasonable for successful
navigation between current and goal positions was taken to be 80% of the time taken
avoiding from home to the current position. If the navigation behaviour was still in
operation after this length of time, a 'timeout' was said to have occurred and recovery
procedures (see below) were recruited.
Orientation stage
A combination of odometric error and the sheer bulk of the Nomad made more accurate
positioning using only odometric information impossible (see section 5.1.2) therefore
the second phase of navigation involved running the behaviour align (section 4.3.5)
which implemented a form of orthokinesis allowing precise positioning.
If navigate exited successfully the internal state variables last-behaviour-status
and near-home would equal 1, and last-behaviour would equal 'navigate' in which
case the initialisation conditions for align would be met and the behaviour could com¬
mence. The Nomad now entered a locative stage of navigation where niche-engineered
features of the environment were exploited to aid precise positioning. Initially rotat¬
ing base and turret to the region of greatest free space (orient-aheadQ [0,1] sec¬
tion 4.3.4), meant that orientation and alignment with respect to side and rear surfaces
could occur.
A combination of navigate and align robustly permitted the Nomad to position itself
within 1 or 2 inches of its starting position even following runs of 10s of metres from
home.
5.1.4 Navigation and error recovery
The structure of the Nomad's niche (see figure 4.3), long corridors, with separate
rooms, and dog-leg corners, meant that the strategy of steering more or less directly
toward home, in the absence of planning and prospective control, would often fail.
Although primitive, one advantage of this algorithm is that it is rapid, requires no
form of spatial map, and does not suffer from the problems associated with planning
a route through unknown territory. Furthermore, timeout occurs often giving a rich
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error space in which to test recovery procedures both in and of themselves, and as part
of the overall architecture.
In situations where the Nomad became stuck behind a corner, avoid would repeat¬
edly interrupt navigate leading to a timeout — navigational failure due to timeout
was assumed always to be the result of blockage between the current position of the
Nomad and home1. Preliminary investigation of recovery procedures centered on sim¬
ple recovery strategies such as wall following, and creating a temporary goal location








Figure 5.2: A recovery procedure for navigation: wall-following
1 It must be noted that the Nomad, in its current incarnation is unable to reliably distinguish land¬
mark features of the niche and thus navigational failure resulting from massive odometric error is
unrecoverable. In the cases where odometric error became too great no recovery procedures would
be successful and the task would return failure.
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Wall following The first example of a recovery procedure (Figure 5.2) switches the
Nomad into wall-following mode, which continues until either the distance from
the goal is less than recovery-range in which case navigate returns success,
or timeout has once again occurred (see Figure 5.3) when obviously failure is
returned. Given the structure of the niche, long walls with few areas of free space,
this has the potential to be a robustly successful strategy.
Obviously a potential difficulty was that wall following might occur in the wrong
direction, i.e. away from home. This problem was circumvented by addition of a
monitoring function (section 4.3.4) that compared current (x, y) with home (r,
y) over a small time interval. Because in some cases movement towards home
might temporarily result in an increase of:
wall following is terminated only if both Ax and Ay are increasing. This simple





Figure 5.3: A recovery procedure for navigation: Wall-following. The algorithm
Goal creation An alternative strategy involved creation of a new temporary goal
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(see Figure 5.4). In the case of path obstruction, detouring along either the x
or y axes is an effective strategy given the angular construction of the niche.
If navigation to this temporary goal was successful an attempt was made to
steer directly toward home, if unsuccessful once more goal creation was repeated.
This process continued until either the Nomad was within recovery-range, or







Figure 5.4: A recovery procedure for navigation: Creating a temporary goal
Preliminary investigations with the recovery procedures depicted in Figure 5.3 and
Figure 5.5 indicated that the concept of a stack of recovery procedures for a behaviour,
each maintaining a record of success and failure, is workable in principle. However,
recovery from error was not the central focus of this implementation and no further
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This early phase of navigational development consisted of a task (see Figure 5.1) such
as: align => avoid => navigate ==> align. Although not really an adaptive
behaviour in the strict sense, for the purposes of this investigation avoid could start
only if align had exited successfully. After a given timeout period navigate was
called and, if navigate exited successfully, align could be called once more and, if
successful, the task would itself return success.
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Navigation was split into two distinct phases, navigation and orientation, analogous to
the coarse and fine grained goal seeking behaviour of the desert ant (Wehner & Raber,
1979). The serial, state-based construction of the architecture was critical, allowing
for signal reinterpretation at different task stages. Niche engineering was utilised to
create a recognisable home location from which all runs began. Niche constraints,
essentially the corridor environment and the predominance of right-angles, served to
simplify recovery procedures. Preliminary investigations showed that the architecture
could support multiple stacked recovery procedures, and execute them when required.
5.2 Learning to navigate
5.2.1 Rationale
Although algorithms had been developed which allowed the Nomad to use a combina¬
tion of the strategies of dead-reckoning, and orientation (see section 5.1.3) to find its
way home from distant sectors of its niche, the behaviour obtained lacked the robust¬
ness which might be achieved using a learning strategy. Furthermore, the navigation
behaviour, as initially implemented, provided little potential for further derivations.
The next phase of research2 concerned learning to navigate, again constrained by our
overriding economy considerations, both in terms of design and internal evaluation
criteria. Using only compass information and short range sensing, the Nomad was
required to self-select the best trajectories within the niche with the eventual goal
being movement along the longest axis of the niche with the least perturbation caused
by obstacles, and at the cheapest design and computational cost.
5.2.2 Using a compass for navigation
Compass information provides a global directional frame of reference within which ac¬
tion can occur. Within the biological realm such global compass information can be
obtained both internally and externally. Many organisms, for example bacteria, hon¬
eybees, and pigeons (Walcott, & Walcott. 1982) have been found to possess miniature
magnets which might potentially be influenced by the earth's magnetic field. Although
2
Buoyed by the arrival of a new magnetic compass!
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it remains unclear how this information is encoded within the nervous system (McFar-
land, 1999), such idiothetic compass information does seem to be utilised by a number
of organisms. The internal clock sense of honeybees has been shown to be influenced
by a variety of magnetic phenomena (Gould, 1980), as is the navigational ability of
pigeons (Bookman, 1978). Birds in general seem to be capable of using the declination
of the earth's magnetic field, in conjunction with visual information, for navigation
(Wallraff, 1978).
Other species, from desert ants (Wehner & Raber, 1979) to starlings (Kramer, 1950),
have been found to utilise the polarisation of sunlight by the atmosphere, others, such
as the indigo bunting (Emlen, 1972), have been found to utilise rotation of stellar con¬
stellations (Schmidt-Koenig, 1979; Wallraff. 1984). Possibly the most common strategy
is utilisation of both internal and external compass information, for example constel¬
lations and magnetic field are used by many migratory birds (Wiltschko & Wiltschko,
1975, 1976).
This implementation strove to develop 'true' dead reckoning based dually on compass
information and odometry, following an initial trial and error learning phase which
would demand self-selection of vectors by the system.
The magnetic compass fitted to the Nomad returned the angle from magnetic north
in units of one tenth of a degree. A simple function queried the compass for this value
(get-cpO [0,1] section 4.3.1). Whilst stationary a time-series of the values returned
indicated small fluctuations around a central value of ± 3 degrees with occasional
drastic spikes with several hundreds of degrees of error.
These oscillations were overcome simply by taking ten consecutive readings (over ap-
prox. 1 sec) disregarding any reading which was more than 5 degrees different from
any of the others, and then averaging the remainder of the values. This simple func¬
tion (smooth-cpO [compass] section 4.3.4) served to eliminate spikes and provided a
consistent compass value for any single position.
Subroutines (turn-to-bearing(theta) [0,1] and fine-align(theta) [0,1], see sec¬
tion 4.3.4) were developed in order to enable the Nomad to orient turret and base to






Starting from any position along the long corridor of the niche, the Nomad was required
to determine the long axis of the corridor by moving along a series of bearings, and
their inverse, until an obstruction was detected — progressively narrowing down the
set of possible bearings by trial and error, and eventually settling into one privileged
direction of movement.






The learning task was for the Nomad to use its compass information in order to de¬
termine the long axis of the niche (see Figure 4.3). The first attempt to solve this
problem utilised the behaviour axis (section 4.3.5) and consisted of an algorithm (see
Figure 5.6) which moved the Nomad along its current compass bearing until an ob¬
struction was detected, whereupon the Nomad moved along the inverse of the vector
until its path was again blocked. A log was maintained of the time spent in free travel
along the vector and its inverse.
Initially the starting bearing (theta) was used as a seed from which to derive alterna¬
tive bearings. This initial value was varied by ± 30 and ± 60 degrees. Movement was
attempted along each of the resulting five bearings. A log of time and distance infor¬
mation was consulted and an economy criterion used to select the best three bearings
- those which admitted the longest amounts of uninterrupted movement.
These three bearings were then each tried once more and the best of the three se¬
lected. This direction then became the seed for a further set of three bearings (±
10 degrees), the best of which became the seed for a further set of three bearings








































dir(811) time = 3
dir(211) time = 10
dir(511) time = 0
Data: (runl)
potential-dirs(311,211,111)
dirt 111) time = 0
dir(21 1) time = 3
dir(31l) time = 15
Data: (run 2)
potential-dirs(361,311,261)
dir(361) time = 5




lir(281) time = 2
lir(241) time = 0
lir(261) time = 0
Figure 5.7: A typical run
bearings (± 2 degrees). Although the implementation described here only iterated
three times (see section 4.3.5) in theory this process could thence be iterated until
no improvements in performance occurred. It was thought that varying the as yet
most successful direction by progressively smaller amounts (determined by ratio
and reduce-ratio) would result in the Nomad setting upon the longest axis of travel
which should correspond to the corridor of the niche. In this manner it was hoped
that, in the absence of both a pre-installed map and long range sensory information,
successful navigation in the corridor area of the niche would be obtained.
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Initial results
Although the algorithm itself appeared to work as expected (see Figure 5.7 for data
from a typical run), a serious problem was that even over the relatively small distance
along the corridor of the niche, the compass readings changed quite rapidly. At different
points along the axis the readings were too divergent to allow one main free axis to be
determined. After travelling along theta and discovering an obstacle, when the Nomad
attempted to travel back along the bearing (inverse-theta) the compass reading was
displaced such that movement was instead at an angle to the desired bearing (see
Figure 5.8).
yv'i
Figure 5.8: Compass error caused movement at an angle to the desired bearing
The left side of the figure depicts what was expected to happen: after travelling along
the bearing theta (30 degrees) and meeting an obstruction, the library functions
turn-to-bearing(theta) [] and f ine-align(theta) [] are called and the Nomad
should rotate to the inverse of the original bearing (210 degrees) and start to move
back towards the origin x. In reality (right hand figure), due to changes in the compass
value after moving the distance (d), 0 degrees has shifted anti-clockwise through the
angle z. Now when the Nomad attempts to turn to inverse-theta, according to the
original bearing system it is actually on a bearing of 180 degrees and movement along
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this bearing results in approach to point Y.
The severity of the compass drift over even apparently very small distances meant
that a change in the position of the robot by even a metre or two could occasionally
disrupt the returned compass reading by up to 200 degrees. Obviously such large
variations were unexpected and quickly became problematic — especially in such a
large navigable space.
The initial response to this problem was to see whether or not this drift was lawful —
if so, it might have provided unforeseen benefits, for example as a third (along with
odometry and time), and independent, distance metric. Such lawful variation might
have provided a very useful confirmatory device with respect to actual (as opposed
to odometrically derived) distance travelled. Unfortunately this was not to be. The
variation of the compass readings seemed to depend primarily on vicinity to the many
computers and monitors located around the niche, and (presumed) steel girders holding
the building together and did not seem to obey any lawful pattern of variation that
could be detected.
The solution to the compass-drift problem led to the development of the algorithm
which will be discussed below (section 5.2.4). Breaking up the space into smaller
physical regions allowed the Nomad to rely on its compass information within a region,
without large-scale movement being compromised by error.
5.2.4 Final implementation — niche segmentation
Rationale and task
Rapid changes in the returned compass value even over small distances meant that
the initial approach: learning of the long axis of the niche through trial and error
experimentation over the entire space had to be abandoned. The compass, however,
provided an invaluable source of information with respect to the orientation of the
robot, in that the other sensors (sonar and ir) were simply too inaccurate to provide
exact orientation cues in virtually all areas of the niche (with the exception of the
niche-engineered home location discussed earlier). Despite quickly mounting compass
error upon movement, returned values whilst stationary provided useful orientation
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information for the Nomad. In a given position the obtained compass reading could
be used to reliably position the robot in a desired orientation. Consequently, it was
thought that primitives could be installed in the Nomad which would ensure that
movement remained within the error tolerance of the compass. By adding a further
constraint to trial and error experience of potential vectors, namely termination of
movement if compass error reached 15% of its initial value, the movement of the Nomad
would never result in unmanageable disorientation. Iteration of the process of vector
derivation, experimentation, and self-selection should lead to segmentation of the niche,
dually based on the Nomad's experience of obstacle distribution and compass error.
Initially the Nomad was positioned near home, and the orthokinetic behaviour align
(section 4.3.5) was run to attain an exact, standardised starting position (see Fig¬
ure 5.9) — it was assumed that all runs would start here providing a constant frame
of reference with respect to which all movement in the niche would be interpreted.
From this position the Nomad was required to progress down the long axis of the niche
by attempting movement along different vectors, segmenting the niche into distinct
sectors as it went.
Routines and behaviours recruited
Figure 5.9: Initial position.
Library functions Behaviours
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INITIALISE
Figure 5.10: The final learning algorithm.
The algorithm
The general structure of the algorithm outlined above (see section 5.2.3) was retained
with a number of modifications for this new approach to navigational learning. It
was decided that the movement-related compass error would be incorporated in the
modified algorithm. As before, the Nomad would begin with its initial orientation
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acting as a seed for a set of vectors to be derived and attempted, but now success
would be defined as an (empirically-determined) unacceptable error build-up on the
compass. Assuming that movement along a vector should result in stability of the
compass reading, when the value returned by the magnetic compass attained a value
differing by more than ± 15 degrees from the expected value theta this was taken
as an indication that the Nomad had made some progress along the given vector and
was thus taken as a criterion of successful movement (odometric and time-based data
continued to be collected in order to ensure that some movement had, in fact, occurred
and to enable arbitration between multiple vectors which resulted in compass error).
The behaviour learn (number) [] (described in section 4.3.5) was executed after align
had exited successfully. This behaviour iterated a number of times, on each iteration
a new sector was instantiated (corresponding to a discrete region of physical space)
with a seed angle (theta) namely the initial bearing of the robot.
Each sector created a list of potential-vectors and instantiated each one as a
vector object. Each vector was then executed in a random order (vec : :run() [time]),
with odometric, time and compass data logged at start and finish, along with success
status. Upon meeting an obstacle, or the success criterion being met, the Nomad
reversed to the origin of the sector using vec: :go-back() [0,1]. Once a sector
had exhausted its potential-vectors the most successful one was determined ei¬
ther from amongst those which had been successful (where compass error varies by
± 15% from theta) or, if no vectors had met the success criteria, by using a time-
metric. Whichever vector permitted the longest amount of uninterrupted movement
was chosen as the privileged vector for that sector (see sec : : get-best-vec () [] and
sec: :get-best-fail() [] section 4.3.4).
The routine sec : : go-to-edge-state () [0 ,1] then moved the robot to the edge of the
current sector along the privileged vector using the routine vec: : go-to-edge () [0,1]
This process coidd then be iterated a given number of times (see Figures 4.19 and 5.10).
It is important to note that at the edge of the sector (following implementation of
vec: : go-to-edge () [0,1]) along the vector (60 the obtained compass reading is likely
to differ substantially from theta. This was the problem with the initial attempt at
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axis learning (section 5.2.3). However this second implementation, by breaking up the
niche into smaller units of space, determined either by obstacle layout or compass error,
circumvents this problem. Within a sector the compass can be relied upon to give a
stable reading. Essentially the compass is recalibrated at the transition points between
sectors in that each possesses its own magnetic frame of reference (see Figure 5.11).
North A \ wNorthyNo
STATE BOUNDARY STATE BOUNDARY
Figure 5.11: After three iterations: transition between sectors. Each sector possesses
a unique magnetic frame of reference.
Experimental results
The outcome of the repeated iteration of this algorithm was movement along the free
axis of the corridor area of the niche, which was broken down by self-determined internal
criteria into discrete physical spaces (see Figures 5.12 & 5.13). The fixed starting
position obtained through the orthotaxic mechanisms implemented by align meant
that information about learned sectors could be written to memory and recalled at a
later time — the Nomad possesses a life-history and can begin to develop a cumulative
knowledge of its surroundings.
Once learn(number) [] had exited successfully the Nomad was positioned some dis¬
tance away from home and could invoke dead-rec(x,y.range) [] in order to reach
the vicinity of home, and then align to attain the exact origin position.
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Figure 5.12: The Nomad's view of its noisy world.
Key:
» attempted bearing
- most successful direction for sta e
state boundary
Figure 5.13: Fourth iteration: transitions between sectors.
5.3 Retracing routes
Learning a number of sectors and their corresponding vectors should ideally result in
long-term benefit for the system. The Nomad is a large robot whose batteries run down
after a period of 3-4 hours, therefore a long-term memory is essential (see section 4.2).
The routine mem: : save (filename,data-list) [0,1] is invoked at the end of a run
and uses the Perl module 'Storable'3 to collapse sector and vector information, and
write it to filename. At the beginning of a new run invocation of the command
mem: : retrieve (filename) [0 .reference] loads this data into memory. The Nomad
3 Freely available from the comprehensive Perl archive network CPAN: ftp.funet.fi.
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can therefore access the data related to previous runs.
Assuming that the Nomad is placed near the home location and align() [] is imple¬
mented, the odometric and compass information relating to the stored sectors and
vectors will remain valid. The task now is to use this information to navigate to a
required sector without having to repeat the trial and error learning procedure.
5.3.1 Moving outward from home
Routines and behaviours recruited
Library functions Behaviours





The behaviour retrace (section 4.3.5) queries the internal state variable sector-list
for available sectors or, if none are present, attempts to load a previously learned list
by invoking retrieve (filename) [reference] (section 4.3.5).
If the behaviour is called with the optional argument sector-number and there are
sufficient sectors in the list, then the command retrace (sector-number) [0,1] will
be invoked, otherwise the user is asked to input sector-number via the keyboard before
the behaviour can commence.
Now the Nomad utilises routines from the sector and vector libraries to follow the
previously learned vector route to the origin of sector-number (see Figure 5.14 and,
for more detail, Figure 4.20). The Nomad therefore reaches the desired sector using
the preferred vector within each learned sector on the way, without having to repeat
the trial-and-error process.
5.3.2 Moving toward home
A vital competence for an active agent is the ability to get back home from a given
sector of the niche. The way that this was finally implemented in the Nomad was
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Figure 5.14: Retracing a vector route
simply through a process of dead-reckoning (dead-rec) directly home, although dead-
reckoning through sector origins, and an alternative, vector-based, method were also
examined (see Figure 5.15).
Vector-based





Initially, an attempt was made to use vectors to return, through each sector, to the
home position (see Figure 5.15 B1 for a view of how this ideally appear), unfortunately
there were two problems with this approach.
1. Within a given sector the most promising vector was used to get to the state
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B: Movement toward home
Three methods:
B1: Vector-based (idealised)
B2: Dead-reckoning through sectors
B3: Dead-reckoning directly
Figure 5.15: Three methods of moving toward home
reached, the value of the compass was read and stored as a private state variable
theta-edge. This was because of the error build-up on the compass as discussed
earlier — at the sector edge the value of the compass could vary by up to 15%
from the initial value of theta. It was thought that this modified value might be
used to return to the origin of a given sector on the return journey. However,
movement on the new vector theta-edge did not correspond accurately enough
to the odometric data gathered by the initial vector during the learning stage,
with the result that return movement was highly error prone, and not sufficiently
accurate to permit robust locomotion to home.
2. Due to this error, and because sector boundaries tend to occur relatively proxi-
mally to surfaces within the niche (this being one of the criteria, along with suc¬
cess, for termination of movement along a given vector — see vec : :run() [time]
section 4.3.4), return locomotion was often interrupted by these surfaces. The
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Nomad was often unable to reach a given origin point even with a small angle of
deviation from the original vector.
Dead-reckoning






Two methods of dead-reckoning were examined.
1. Dead-reckoning from sector origin to sector origin (see Figure 5.15 B2). This
method moved the Nomad home through each of the sectors traversed on the out¬
ward journey using the routine sec: :nav-origin(0) [0,1] — a dead-reckoning
procedure using the library routine go (x,y,range) [0,1]. This procedure differs
from navigate in that no account is taken of obstacles. The Nomad does not
'expect' locomotion to be interrupted as it is essentially retracing a vector along
which free movement should be possible. As with the compass-based method de¬
scribed above (section 5.3.2) the problem of origin points occurring near surfaces
tended to prevent the routine from reaching the origin point of sectors and thus
often derailed the entire procedure4.
2. Dead-reckoning directly home from any given point (see Figure 5.15 B3). The
behaviour dead-rec is invoked and steers the Nomad directly home without nec¬
essarily passing through the origin points of previous sectors. Again dead-rec
as currently implemented takes no account of obstacles assuming that the run
will be clear toward home. Replacing dead-rec with navigate would allow the
Nomad to steer around obstacles on its homeward journey, although the conse¬
quence would be that novel obstacles would not be detected.
1 Of course, providing error recovery procedures is relatively straightforward and would have allowed




The implementation described above forms part of an attempt to discover how much
navigational behaviour can be achieved relying only on inbuilt compass information
and short-range sensing in the absence of both geometric and topological maps. The
implementation is grounded in our considerations of economy both in terms of design
and as an internal arbitration metric. These considerations have resulted in a design
approach which stresses installation of design primitives in the system, together with
economy-based arbitration metrics. Interaction with the environment should, over the
life-history of the system, result in improved performance constrained by economical
considerations.
It is clear that successful corridor navigation might be achieved using more simple
strategies such as wall following (Nehmzow & McGonigle, 1995, 1993), or by using long
range sensing to determine areas of free space. However the advantage of the present
strategy lies in its extendibility. The result of the learning phase is a segmentation of
the Nomad's physical environment into discrete (and navigable/manageable) physical
spaces each of which can be treated independently in terms of preferred vector, object
density (and hence robot velocity), object identity etc. — sectors provide state, an
internal context within which to interpret both signals and behaviours. State-based
behaviour transitions, and the categorisation of physical space into areas correspond¬
ing to discrete internal, 'cognitive' states, provides a unique opportunity for shifting
interpretative stance according to both internal and external context.
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- attempted bearing I. additive vector: stales I ...2
....... most successful direction lor state 2. additive vector: states 2...3
/ state boundary } additive vector: states 3...4
— — — additive vector across consecutive slates
Figure 5.16: Vector addition across consecutive states: 1 & 3 would be successful
extrapolations. 2 would fail.
The existential payoff from such a strategy is the automatic detection of environmental
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variance and invariance. The Nomad has expectations about its environment, in terms
of the whereabouts of free space. Changing sensory stimulation within the same seg¬
ment of physical space across runs signals novelty. Furthermore accurate and robust
positioning of the Nomad within sectors provides a basis for the visual identification of
landmarks and other objects from the same orientational perspective on different runs,
circumventing the problem of multiple viewing angles. The state-based decomposition
of physical space (reflected by discrete sectors) also helps to avoid the problems asso¬
ciated with 'perceptual aliasing' — the difficulty associated with distinguishing niche
features which are very similar in sensor profile. This is a serious problem for indoor
mobile robots (Nehmzow, 1995, for example) where the environment contains many
near-identical features such as corners, intersections, doorways etc. Adopting a fun¬
damentally state-based approach means that state is prior to landmark recognition,
rather than subsequent to it as for many navigational implementations (Duckett &
Nehmzow, 1999a, for example), and thus provides a method of distinguishing similar
niche features grounded in internal context.
Integration of preferred vector across sectors leads to macro-environmental information
becoming available (see Figure 5.16). In this way a progressively more global system
of reference can be obtained, which could then serve to constrain future movement,
interpretation of default, and of putative objects. With neither long range sensor data,
nor human supervision, the Nomad develops a 'cognitive map' of the layout which
reflects its history of exploration. This 'map' is analogous to the topological maps of
other recent implementations (Duckett & Nehmzow, 19996, for example) yet is achieved
at far less computational cost.
One further important derivation of this approach concerns the installation of design
primitives and economy metrics whose operation through the system's trial and er¬
ror experience of its environment can lead to self-organisation of behaviour. Having
demonstrated the feasibility of this approach with respect to essential low-level naviga¬
tional behaviours, the next phase of research should be concerned with extending this
process to other areas of system competence such as rational behaviour recombination
with respect to goals. It is envisaged that this self-organisational process, constrained
by arbitration mechanisms based on economy, will be applied next to self-selection of
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behaviours for task success — rather than installing a sequence of behaviours to achieve
a goal, this sequence should be learnt by the system over time through an analogous














Figure 5.17: Going home
Combining alignment (align), learning (learn) and retracing (retrace) phases with
direct dead-reckoning (dead-rec) home in a single task results in overall behaviour
reminiscent of the navigation of the desert ant Cataglyphis (see Figure 5.17). Start¬
ing from a fixed position in space on each run, the Nomad first learns about distinct
physical regions of space (sectors) and the privileged vector within each space. This
data is written to memory and can be retrieved at any point. Retracing a learned
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route through the environment using vector-based information results in the Nomad
following a canonical outward path from home. Use of canonical paths improves navi¬
gational accuracy (Gallistel, 1990) and is a feature of the navigation of many biological
organisms5. Dead-reckoning toward home from a distant sector of the niche follows,
the exact learned path is now ignored — instead a more direct route is adopted. Once
near home an orthokinetic mechanism utilises known features of the niche to achieve
accurate localisation.
In the absence of explicit design, the approach results in segmentation of external space
reflected by internal sectors which provide vital contextual information, and a vector-
based topological map of the system's environment achieved at little computational
cost. Vector addition across states can lead over time to both increased economy of
movement and recognition of macro-environmental features.
5.5 Related work
The problem of self-localisation of robot systems is often (Nehmzow, 1995, for example)
divided between global localisation which requires a system to be capable of relocali-
sation under conditions of locative uncertainty, and position tracking, which assumes
that the initial position of the system is known. As many methods of localisation
for mobile robot systems have now been proposed (see Borenstien et al. 1996 for a
recent review), this section will focus on implementations which feature an internal
map-based representation of the environment with particular emphasis on those which
incorporate autonomous map-construction. A number of exemplars will be described
from each of the major approaches: metric and topological schemes, both installed and
acquired. It is argued that although these methods have been shown to result in ro¬
bust navigation, this has been achieved at relatively great expense — both in terms of
hand-design of systems and run-time computational demands. Furthermore, although
often successful, it will be suggested that these implementations are restricted to the
navigational domain, providing little inspiration, or potential, for extension of methods
to other domains of competence.
5 The wood ant (Formica rafa) maintains stereotyped paths between food sources and the nest, for
example.
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How accurate is the geometrical characterisation of a navigating system's representa¬
tional scheme? Although humans clearly use geometrically-based representations their
meaning is acquired over development. Over the course of ontogenesis an individual
system's experience of space, through situated action within some environment, is
convolved with interpretation of externalised forms of geometric representation (Mc-
Gonigle, 1999). Such interpretation requires a theory of map understanding, which
permits transfer of knowledge according to a conventionalised representational code
allowing a system to benefit from the learning experience of others without having to
directly learn the information contained within through direct experience. The geo¬
metrical maps which are an important feature of human navigational behaviour have
evolved over collective human cultural experience — the medieval 'mappa mundi' are
vastly inferior to the maps of today, which are themselves now being refined yet further
with the aid of global positioning satellite data (Whitfield, 1994). Such maps are con¬
ventionalised to support cognitive economy on the part of the interpreter. To conflate
such external symbolic representations, with the primary mode of spatial representation
within systems, therefore, seems premature. Rather, geometrical map understanding is
acquired over ontogenesis by a process which requires translation between primary in¬
ternal, non-symbolic forms of representation and an externalised geometric code. Over
the long term artificial systems should be able to acquire such understanding but it
should not be pre-installed within the system.
Notwithstanding this argument, geometrically-based systems also suffer from a further
serious problem — computational expense. Geometrical systems represent Euclidean
space using a Cartesian (x,y,0) coordinate system; all such information is represented
whether immediately relevant or not.
Installed
Self-localisation involves map-based information such as landmark position being utilised
for odometric recalibration. Typical Cartesian-based systems feature maps where land¬
mark location is pre-installed. Lee (1995), for example, developed an implementation
CHAPTER 5. NAVIGATION 182
which recalibrates a position estimate based on current robot position relative to land¬
marks whose position was preinstalled within the system.
Burgard et al. (1998) have designed an effective museum6 tour guide robot. A de¬
tailed map of the environment was preinstalled within the system based on painstak¬
ing hand-measurement of distances between environmental features. The system uses
a probabilistic Markov localisation algorithm to update positional estimates over time.
Obviously this approach is not ideal in a number of respects:
• it is highly uneconomical — both in terms of the time spent gathering measure¬
ments by hand, and in the computational costs of self-localisation;
• the ontology of the system directly reflects that of the designer: both in terms of
the geometric representation, and relevant landmark features — the meaning of
the metrical representational schema and landmarks is preinstalled and does not
reflect the situated action of the system.
• is is inflexible. Navigation will only be successful once the designers have hand-
measured the environment. Additionally the system is inoperable in environ¬
ments which lack the relevant features used for landmark recognition, for example
the outdoors.
• it lacks autonomy. The system relies on its human designers both to provide a
global frame of reference, and for its ontology of landmark features.
These problems are characteristic of many geometrical systems (Borenstien et al., 1996)
and have recently motivated two interlinked research directions. The first concerns
autonomous recognition of landmarks based on an acquired feature set; the second
requires autonomous map construction.
Acquired
Thrun (1998a), for example, describes a Bayesian landmark learning algorithm. The
model relies on the assumption that the system operates in a partially observable
6 Currently operative within the Deutsches Museum Bonn.
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Markov environment (Chung, 1960) — one in which the only state is robot location —
perceptual and control noise is independent of noise at previous points in time. The
algorithm (BaLL) trains neural networks to extract low-dimensional feature represen¬
tations (occupancy grids) of landmarks based on a Bayesian analysis of probabilistic
localisation which provides the criteria for feature extraction — minimisation of local¬
isation error — such that discriminatory features are optimised for locative accuracy.
This approach adds autonomy, optimality and environmental flexibility to the system
but is unintegrated within a larger navigational system.
Thrun et al. (1998) present an algorithm for landmark-based map acquisition with
concurrent localisation where the problem of map building is characterised as a maxi¬
mum likelihood estimation problem where both landmark location and robot position
have to be estimated. The system has operated successfully in a cyclical environment
of 60 by 25 metres and can manage both position tracking and global localisation.
Map acquisition occurs through the process of teleoperation of the robot through the
environment. The user selects 'significant places' (such as intersections, dead ends,
and corners) and informs the robot that such a place has been reached and the sys¬
tem then learns the sensory signature of the location. Although an improvement over
their previous implementation (Burgard et al., 1998) in that a map does not have to be
hand-crafted (a process which took several days) and pre-installed in the robot but can
rather be acquired through teleoperation (taking instead a few hours), over-reliance
on the designer's ontology of landmarks, and the computational costs of geometric
representations remain unresolved.
Yamauchi et al. (1998) have developed a system which explores and builds maps of novel
environments using a global occupancy grid. Again, problems with this approach are
the computational costs of constructing a geometrical map of the environment and that
this approach requires very accurate laser sensing and precise odometric information
in order to construct an accurate map — it is unclear how effective this system might
be given less accurate means of sensing.
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Resulting mainly from the huge computational costs associated with the use of geo¬
metric maps, and inspired by evidence of topological maps in human cortex (Knudsen,
1982; Churchland, 1986; Sparks & Nelson, 1987. for example), an alternative approach
to map representation encodes the relative positions of landmarks rather than a global
coordinate system. This approach obviously requires that the environment contains
features which can serve as detectable landmarks for the system (either installed or
acquired) and that the robot follows canonical paths between landmarks in order to
disambiguate sensor signals and allow for reliable landmark recognition. Topological
maps require much less computational power to construct and maintain than their
geometric analogues thus providing the potential for representation of environments
of much larger magnitude than those which can by navigated using only geometric
representations (Duckett & Nehmzow, 1999a).
Installed
As for geometrically-based systems, many topological systems utilise Markov locali¬
sation which demands that a map of the environment is preinstalled in the system.
Koenig & Simmons (1996), for example, assume that a topologically correct sketch of
the environment is available to the system. They use probabilistic Markov localisa¬
tion, specifically an extension of hidden Markov models to partially-observable decision
processes where the robot maintains a probability distribution for a set of discrete lo¬
cations which is refined over time. The major problem with this approach is again,
that potential landmarks (and actions) are defined using a pre-given ontology of doors,
intersections etc.
Yamauchi & Langley (1997) developed a method where each possible landmark lo¬
cation is represented by a local occupancy grid. Localisation of the system entails
construction of a recognition grid from immediate sensor readings and use of a hill
climbing procedure to search the space of potential transformations in order to find
the best match with a set of stored grids. This system, although effective, demands
high computational resources and therefore lacks real-time efficiency. Furthermore, it
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is ineffective within environments which feature high levels of perceptual aliasing.
Weiss & von Puttkamer (1995) use cross-correlation of laser scans in order to identify
robot place and position within that place. In order to reduce computational load laser
scans are reduced to histograms prior to matching. Angular histograms are initially
convolved to overcome the problem of robot orientation and then x, y histograms are
matched with stored representations in order to determine position. Although more
rapid and less computationally expensive than the approach of Yamauchi & Langley
(1997), it remains unclear whether effectiveness would be retained with the use of less
detailed sensors and, again, system efficiency suffers in environments featuring high
levels of perceptual aliasing.
Acquired
Shatkay & Kaelbling (1997) have generalised the Markov localisation approach of
Koenig & Simmons (1996) to support mapping in the absence of prior information.
Instead the system consults local geometric information to discriminate locations and
thus localise, but a serious problem with this approach is that it fails to take cumulative
rotational odometric error into account (Thrun et al, 1998).
Lu & Milios (1997), together with Guttmann (1996), have proposed a method that
matches laser data to partially constructed maps, utilising Kalman filters for position¬
ing. This approach is incapable of representing ambiguities consequent upon perceptual
aliasing and can only compensate for a small amount of odometric error. Furthermore,
once again it remains unclear whether the approach would generalise to less data-rich
sensors.
Duckett & Nehmzow (1999a,b) have developed an implementation for a Nomad 200
which features construction of a topological map augmented with metric information.
This approach combines cross-correlation techniques for matching sonar data with
learned sensory signatures, with a probabilistic algorithm for refining a position esti¬
mate over time using multiple Kalman filters. This algorithm delivers an updated esti¬
mate of both likely topographic location together with most likely Cartesian position.
Although the system delivers robust navigation, problems associated with perceptual
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aliasing remains incompletely resolved (Duckett & Nehmzow, 19996). Furthermore,
exploration is unprincipled — the system moves randomly into areas of free space,
unconstrained by economical principles. An additional problem is that, as the im¬
plementation lacks internal state, there is no way to reliably determine that multiple
nodes of the representation reflect identical locations.
5.5.3 Comparison with the current implementation
The types of implementation described above often support robust navigation through
the environment. The implementation described in this chapter, although not currently
as advanced as some of the implementations described above, does, it is believed,
incorporate a number of important principles absent from alternative approaches.
Ontology Many effective robotic navigational systems rely for their operation on a
pre-given ontology of both map type and landmark features. Such systems rely on
recalibration of odometry through recognition of landmarks which are either niche
engineered such as bar-code reflectors (Everett et al., 1994), or easily recognisable
visual patterns (Borenstein, 1987), or niche features determined by the designer
such as doors (Koenig & Simmons, 1996) or ceiling lights (King & Weiman,
1990) together with hand-crafted filtering algorithms which sift sensory data for
the presence of landmarks.
In contrast the implementation described herein is provided with a design prim¬
itive whose iteration results in segmentation of physical space on the basis of
system capacity (compass error) and obstacle distribution. The 'meaning' of the
internal representation of a region of external space (a sector) directly reflects
the system's situated activity within its environment. For the current area of op¬
eration of the system recalibration of odometry has not been found to be strictly
necessary. When the size of the area to be explored is increased it is envisaged
that odometric recalibration will occur first through orientation to a stored turret
0, followed by execution of an orthotaxic mechanism similar to that of align —
no reliable detection nor disambiguation of landmarks will be required.
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Perceptual aliasing Reliable determination of landmark identity in environments
which feature a high degree of perceptual aliasing (the presence of hard to dis¬
ambiguate landmarks) remains an unresolved problem for the majority of navi¬
gational implementations — especially those featuring topological maps (Weiss
& von Puttkamer, 1995; Lu & Milios, 1997; Yamauchi & Langley, 1997, for ex¬
ample).
This problem arises because, for these systems, context is subsequent to landmark
recognition — accurate determination of position is possible only once a niche
feature has been reliably identified. The difficulty of effectively disambiguating
near-identical landmarks has led to the development of probabilistic Markov al¬
gorithms which refine position estimates after the event. The implementation
described herein currently possesses no methods for landmark recognition but
addition of such procedures, such as occupancy grid methods (Moravec, 1988),
is straightforward and is an obvious immediate extension to the system. The ad¬
vantage of this implementation is that context is prior to landmark recognition
- reflecting internal state. The important consequence of this design feature is
that the problem of perceptual aliasing does not arise — within a given sector
there will be only one possible landmark to be disambiguated. Odometric error
can then be overcome either through recalibration or again through orthokinetic
mechanisms.
Economy The implementation described herein stems from our explicit quest for
economy of design, and for economical behaviours. It is now well accepted that
geometric maps come at greater computational expense than their topological
equivalents (Nehmzow, 1995, for example). Our implementation brings greater
economy than characteristic of topological, or hybrid topological/geometrical
systems. No complex algorithms are incorporated for filtering feature informa¬
tion from sensor data, no detailed or long range sensor information is required.
Rather, through situated activity, the system develops a 'map' of its surrounding
environment based purely on obstacle distribution through iteration of a simple
algorithm.
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Furthermore incorporating economy as a utility metric for arbitrating between
behaviours means that the minimum number of sectors are generated consistent
with relatively error-free navigation through any given environment — the result
is minimisation of the amount of representation required.
Extendibility In terms of navigation, our implementation is easily extended to in¬
corporate landmark recognition and object identification. It is also inherently
flexible — successful operation does not depend on the presence of detectable
niche features, nor indeed any surrounding objects. If operated in an environ¬
ment devoid of objects, the system would segment physical space into regions
whose size reflects only the capacity of the system to locomote within its com¬
pass error tolerance, resulting in exploration of the greatest amount of free space
for the least computational cost.
The majority of navigational implementations are highly specialised. Their de¬
signers do not explicitly discuss the role of navigation within a broader range of
competences possessed by the system as a whole. Our implementation is designed
to support navigation as one element of a multitasking, multiply competent ar¬
tificial system which has the potential to become progressively more competent
over its life-span thanks to installed memory functions. As such its navigational
behaviour admittedly cannot currently compete with the most advanced purely
navigational systems now developed (Duckett & Nehmzow, 19996, for example)
— our criterion of adequacy demands only that it can support further compe¬
tences in the logical hierarchy. Navigation forms only one element of the design,
and is currently being used as a test bed for our range of design principles —
faultless navigational behaviour is not currently our experimental target.
The most important area of extendibility of our implementation, absent from
other navigational systems, is the application of our self-selection mechanism to
other areas of competence. The next stage of development will involve applying
the logical form of our self-selection algorithm (trial and error experimentation
followed by arbitration and behaviour selection on the basis of economy) to other




An initial navigational competence was engineered for the Nomad which supported
robust navigation to home from distant parts of the niche through the joint operation
of an odometrically-based simple dead-reckoning algorithm and an orthokinetic align¬
ment mechanism. State-based reinterpretation of signals was vital to this approach —
allowing orientation to obstacles to supplant avoidance when near home. This portion
of the research also demonstrated the capacity of the overall architecture to support
stacked error recovery procedures.
The navigational learning implementation described in this chapter was designed to
examine the operation of a number of design features fundamental to our synthetic
approach. Critically, would we be able to design a navigational system based upon the
operation over time of a small number of design primitives in conjunction with system
self-selection on the basis of economy?
The final learning implementation described above demonstrates the feasibility of our
synthetic approach.
• Repeated iteration of a simple algorithm resulted in segmentation of physical
space into a number of discrete, internally represented sectors through situated
trial and error activity. The meaning of these internal representations directly
reflect the experience of the system within its niche; not the designer's preinter-
pretation of the world.
• Self-selection of privileged vectors was achieved through an inbuilt economy
metric, guaranteeing that the most behaviour was obtained for the least compu¬
tational and time costs.
• Finally the system supports robust and reliable navigation between sectors, both
within runs and, due to installed memory functions, over time, providing the
potential for lifelong learning.
Although clearly not as advanced as some specialised navigational implementations
which have been developed recently, the system incorporates a number of important
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features absent from other implementations. Critically, the system provides the poten¬
tial for extendibility in a number of important respects.
State-based interpretation of niche features is an important future development.
The problem of perceptual aliasing of environmental features is circumvented
since state is prior to landmarks rather than a derivation from them. With
more detailed sensing algorithms, or addition of a visual layer, objects could be
locatively encoded easing the burden of unique identification.
Odometric recalibration is envisaged to occur through orthotaxic mechanisms which
do not necessarily rely 011 landmark identification.
Prospective control and expectancy are immediate derivations of niche segmen¬
tation, Each sector is associated with different 'expectations' of navigable dis¬
tance; environmental variance can be easily identified by the system.
Abstraction of knowledge can be easily achieved by integrating vectors across
sectors. In this way a more advanced vector-based map of the environment
can be constructed.
Transfer of the logical structure of the approach — trial and error experimentation
followed by self-selection on the basis of economy — to other domains of compe¬
tence is an important future area of development.
Our design strategy has been applied to navigation using only very primitive sensing
and minimal pragmatic representation. Self-selection of behaviours based on inbuilt
economy metrics, in combination with a simple iterative algorithm results in segmenta¬
tion of niche space into discretely represented sectors whose meaning derives from the
situated locomotor activity of the system, and is not preinstalled by the designer. Hav¬
ing demonstrated the feasibility of our synthetic design stance within a navigational
domain, the way lies open for its application to other areas of robotic competence.
Chapter 6
Resume, the future, and final
conclusions
The last chapter described some experiments in self-organised navigation supported
by the architecture described in chapter four, which extended the robotic implementa¬
tions and was motivated by the biological characterisation described in chapter three.
This final chapter strives to contextualise this research with respect to the alternative
perspectives on intelligent systems, restate the synthetic strategy, and outline some
promising future research directions.
Initially the argument is restated. Both traditional symbol-based and behaviour-based
stances omit from their biological characterisations some important features of in¬
telligent systems. Neither stance, nor their conjunction, seem capable of supporting
the development of artificial intelligent systems. Dynamic and situated perspectives
emphasise the transactional nature of intelligence and its development. In terms of de¬
sign these stances stress the contextuality of adaptive behaviour and the importance of
interactions both internal to a system, and between system and environment, in scaf¬
folding intelligence. Unfortunately these stances under-specify artificial designs and
the implementations inspired tend to be simple rather than complex.
Next the synthetic strategy adopted herein is restated — our understanding of intel¬
ligent systems must be based on both reverse engineering of biological systems, and
attempts to construct artificial systems. In contrast with the majority of current re¬
verse engineering approaches which tend to focus on the locomotor and perceptual
behaviours of simple systems, McGonigle and Chalmers provide a detailed character-
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isation of complex biological systems. This characterisation of systems self-regulating
over ontogenesis towards ever more economical information handling strategies sug¬
gests a number of design principles for artificial intelligent systems. Critically, such
systems should be designed with sufficiently rich primitives, including both reactive
behaviours, specialised inductive mechanisms, and arbitration criteria which through
inter-system and system-environment interactions over ontogenesis can support the
development of increasingly complex adaptive competences. This synthetic, complex
systems stance is suggested to overcome the impasse between the static symbol-based
characterisations of complex systems, and the unscalable traditional behaviour-based
characterisations of simple systems.
Subsequently some promising future areas of research within robotics, suggested by
our synthetic stance, are identified. The unifying theme of these areas is progressive
adaptation over the life span. Learning to learn, error recovery and diagnosis, and ac¬
tion selection are all fundamental areas within which development is required. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.
6.1 The argument
Both the cognitive sciences and artificial intelligence feature a tension between two
stances: symbol-based and behaviour-based. Within the cognitive sciences the behaviour-
based conceptualisation of systems gave way during the middle of the twentieth century
to a symbol-based characterisation. Artificial intelligence has recently witnessed the
reverse transition. Although often construed as mutually exclusive within psychology,
when applied to the construction of artificial systems a number of limiting isomor¬
phisms emerge.
Over the past two decades the symbol-based characterisation of complex biological
systems has come under increasing attack (section 1.1.1). Its experimental emphasis
on linguistic tasks serves to reinforce the underlying assumption that the core com¬
petence of complex biological systems is the logical manipulation of symbolic internal
representations. The assumption that cognition can be abstracted away from its bio¬
logical and environmental roots has led to the problem of symbol grounding: how to
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reconnect body and mind. Furthermore, cognitivist accounts are unable to explain the
phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins of intelligence.
When applied to the development of artificial systems, in the form of classical robotics
(section 1.1.2), the symbolic stance is derailed by two category errors: that the mind
can be abstracted away from its biological instantiation; and that the complexity of
behaviour is reflected in analogous internal control structures. The artificial systems
which result are brittle and unreactive. The implicit assumption that an exhaustive
symbolic model of the world is necessary leads to the adoption of toy-worlds and pre-
interpreted domains of competence within which system behaviour is hand-crafted.
The ontology of such systems is that of the designer.
Behaviourism, in contrast, eschews the explanatory role of internal control and repre¬
sentational structures and instead focuses on the operation of an optimised associative
inductive mechanism in biological systems (section 1.3.1). As a result the experimen¬
tal methodology of the paradigm centres on the relationship between arbitrary events
within a small spatio-temporal space in simple systems, or reflexive subsystems of com¬
plex systems. Notwithstanding the accuracy of the account for the characterisation of
simple systems it remains unclear how the progressive phylogenetic and ontogenetic
adaptation of systems can be explained through the operation of, and modifications
to, this optimised associative mechanism alone.
The analogous stance within robotics, reactive BBAI (section 1.3.2), attempted to move
away from the pre-interpreted symbols of classical robotics by grounding behaviour
directly in the world. However, the exclusive focus on behaviour, in the absence
of internal control mechanisms and representation, meant that little remains to be
grounded: such systems are semantically blind. The behaviour of such systems does
not emerge through interactions as hoped, but rather is carefully engineered by the
designer. Scaling of purely reactive systems by design has not been successful as a re¬
sult of the difficulties inherent in hand-crafting 'emergence'. Learning in such systems
is restricted to refinement of sensor-actuator links.
Hybridisation (section 1.5) initially appears to be a possible way to circumvent this
impasse: traditional reflective components might effectively generate behaviours, with
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atomic components providing reactivity and robustness. Logically, however, hybridis¬
ation can only result in systems which remain hand-crafted and preinterpreted — now
at both reflective and reactive levels.
Over the last two decades, dynamic systems and situated perspectives on intelligent
systems have been proposed as potential means of resolving this impasse. The dynamic
perspective (section 2.1) provides a rich metaphorical language for describing complex
systems: ontological lower bounds, state spaces, trajectories, self-organisation etc. The
computational approaches motivated by dynamicism — connectionism, ALIFE, and evo¬
lutionary robotics (section 2.3.2) — share a laudable emphasis on open-ended change
in system organisation over time based on inter-system and system-environment inter¬
action but lack explicit, contextualised knowledge and therefore the basis for adaptive
internal control. Such systems remain essentially reactive.
The situated perspective on cognition (section 2.2) emphasises the coordination of per¬
ception and action dually constrained by physical embodiment and environment. For
some theorists adaptive behaviour arises through direct coordination in the absence of
internal representation; for others adaptive behaviour is mediated by contextual rep¬
resentations, grounded in direct experience of the world. Such considerations suggest
that structural and niche constraints should be utilised to coordinate perception and
action in artificial systems. Representation, if present at all, should be limited to non-
manipulable, agent-centered information. Unfortunately, these considerations have not
been easily translated into clear design prescriptions. Situated robotic systems (sec¬
tion 2.3.1) have demonstrated that augmentation of reactive behaviour-based systems
with agent-centered representation can support contextually-appropriate behaviour yet
these systems also remain essentially reactive.
Over the past decade researchers within robotics have coalesced into two main groups.
One is essentially cognitivist in outlook, and includes classical, and more recently cog¬
nitive, robotics. Here researchers (Lesperance et al., 1998; Thrun & O'Sullivan, 1998;
Levesque & Reiter, 1998; Shanahan, 1998, for example) are attempting to augment
the acontextual logical approach of classical robotics with special purpose algorithms
and contextually-informed reasoning. Shanahan's (1998) 'reinvention' of Shakey, for
example, uses circumscriptive event calculus (Shanahan, 1997) which views planning
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as an abductive task. Sensing, planning, and acting are interleaved; often temporal
constraints are imposed on the time spent within each activity. These architectures
remain essentially sense-plan-act in nature, but behaviour is generated from the par¬
tial results of the planner in order to provide reactivity. These systems, like those of
classical robotics, are completely preinterpreted: symbols (doors, holds, inroom, for
example) reflect the designer's ontological stance. Such cognitive robotic implementa¬
tions are essentially traditional classical/behaviour-based hybrids with emphasis on the
classical component. Researchers are interested in complex competences and thus find
the classical cognitivist stance attractive. They hope that the addition of reactivity at
the atomic level together with some element of contextual reasoning will allow them
to avoid the problems of classical robotics.
Within the alternative, 'animat' approach (see Meyer & Guillot 1991, 1994 for re¬
views), researchers are designing traditional behaviour-based architectures augmented
with deictic representations (Mataric, 1990, for example) or biologically-inspired 'mo¬
tivational systems' (Halperin, 1991, for example), or are adopting an emergent stance
which emphasises connectionist and evolutionary methods (Cliff et al., 19936, for ex¬
ample). These approaches remain at the reactive behavioural level and show little sign
of making the transition from simple to complex artificial systems (see Nolfi 1998, for
a review).
The central argument of this thesis is that this impasse should be resolved by a new
synthetic design stance informed by the characterisation of complex biological systems,
from within a dynamic perspective.
6.2 A new synthetic design stance
A number of researchers within robotics have advocated adoption of a synthetic strat¬
egy recently (Pfeifer, 1997, for example). Indeed the goals of artificial intelligence are
often described as the construction of intelligent systems as a means of developing a
better understanding of biological intelligence (Winston, 1984, for example). Many
researchers within robotics are guided by Braitenburg's (1984) law of 'uphill analysis
and downhill synthesis' which suggests adoption of a dialectic process of observation
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of biological systems, together with construction of their artificial counterparts. Cur¬
rently the impasse within robotics stems from a tension between the construction of
artificial systems whose competences are designed to reflect those of humans (cognitive
robotics), and those whose competences reflect those of simple biological systems such
as insects (the animat approach). Between these two extremes, as within human de¬
velopmental and comparative psychology, we have an 'unbridgeable gap' (McGonigle
& Chalmers, 1996).
The position advocated here is that a synthetic strategy will be effective only if con¬
joined with a complex systems stance. Although simple and complex systems share
many design features there remain significant differences between the two which can
only be understood by studying complex systems directly. There are qualitative, as
well as quantitative, differences in the endowment of neurological machinery between
systems of differing levels of complexity (Williamson et al, 1993; Gazzaniga et ai,
1998, for example). These differences in lower bounds constrain the trajectories avail¬
able to different systems, explaining why some remain fixed at purely behavioural
levels of adaptation whilst others become progressively more epistemically adaptive
over the course of ontogenesis. The most cognitively complex systems we see, hu¬
mans, do not enter the world at their complex end-state, but rather become complex
over development. This fact suggests that a dynamic, developmental perspective must
form part of our synthetic position: both with respect to characterising biological sys¬
tems and developing intelligent artificial systems. The dynamic perspective suggests
that we should strive to characterise, and ultimately replicate, the ontogenetic pro¬
cesses) which lead, from a core collection of design primitives, through inter-system,
and system-environment transactions to increasingly adaptive systems, at both be¬
havioural and epistemic levels, in response to environmental challenge.
A core feature of our synthetic stance is that the inspiration for the design of ar¬
tificial systems comes from neither engineering nor computational perspectives but
rather from biology: from the reverse engineering of complex biological systems. Our
stance, therefore, falls midway between the 'insect' robotics of animat, evolutionary,
and behaviour-based approaches, and classical or, more recently, cognitive robotics
which shares a mischaracterised developmental end-state with cognitivism in general.
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6.2.1 Traditional reverse engineering
Reverse engineering of biological systems is often claimed to be an important feature
of behaviour-based and animat robotic approaches. These traditional behaviour-based
approaches, strive to discover the principles underlying adaptive behaviours in their
natural setting. Recent exemplary examples of such approaches follow:
Franceschini and colleagues (1991, 1993, 1997) have developed a robotic imple¬
mentation capable of navigation through visuo-motor coordination mechanisms based
on detailed study of the navigational ability of the fly (Franceschini et ai, 1996).
Ayers and colleagues are studying the neuroethology of invertebrate and lower ver¬
tebrate motor systems in an attempt to establish the adaptive mechanisms which un¬
derlie simple locomotor and action patterns in addition to more complex goal oriented
behaviour (Ayers et al, 1998). A major research focus of this group is the neuroethol¬
ogy of locomotory behaviour in lobster (Homarus americanus). Based on detailed
study of the kinematics of walking and navigation behaviours, and the adaptation of
lobsters to current and surge (Ayers & Davis, 1977; Swain et al., 1995; Breithaupt &
Ayers, 1996, for example), including recording from the motor system of freely behaving
lobsters, the research group is developing biologically-based controllers for ambulatory
lobster-based (Ayers, 1995, for example), and undulatory lamprey-based (Jalbert et al.,
1995, for example) robots.
Kirchner and colleagues are working in collaboration with Ayers et. al. in their
attempt to reverse engineer the behaviour of the scorpion (SCORPIONIDAE) with partic¬
ular emphasis on navigation and its capability for omnidirectional locomotion. Their
observations of the adaptive behaviour of scorpion have led them to develop an au¬
tonomous system whose behaviour is directed by a sequencing controller which releases
exteroceptive reflexes along with sequences of behaviour (Kirchner & Hertzberg, 1997).
Although these approaches are admirably grounded in biological observation most re¬
verse engineering remains focussed on locomotor behaviours in simple systems. How¬
ever, as previously argued, no convincing evidence that incrementation of such systems
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can lead to complexity has yet been provided in either psychology or robotics.
6.2.2 Reverse engineering complex systems
Evidence from the neurosciences (Gazzaniga et ai, 1998, for a review) strongly suggests
that qualitative differences pertain between species in their complement of adaptive
specialisations (Williamson et al, 1993). Different species possess different inductive,
and control, machinery optimised for use in differing internal and external contexts
(Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1973; Gallistel, 1990, 1995; Marler, 1991). Such consider¬
ations suggest that reverse engineering of simple biological systems, or reflexive sub¬
systems thereof, will be insufficient in isolation to support the construction of complex
artificial systems.
Until recently complex systems have been relatively neglected in biological analysis —
due largely to a mischaracterised logico-deductive end-state which made elucidation of
the causal determinants of behaviour impossible. We were left with the 'unbridgeable
gap' (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1996) between traditional symbol-based and traditional
behaviour-based stances. With the development of the new developmental and compar¬
ative paradigms of McGonigle and Chalmers, reverse engineering of complex biological
systems becomes possible as never before. Accurate characterisations of complex bio¬
logical systems, within dynamic and embodied perspectives, suggests a range of design
principles for the construction of complex artificial systems.
McGonigle & Chalmers' (1977, 1984, 1998 for reviews) studies of cognitive growth
in human and non-human primate suggest a radically different characterisation of in¬
telligent biological systems than that provided by traditional cognitivism. Conjoining
comparative and developmental perspectives has allowed them to circumvent the prob¬
lem of the interdependence of language and thought, and of the origins of meaning for
linguistic agents, which beset traditional cognitivist characterisations.
These experimental paradigms portray complex biological systems self-regulating to¬
wards maximally economic information-handling strategies in the face of incrementa¬
tion of task difficulty. The "epistemic" agent is revealed to be on an open-ended growth
trajectory, from a number of preinstalled 'design' primitives which form the ontolog-
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ical lower bound, towards progressively more powerful cognitive strategies through
system-environment interaction and system self-organisation arbitrated in accordance
with economy metrics. The serial control of behaviour does not depend on the posses¬
sion of a linguistic competence nor on appropriately serially structured features of the
environment, as implicitly assumed by traditional cognitive and behaviourist stances
respectively, but rather reflects an hierarchical cognitive organisation at multiple levels
of abstraction.
This novel characterisation is inherently embodied, situated, and dynamic but diverges
from these perspectives, and from traditional reverse engineering approaches, in its fo¬
cus on progressive epistemic adaptation, based on internal arbitrational mechanisms,
across the lifespan. The resulting cognitive organisation however apparently "sym¬
bolic" derives from object-oriented transactions over ontogenesis. By grounding their
characterisation in behavioural assays of system competence, McGonigle and Chalmers
can characterise progressive adaptation of systems at both behavioural and epistemic
levels. This new perspective provides a much-needed bridge between traditional cogni¬
tive accounts which focus on logico-deductive competences and traditional behaviour-
based accounts which emphasise associationistic modification of tightly-coupled be¬
haviours. The origin of complex, 'cognitive' competences in intelligent biological sys¬
tems is no longer, therefore, the miracle it sometimes appears to be — we can observe
the precursors of cognition in the variety of specialised inductive mechanisms which
form the ontological lower bounds of systems, and witness the transformation from
simple to complex over ontogenesis.
The central argument of this thesis is that adoption of this novel characterisation of
intelligent systems within robotics will perform a similar function — providing a bridge
between the ungrounded systems of classical, and cognitive, robotics and the unscalable
systems of behaviour-based, and animat approaches.
6.2.3 Design prescriptions
McGonigle and Chalmers' biological characterisation suggests a number of design prin¬
ciples which must be incorporated within any architecture for artificial intelligence
which aspires to epistemic ontogenetic extendibility — one of the central problems
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facing contemporary robotics (Kirsh, 1991, for example).
Such architectures should be embodied, with relevant structural features utilised to
constrain induction whenever possible. Systems should be endowed with sensors which
are sufficiently sensitive to deliver rich perceptual data; and actuators which enable
the system to act on the world — action scaffolds cognitive development1. Systems
should be situated in real, rather than toy, worlds thereby providing a rich, dynamic
environment which challenges the system to become more complex.
The ontological lower bound of biological systems ultimately determines their adaptive
potential over ontogenesis: the richness of both 'hardware' and 'software' differentiates
systems which remain at primitive levels of adaptation from those capable of progres¬
sive epistemic adaptation. Biological systems possess a range of reflexes and instincts.
Often these are system-preserving and are, therefore, especially critical at early devel¬
opmental stages. There should be no objection to installing reactive system-preserving
behaviours in our artificial systems. Neuroscience, and neuroethology, reveal that bio¬
logical systems are endowed with adaptive specialisations, from associationistic mech¬
anisms to more abstracted inductive devices, optimised for use in different contexts
(Marler, 1991; Gallistel, 1995; Gazzaniga et al., 1998). We should analogously instill a
range of reflexive and inductive mechanisms, along with internal context, through state,
within our artificial systems. McGonigle and Chalmers' characterisation reveals that
self-organisation relies on internal arbitration mechanisms — especially those based on
economy. Such mechanisms are especially vital for resource limited (in terms of both
power and computation) artificial systems.
As with all complex biological systems, artificial systems should be endowed with
memory in order to support progressive adaptation so that later behaviours rest on
earlier achievements (McGonigle, 1991, 1995), and so that epistemic derivations of
behaviour can emerge. Furthermore development should be staged (McGonigle &
St Johnston, 1995) — it might be that staged development is a logical necessity for
1 The current endowment of our robotic platform, the Nomad 200, omits any form of actuator which
can change world state. Unlike the R2 which was capable of collecting and ordering stimuli (McGo¬
nigle & St Johnston, 1995), the Nomad can only move within an environment and was not, therefore,
capable of equally striking behaviour. In order to demonstrate the complexity of internal processes
in the current architecture the Nomad maintains a vocal commentary on its activities. Obviously
this is not ideal. In the long term, the ability to act on the world must be provided.
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intelligent systems. Developmental stages might serve to progressively limit induction,
by decomposing problems into inductively tractable sub-problems, ensuring that the
system advances through stages of 'proximal development' (Vygotsky, 1978). Our
artificial systems might also benefit from staged growth through the provision of a series
of inductive restrictions which constrain, and thereby enable, epistemic development
(Luger & Stubblefield, 19986, pp. 760-761).
Artificial systems should be modular, hierarchical, and serial. Modularity provides
robustness, and allows a system to possess multiple encapsulated, and sometimes log¬
ically incompatible competences (Fodor, 1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; McGonigle,
1991). Hierarchical organisation underlies the ability of complex systems to recombine
behaviours at multiple levels to achieve their adaptive goals and, furthermore, supports
multiple control, induction, and monitoring mechanisms operating simultaneously at
multiple time scales and levels of abstraction. The problem of serial control inheres
to all actions of systems (Lashley, 1951). A serial architecture capable of accessing
modular primitives provides the potential for the development of artificial systems
whose behaviour follows a rational syntax and immediately confers contextuality upon
a system. Action and perception can then be instigated and interpreted within specific
contexts indexed by both internal and external state.
Finally our artificial systems should be truly autonomous-, not merely flexless but ca¬
pable of self-regulation, initially at behavioural, but later at epistemic levels. Such
autonomy demands recombination of behaviours to achieve goals, in conjunction with
contextual interpretation of behavioural success. Systems must, therefore, be endowed
with, or acquire, arbitration criteria and be cognisant of behavioural success and de¬
fault. Self-organisation through inter-system and epigenetic interactions over ontogen¬
esis based on installed primitives and experience, should lead to progressive adaptation.
Adoption of these principles constitutes a third position, situated midway between the
approaches of cognitive robotics, and animat researchers, yet providing a method of
moving from simple to complex artificial systems both through design, and through
system self-organisation.
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6.3 The future of robotics
The research reported herein is based on a design stance which has motivated a for¬
mal functional architecture together with a number of robotic implementations within
the Laboratory for Cognitive Neuroscience and Intelligent Systems at the University
of Edinburgh — a stance which strives to steer a middle path between both tradi¬
tional cognitivist and traditional behaviour-based approaches to robotics. Based on
characterisations of the epistemic growth of complex biological systems (McGonigle
& Chalmers, 1998a, for a review) the long term focus of research is the construction
of complex artificial systems. McGonigle & Chalmers' biological characterisation con¬
centrates on learning over ontogenesis motivated by incrementation of environmental
complexity, which allows a system to develop progressively more efficient information-
handling strategies and to become increasingly inductively powerful over ontogenesis.
This section focuses on future areas of development within robotics congruent with
both our biological characterisation and the history of robotic implementations from
our research group. The areas addressed focus on the core abilities of systems to 'learn
to learn' and to self-organise in the light of experience over ontogenesis — convergent
with one of the most fruitful areas of current machine learning and an area recently
predicted to be the future of artificial intelligence (Mitchell, 1996).
6.3.1 A life-historical approach
Learning to learn demands an experiential history. Biological systems become pro¬
gressively more adaptive by scaffolding competences on those already achieved in the
face of continual environmental challenge (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1998a). Systems
'learn to learn' by exploiting previous successes in current challenges. A life historical
approach is therefore a necessity for any artificial system which we desire to be capable
of progressive epistemic adaptation (McGonigle, 1991).
Classical machine learning techniques required the designer to prespecify what is
learned by a system and how (Lee & McGonigle, 1996; Luger & Stubblefield, 19986).
Recently reinforcement learning techniques have become more popular within robotics,
but are slow and scale badly (Wyatt, 1995). Logic-based abduction has also become
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more popular (Shanahan, 1996, for example) but the restrictions of the logic-based ap¬
proach result in a failure to capture the pragmatic roots of symbol semantics. Learning
from experience, where the context and relevance of learned information is discovered
by the system itself, remains the central problem of Al (Samuel, 1983).
More recent machine learning implementations have attempted to address some of these
issues — learning to learn is a relatively recent departure. As with most traditional
machine learning methods, general functions are induced from experience, although
attempts are being made to develop algorithms that can change the way in which
they generalise (Thrun & Pratt, 1998, for a collection of recent articles). Part of
this endeavour involves a recognition of the importance of learning across the lifespan.
Thrun (19986), for example, addresses progressive system exposure to a series of tasks.
In these cases the possibility of transfer across multiple tasks arises. Preliminary
evidence in the domain of object recognition, indicates that resultant learning is more
efficient than possible within traditional 'single-task' machine learning approaches.
Recent research directions focus on cross-task transfer as the basis of incrementation.
CHILD (Ring, 1998), for example, is an agent capable of continual, incremental and
hierarchical learning. Solution of complicated non-Markovian reinforcement learning
tasks can be transferred to similar, but more complex tasks, which the system con¬
sequently solves more rapidly. Schmidhuber et al. (1998) describe a reinforcement
learning system capable of altering the way it self-modifies over time, through utilisa¬
tion of a "success-story" algorithm (ssa). The SSA uses backtracking to delete previous
modifications which have not been found to be associated with accelerated learning.
This approach, analogous to our implementation of internal arbitration based on an
economy metric, was found to result in significantly accelerated learning in comparison
with alternative methods.
The approach adopted herein shares some of the aims of these recent approaches, but
relates most closely to contemporary cognitive and expert systems research that con¬
centrate on a framework which assumes progressively more proficient interpretation of
input based on a system's existing knowledge base and derived expectations (Jackend-
off, 1983; Brunei-, 1990; Stern &: Luger, 1993, for example). Such approaches eschew
the Tarskian (1944, 1956) static mapping of symbol to object instead adopting a more
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pragmatic, contextually-informed conception of meaning. Indeed, this perspective con¬
tinues that of Pierce (1958), and later de Saussure (1974) and Grice (1975) where the
meaning of signs is derived from their relation both to other signs and, critically, sign
interpretation. This perspective suggests that the semantics of signs can be understood
only in relation to their interpretative function and in the context of action within the
environment. Clearly, if the changing interpretative stance of a system determines the
meaning of signals and behaviours, then designing systems capable of contingent con¬
textual interpretation is a necessity — artificial systems should therefore be capable of
multiple task-achieving behaviours.
The following sections deal, first, with an abductive approach to error diagnosis and
recovery — the primary focus of our long-term investigations of increased interpreta¬
tive proficiency, and second with self-organisation of behaviours in the context of the
problem of action selection.
6.3.2 Error recovery and diagnosis
We have seen that a core feature of the biological analysis discussed in section 3.1.3 is
self-organisation through internal arbitration. Clearly such arbitration between com¬
peting behaviours requires system cognisance of behavioural success and default to¬
gether with arbitration criteria and interpretative mechanisms. The synthetic agenda
espoused herein suggests that intelligent artificial systems should be designed which
incorporate these features and this must consequently be a key area of system devel¬
opment.
Within Al error is often regarded as the result of an imperfect implementation of an
algorithm which is essentially faultless in human. The constrained domain of assembly
robotics is the main area within robotics where the implications of error have been
considered. Here two kinds of error are generally distinguished: errors avoidable by
the system through fault tolerance mechanisms and those arising from inconsistency
between a system's world model and current world state. The first type of error is most
often handled by preventing the error situation occurring in the first place, for example
Trevelyan & Nelson (1987), Langle & Liith (1995), and Malcolm (1997) all discuss
hybrid systems which utilise reactivity at the atomic level to provide fault tolerance
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and thereby circumvent the occurrence of this type of error. Errors resulting from
inconsistency of world model and the current state of the world call for interpretation,
diagnosis, and recovery (Srinivas, 1977).
Error cognisance, interpretation and recovery remains relatively unexplored within
non-assembly robotics. An exception is Simmon's (1990) task control architecture
(tca) which consists of a set of task-specific computational processes (modules) which
communicate with one another by passing messages through a central control module.
This central module dynamically routes messages amongst the task modules. Tasks
are constructed as hierarchical task trees which encode the parent-child relationships
amongst messages. The system allows concurrent execution of steps in the task tree —
both computational and physical processes. Monitoring and error handling procedures
are then added after the code for handling normal situations is in place, but the
architecture does not address low level control.
The most often cited example of error recovery within non-assembly robotics is At¬
lantis (Gat, 1991a,6) a hybrid, three-layer, navigational architecture based on the
earlier reactive action packages (raps) of Firby (1987). The lowest level of the system
controls the execution of action primitives; the second controls sequences of activities;
the third runs asynchronously and performs time-consuming computation (i.e. plan¬
ning). Action primitives are annotated with a list of resources they use, and a set of
semaphores prevents two interfering primitives from being active simultaneously2. A
task bin consists of the task schemas in which the system is currently engaged, each of
which is a collection of methods for initiating, monitoring, and terminating behaviours,
as well as for invoking other task schemas.
An explicit design feature of atlantis is error cognisance and recovery. According to
Gat (19916):
"Designing a robot from the ground up to fail cognizantly is absolutely
crucial to robust intelligent behaviour." (Gat, 19916, p. 36)
Gat's rationale is threefold: designing systems which fail explicitly simplifies the design
2 Thereby providing a form of implicit behavioural syntax analogous to that supported by the initial¬
isation and default conditions of the current architecture — see section 4.3.5.
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process — it is easier to develop algorithms which fail and report that failure than it
is to design those that never fail. Designing a system with cognisant failure and error
recovery means that the designer does not have to explicitly anticipate all possible oc¬
currences at the outset; furthermore, through combination of imperfect algorithms and
error recovery overall system behaviour is far more reliable than any of its individual
component actions (Gat, 19916, p. 37).
Within ATLANTIS failure of an action primitive is reported to the invoking task. The se¬
quencing layer then invokes recovery procedures. Recovery procedures include retrying
the action, or choosing an alternative method from the task schema. If all attempted
methods fail, this failure is reported once more to the invoking task, it is unclear
what happens consequently. As instantiated, ATLANTIS possesses a pre-installed error
typology, with hand-crafted error recovery procedures available for each type of failure.
State-based evaluation
The extendibility of Gat's approach, and the later development by (Gat & Dorais, 1994)
in the absence of state-based decomposition (an issue he does not explicitly address
with respect to error recovery) will be limited — just as classical learning approaches
suffered from a lack of state-based decomposition. The storage of successful macro-
operators in STRIPS (Fikes et al., 1972; Nilsson, 1980), for example, resulted in a serious
combinatorial problem — as the number of stored operators increased so did the time
spent pattern matching in order to determine whether or not an operator could be
applied (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986).
Biological systems do not seem to suffer such penalties from acquiring new data or
skills, and it is clearly important that our artificial systems can also benefit from learn¬
ing. Decomposing system experience into distinct contexts, based on both internal
and external state, is one method of circumventing this combinatorial problem (Mc-
Gonigle, 1995). Induction is constrained by context — a system is enabled to learn by
partitioning its experience, allowing reinterpretation of external signals together with
the status of behaviours. The semantics of such a system no longer feature static asso¬
ciations between symbols and objects (Tarski, 1944, 1956) but rather permit variable
interpretations of identical phenomena dependent on a range of contextual features.
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Again the stance expounded herein strives to re-embody and resituate the behaviour of
intelligent systems within a wider pragmatic context.
Furthermore, providing a task grammar enables a more principled approach towards
error. As argued by McGonigle (1995) the syntax of most tasks results in error distribu¬
tions skewed towards the consummatory end of a series of behaviours. The architecture
described herein is motivated by an approach to error detection and abduction first
detailed by McGonigle (1991). Here a task-grammar associated with internal state
transitions allows a decomposition of serial behaviour into a number of discrete and
critically, self-discriminable, states each of which is associated with its own repair pro¬
cedure. Based on an earlier model of transitive choice behaviour (Harris & McGonigle,
1994), McGonigle (1995) proposed an abductive reasoning as rule stack model of error
recovery (see figure 6.1).
The current architecture is designed to incorporate this rule stack approach whilst
providing for the addition of interpretative mechanisms at a later stage of develop¬
ment. The complexity of both the niche (figure 4.3), and the Nomad's behaviours
(section 4.3.5) ensures a rich error space. The architecture reported herein (chapter 4)
bears some similarity to ATLANTIS. Here behaviours are associated with appropriate
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recovery procedures by the designer (see section 5.1.4) although an error typology is
not provided explicitly. Behavioural default is associated with a set of recovery pro¬
cedures, each of which maintains a record of the (internal) context in which it has
occurred, the number of times it has been recruited, and its success rate.
Now armed with an architecture cognisant of error, the next phase of investigation
should be targeted at more detailed error interpretation. Here a state-based approach
is vital. Within the architecture described herein, each behaviour is provided with
associated explanation templates, instantiated and maintained uniquely for different
internal contexts (see figure 6.2). Error interpretation and recovery for the same be¬
haviour can differ between different tasks, and even at different stages within the same
task thereby providing context specificity. In this example, navigational error, e.g. due
to timeout, might arise for different reasons dependent on the antecedent behaviour.
By allowing contextual interpretation of behavioural default, timeout error due to
temporary interruption, for example, could be contrasted with that consequent upon
the Nomad's presence within a particular portion of the niche (the sector associated
with retrace (3) for example). Through the provision of internal state both identical
signals, and seemingly identical error types can be distinguished.
Currently our approach features hand-crafted priorities for different recovery proce¬
dures which can be modified in the light of experience. Based on successful transition
to the consequent behaviour or task, the success of different recovery procedures within
a given context can be assessed allowing a system to benefit from its experience over
time. This demonstration of architectural support for error cognisance together with
stacked recovery procedures, was clearly an essential precondition for our next phase
of research.
It is suggested that providing explanation templates for behavioural default, together
with an abductive inference procedure, will enable the system to learn its own error
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TASK: ALIGN - AVOID - NAVIGATE - ALIGN
NAVIGATE (align - avoid -navigate - align)
ERROR PROCEDURE N SUCCESS
obstacle avoid
timeout create new goal
follow wall
odometry call for help
power call for help
L.
TASK: ALIGN - RETRACE(3) - NAVIGATE ALIGN
NAVIGATE(align - retrace(3) - navigate - align)
ERROR PROCEDURE N SUCCESS
obstacle avoid
timeout create new goal
follow wall
odometry call for help
power call for help
Figure 6.2: Explanation templates for two different tasks.
typology, and determine effective recovery procedures for each type, over the course of
its life-history. Clearly, allowing systems to self-determine error occurrence and recruit
appropriate recovery procedures is an important future area of research.
The future: abductive error interpretation
A critical future area of system development is learning of an error typology through
abductive mechanisms. The abduction of error types is made tractable by the segmen¬
tation of experience into discrete contexts in turn made possible by encapsulated tasks,
behaviours, and action primitives. In the long term it is hoped that the use of expla¬
nation templates together with state-transition analyses will enable a system to learn
the semantics of default. By keeping a log of errors by frequency and mapping these
according to both niche space and the grammatical characteristics of the task in hand,
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the original set of recovery procedures can not only be reprioritised but, furthermore,
a new set can be established.
Within AI diagnosis has been investigated primarily only within the field of expert
systems. Early such systems such as MYCIN, for example, represented domain knowl¬
edge and problem solving strategies as a set of relational facts and production rules.
Rule chaining was used to search through the space of potential solutions. A serious
weakness in the production rule approach, however, is that the intermingling of theo¬
retical domain knowledge with heuristic search strategies led to only weak semantics
(Clancey, 1985) and also to brittleness (Luger & Stubblefield, 19986); furthermore,
the system had to be provided with explicit representations of search strategies and
heuristics for evaluation of evidence by domain experts resulting in high knowledge ac¬
quisition requirements (Luger & Stern, 1999). These problems led to the development
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of systems whose representational scheme more clearly distinguished domain knowl¬
edge and heuristics, and which were less reliant on explicit expert knowledge for search
heuristics and evidence evaluation.
Later systems, such as CASNET (Weiss & Kulikowski, 1979) utilised an explicit model
of hierarchical causal relations. This system featured a 'casual-associational' network,
a type of semantic network which represents dynamic processes by the causal relation¬
ships amongst nodes. This representational scheme had three interconnected levels —
classification, observation, and pathophysiology. A complete casual path through the
network from start node to terminal node reflects a complete disease process. The
activation of the network spreads in an analogous fashion to weight propagation algo¬
rithms (Luger & Stern, 1999), with current network state driving hypothesis construc¬
tion through test selection. Although an improvement over earlier systems, causality
in CASNET remained at a superficial level and the structure of the network was hand¬
crafted by the designer. ABEL (Patil, 1981) extended hierarchical causal models by
providing much richer, and contextually-informed, causal links.
The architecture described herein relates most closely to recent models of schema-based
abductive interpretation, based on analysis of the reasoning process of human experts.
Whereas logic-based accounts rest on a Tarskian commitment to a fixed relationship
between sign and signified, and tend to assume that the explicandum is fixed at the
outset of the inductive process, abduction is the inductive process of constructing ex¬
planatory hypotheses dynamically (Pierce, 1958) where the current state of knowledge
regarding the problem drives knowledge acquisition and evaluative processes.
Stern & Luger (1993) have developed a very fruitful approach to error diagnosis. Their
system is designed for semiconductor failure analysis and is informed by detailed ob¬
servation and interviews with human experts. Human experts seemed to rely only on
a limited number of explanation patterns reflecting the causal patterns ('failure mech¬
anisms') they had experienced. The initial hypothesis formation process involved the
use of heuristics to select and order possible appropriate failure mechanisms, followed
by elaboration of causal hypotheses over the investigative process. The entire process
seemed to be motivated by the use of schemas, abstract causal patterns, to interpret
evidence and focus abductive reasoning. This approach is much more congruent with
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the one envisaged here in its pragmatism and dynamism — current explanatory hy¬
potheses influence the explanatory causal patterns chosen. Furthermore, the current
architecture allows nesting of error analysis — recovery procedures can, themselves,
be treated as behaviours and therefore subjected to similar error analyses — as do ex¬
planation schema models. Causal processes can be specified in terms of other schemas
(Stern & Luger, 1993). Luger and Stern (1999) are currently investigating the pos¬
sibility of extending their abductive approach with Bayesian techniques in a robotics
domain — this is an extremely promising future research direction.
6.3.3 Action selection and multitasking
A second crucial area of future development concerns multitasking artificial systems.
The ability for a single system to perform multiple tasks is not merely important with
respect to the interpretative utility of multiple contexts, but also with regard to issues
of design, control flow, and scaling.
For resource and time limited biological systems the ability to 'do the right thing at the
right time' (Maes, 1989) is critical. The problem of maximising fitness, fundamental to
all biological systems (Dawkins, 1989), decomposes into many sub-requirements neces¬
sitating the possession by systems of effective mechanisms for choosing which activities
to engage in and at what time. As the world is of course only partially knowable, such
'action selection mechanisms' can neither be completely rational nor optimal but must
be robust and effective (Simon, 1955). Biological systems must interleave high prior¬
ity system-preserving behaviours such as eating, drinking and avoiding predation with
more slow-burning behaviours such as reproduction. Action selection must therefore
be both goal oriented and responsive to the current situation, reflecting both internal
and external contextual features. Biological adaptation involves multiple coexisting
competences operating on multiple timescales with great potential for both conflict
and cooperation.
Humphrys (1997) distinguishes between the 'w-problem' — choice at 'system' level of
which goal-directed behaviour to pursue — and the 'q-problem' — which activity, or
subsystem, to execute in pursuit of the chosen goal. A large number of mechanisms
have now been proposed to account for action selection in both biological and artificial
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simple vs. complex
single task vs. multiple task
constrained vs. unconstrained
Table 6.1: A proposed classification scheme for artificial architectures.
systems, some of these address only one of these problems whilst others strive to
address both. Generally, traditional hierarchical and serial models of action selection
are top-down featuring choice of goal followed by choice of activity. More recently,
parallel models tend to intermix the two problems.
We suggest3 that architectures can be characterised on three dimensions (see table
6.1): Simple vs. complex refers to the complexity of competences exhibited by the ar¬
chitecture; single vs. multiple task reflects whether the executed action of the system is
informed by multiple goals or by only one goal at a time; constrained vs. unconstrained
reflects whether the designer has specified (usually hierarchical or serial) constraints
on the choice of final behaviour or their relationships to one another.
Currently the major debate within action selection is between models which feature
some designer-imposed constraints on the ordering of system behaviour (i.e. they are
hand-crafted), and those which rely on free competition between behavioural modules.
A brief description of some of these different architectures follows, before the next
section examines recent suggestions that the limits of hand-crafted control have been
reached.
Constrained systems feature hand-crafted conditional relationships between succes¬
sive behaviours or constraints on action selection.
Single, simple systems such as those of cybernetics (Grey Walter, 1950, 1951,
for example). Here the system's behaviour is in pursuit of a single goal.
System behaviour arises from hand-crafted responses to external stimuli.
Single, complex systems such as those of traditional AI, reactive planning,
and hybridised classical/behaviour-based systems. Some systems (Kael-
bling, 1993) feature only a single task leaving only the q-problem to be
3 Tentatively!
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addressed whilst others, such as Gat (1991a) resolve the w-problem (which
task to pursue) before choosing which actions to execute in its pursuit (the
q-problem).
Hierarchical models feature behaviours or action modules ranked in some
pre-defined order of priority. Control flow is unidirectional — from high-level
to low-level modules. A 'behavioural common path' (McFarland, 1974) acts
as a bottleneck to ensure that only one activity can be expressed at a given
time. Many hierarchical architectures also feature constraints on the serial
ordering of behaviours through annotation with pre- and post-conditions.
Termination of a behaviour updates state, allowing the activation of further
behaviours whose pre-conditions are met thereby providing pre-installed
routes through the space of possible module combinations (Gat, 1991a, for
example).
Within ethology Tinbergen's (1950, 1951), Lorenz' (1973), and Baerends'
(1976) models all feature hierarchical decision structures with activation
spreading downward through the hierarchy. Both Tinbergen and Baerends'
models feature inhibition within layers such that only one activation path
can be active at any time thus ensuring that the w-problem and q-problem
are separated.
Multiple, simple systems such as subsumption (Brooks, 1986a), Maes' (1989)
spreading activation networks, Rosenblatt and Payton's free-flow hierarchies
(1989), and Tyrrell's (1993) extension of the latter.
These systems feature constantly active behavioural modules where the out¬
come of competition is pre-determined to some extent by constraints im¬
posed by the designer 4.
Unconstrained systems have become more fashionable recently due partly to the
popularity of emergent views of action and cognition and also reflecting dissat-
4 Although subsumption is often portrayed as a parallel distributed system (Brooks, 1986a, 1991c)
in reality such architectures are best characterised as pre-structured hierarchies (McGonigle &
Humphrys, 1998); Maes' spreading activation networks feature hand-crafted serial conditions; Rosen¬
blatt and Payton's damn features hand-crafted utility functions; Tyrrell's extension features hand¬
crafted penalties for temporal delays and reward uncertainty allowing the system to optimise be¬
haviour (Humphrys, 1997, for further details).
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isfaction with the degree of hand-crafting necessary for constrained single and
multiple-task models. These systems feature multiple parallel flows of control
each in competition with one another. The w-problem is either unaddressed (for
single task systems) or intermixed with the q-problem.
Single, simple systems such as those of evolutionary robotics (see section 2.3.2).
These systems pursue one simple goal. The behaviour of the system emerges
from the evolutionary (and sometimes also learning) process(es) without
explicit constraint, other than task and fitness specifications, from the de¬
signer.
Multiple, simple systems such as that of Humphrys (1997). These systems
feature multiple behavioural modules constantly active in parallel. The de¬
signer does not impose hierarchical or serial constraints on which behaviours
can be executed at given times.
Humphrys (1996a, 1997) describes a multiple mind architecture, tested in a
simulated environment, which features multiple parallel control flows each
competing with one another. The designer does not impose constraints on
behavioural choice but rather provides the potential for self-organised action
selection. Multiple behaviours are instantiated and henceforth compete with
one another for control of the system, control is gained once the strength of
a behaviour (derived jointly from the expected reward for the behaviour if
obeyed vs. the penalty of the behaviour not gaining control) exceeds that
of the behaviour currently in control. Control of the system is thus dy¬
namically determined by the strengths of all behaviours at a given time. By
logging the reward functions of behaviours the system can self-determine un¬
expected compromises and conflicts between behaviours. Humphrys' system
uses a 'minimise the worst unhappiness' strategy of exploiting reinforcement
learning for action selection.
The limits of hand-crafted control?
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Figure 6.4: Possible routes towards complex artificial systems.
The biological systems which are the targets of artificial intelligence fall into a cate¬
gory unaddressed above — their behaviour is complex and informed by multiple goals.
It is constrained to some degree (by embodiment, the environment, and the ontolog-
ical lower bounds of the system (see section 3.1.2), yet it is also derived from self-
organisational processes over ontogenesis (see section 3.1.3). How are we to move from
the artificial systems of today — the majority of which are constrained, multiple, sim¬
ple, or constrained, single, complex architectures — towards artificial systems which
exhibit complex behaviours informed by multiple goals whilst constrained by system
primitives, yet which are capable of self-organisation over development? What possible
routes (see figure 6.4 and table 6.2) for the scaling of systems can we envisage?

























Table 6.2: A preliminary assessment of potential routes towards complex artificial
systems: their advocates, history, and prospects.
Route A from constrained, single-task, simple systems to complex artificial systems.
This route essentially died out, excepting the thought experiments of Braitenburg
(1984), with the abandonment of cybernetics. Its prospects are, therefore, not
good.
Route B from constrained, single-task, complex systems to complex artificial sys¬
tems. The preferred route of traditional Al and contemporary cognitive robotics.
Although single task, constrained (hierarchical and serial) models like those out¬
lined above succeed in their task of augmenting internal control with reactivity,
arbitration between behaviours, and ultimately action selection, remains hand¬
crafted by the designer. Indeed such hand-crafting is explicitly adopted as a
means of reducing the combinatorial problems of control as well as providing
context sensitivity and goal-directedness (Bryson, In press). This focus, of the
majority of robotics research, on single goal systems has recently been suggested
to be a fundamental strategic error (McGonigle & Humphrys, 1998; McGonigle,
1998). Research on single complex tasks seems to be undertaken with an im¬
plicit assumption that these competences can later be added together to support
complex behaviour informed by multiple goals. Possibly no such path exists —
McGonigle (1998) suggests that multi-goal systems raise control issues which are
not simple additions of single-task skills, nor simple forms of scheduling or opti¬
misation but rather that, as Dennett (1978) argues, we need to conceptualise the
entire adaptive system from the outset, and address a developmental progression
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from multiple simple tasks to multiple complex tasks. The flow of control for such
systems might be so complex that it is impossible to hand-craft — suggesting
that self-organised action selection might therefore be the only way of developing
multi-tasking artificial systems.
Route C from constrained, multiple-task, simple systems to complex artificial sys¬
tems. The preferred route of the behaviour-based, and more recent animat,
camps within contemporary Al. The prospects for this route are not good. These
approaches hope that 'emergent functionality' will result in ever-more complex
behaviours. As argued in section 1.3.2, such emergence is really hand-crafted —
McGonigle & Humphrys' (1998) critique applies equally to this approach — if
hand-crafted, yet the interactional complexity of our target systems is intractable,
then how can scaling take place? Over the past 15 years of research no indica¬
tions have been provided that this route is viable (Kirsh, 1991; Brooks, 1997);
these systems remain at approximately the level attained by the late 1980s.
Route D from unconstrained, single-task, simple systems to complex artificial sys¬
tems. Evolutionary roboticists hope to follow this route5. However, progress is
currently slow and it appears that initial optimism might have been unwarranted
— the evolved implementations resulting from this approach remain at simple
levels of adaptation and, even with the addition of learning mechanisms, do not
seem to be scaling-up (see Nolfi, 1998, and section 2.3.2).
Route E from unconstrained,multiple-task, simple systems to complex artificial sys¬
tems. A relatively unexplored area of research. Preliminary simulated experi¬
ments suggest that self-organised mechanisms are sufficient to support interleaved
simple adaptive behaviours (Humphrys, 19966, 1997). More research is required
in order to determine whether this approach will be successful when the com¬
plexity of the required behaviours is incremented.
5 "Insects first, people later" (Cliff, 1991a).
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The future — self-organised action selection
Clearly the debate between pre-constrained (hierarchical and serial) vs. less con¬
strained, more dynamic, parallel models of action selection will continue. Indeed,
within our own research group, both approaches are advocated. Joanna Bryson is de¬
veloping an architecture (EDMUND, Bryson 1999) which provides some constraint, is
informed by multiple tasks, yet extends purely reactive behaviour-based architectures
by: providing the potential for context and expectation by giving individual activi¬
ties memory; encapsulating such memory but allowing some transfer of information
between activities in order to allow for action on the basis of overall internal con¬
text; and pre-ordering behaviours in sequences, parallel activities, and prioritised sets
in an attempt to combine reactivity with the ability to perform complex sequential
behaviours.
Conversely, Brendan McGonigle and Mark Humphrys propose to extend Humphrys'
work on reinforcement learning based action selection in simulation to the Nomad (Mc¬
Gonigle & Humphrys, 1998). They intend to implement a multiple-task, unconstrained,
complex competence system through self-organised action selection.
It is suggested that the architecture described herein might be a good test-bed for
determining whether, in fact, the limits of hand-crafted control have been reached by
comparing a range of approaches to action selection.
Constrained, single task, complex competence The architecture is both hierar¬
chically and sequentially organised. Currently tasks are defined by the designer:
once a task has been placed on the task queue its execution results in sequential
behaviours constrained by initialisation conditions. Assuming no unrecoverable
default the sequence of behaviours will run until completion. Within behaviours
the ordering of individual activities is pre-determined. Furthermore, currently
no opportunity exists for a switch of task based on environmental conditions:
the architecture is interruptible within behaviours but not across tasks. The w-
problem (which task to execute) is resolved prior to resolution of the q-problem
(which behaviour to execute).
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Partially constrained, multiple task, complex competence The proposed research
of McGonigle & Humphrys' (1998) can be supported by this architecture. Multi¬
ple action primitives are now in place6, the addition of a self-organisational action
selection mechanism, would allow assessment of the prospects of route E above:
from unconstrained, multiple-task, simple competence systems towards complex
artificial systems. McGonigle and Humphrys intend to extend Humphrys' (1997)
system to a scenario where the system must address three goals, at multiple
time scales, simultaneously. Tasks will be interruptible between sequential be¬
haviours such that control of the system can be opportunistic, yet within tasks
the sequential characteristics of the architecture will remain intact. Through in¬
terleaving task-level control of the system, whilst retaining seriality, McGonigle
& Humphrys hope to move toward artificial intelligent systems.
Partially constrained, multiple task, complex competence The favoured approach
of the author, that suggested by the biological analysis of McGonigle & Chalmers
(1998a), and that proposed by McGonigle (1991, 1998). Complex biological sys¬
tems are both constrained and unconstrained. This is, of course, the age-old issue
of nativism vs. empiricism. The approach adopted throughout this thesis is con-
structivist in nature: constraints are imposed by embodiment and the ontological
lower bounds of the system. Over ontogenesis, self-organisation of competences
can occur, constrained by these ontological lower bounds, but relatively uncon¬
strained in the terminology used above — not, that is, hand-crafted.
The current architecture might support examination of the degree of constraint
required. Hierarchical and serial constraints can be imposed at multiple levels,
and a self-organisational mechanism, whether that proposed by McGonigle &
Humphrys (1998) or an internally-arbitrated trial-and-error mechanism, inspired
by the biological characterisation supplied by McGonigle & Chalmers, analogous
to that applied to navigation (section 5.2), can be used in order to support chan^fe
over ontogenesis.
Now pre-installed arbitration procedures based on economy, together with action
and behavioural primitives constrained to varying degrees might, in conjunc-
6 Disregard the behaviours of the system for the time being.
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tion with an abductive mechanism dependent on contextual interpretation of
success and default, enable the system, over its life-history, to learn in which
internal and external contexts actions are likely to succeed, and provide a pos¬
sible route towards complex artificial systems. In this scenario (utilising McGo-
nigle & St Johnstons' (1995) keyboard metaphor of serial control) the system
will itself learn permissible 'keys' in which its behaviours can be played, and
those 'melodies' which are both adaptive with respect to its multiple goals, and
amenable to its designer.
6.3.4 Comparison between architectures
Recently there have been calls for a more quantitative analysis of robotic implementa¬
tions (Duckett & Nehmzow, 1997, for example) with a view to determining the relative
efficacy of different design strategies. However such calls are somewhat premature for
three main reasons.
• Fruitful interpretation of such analyses depends upon an explicit and coherent
mapping between theory and model construction which has yet to be routinely
achieved within robotics. The review of traditional stances presented in chapter
1 shows that both feature imperfect or limited characterisations of intelligent
biological systems that are transcribed into artificial systems which are formally
isomorphic across stances in spite of their differing core theoretical assumptions.
The more novel stances, dynamicism and situated cognition (described in chap¬
ter 2) enrich our understanding of intelligent systems through emphasis on self-
organisation from core design primitives over ontogeny (dynamicism), the im¬
portance of context to behaviour and representation (situated cognition), and
the transactional and emergent nature of intelligence (both) yet neither provide
clear prescriptions, in isolation, for the design of complex artificial systems and
are used to augment, rather than to supplant, the more traditional kinds of
systems.
• The inaccuracy, and limitations, of the majority of characterisations of com¬
plex biological systems results in a second problem: the absence of consensual
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benchmarks of achievement within the field. Across the different perspectives
on intelligent systems, a variety of key features are regarded as essential or de¬
sirable and these become the targets of model construction. Such benchmarks
range from the ability to maintain, manipulate and reason about symbols for the
purposes of plan construction (classical and cognitive robotics) to the ability to
react quickly and appropriately to dynamic external circumstances through re¬
flexes (bb and aniinat robotics), some contextual knowledge (situated robotics),
direct perceptuo-motor coupling to the world (connectionist, evolutionary, and
animat robotics), or evolved controllers (evolutionary robotics).
Contemporary robotic implementations remain entrenched within two main camps:
the symbolic representational/reasoning and the reactive/associative neither of
which are based on accurate and comprehensive characterisations of complex bi¬
ological systems. Our inspiration for the design of intelligent systems must surely
be those which have evolved on our planet (see McGonigle, 1998, for further de¬
tails) and, indeed, the perspectives discussed in chapter 3, from ethology, neuro-
science and the conjoined comparative/developmental programme of McGonigle
& Chalmers, provide a much richer view of situated biological intelligence. Such
research suggests a number of grounded, and therefore non-arbitrary, core archi¬
tectural features of intelligent systems that provide a number of benchmarks for
artificial systems.
As Lashley (1951) observed, the problem of serial order is not peculiarly linguistic
but rather inheres to all adaptive behaviour. The capacity for serial output of be¬
haviour requires hierarchical and modular construction. Hierarchical organisation
underlies the ability of systems to recombine behaviours to meet their adaptive
needs (McGonigle & St Johnston, 1995) and, furthermore, supports multiple con¬
current mechanisms operating at multiple time scales and levels of abstraction.
Modularity confers robustness and permits a system to possess multiple encapsu¬
lated, and potentially logically incompatible, competences simultaneously (Fodor,
1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; McGonigle, 1991). Serial behaviour demands a
repertoire of task-achieving behaviours together with robust and effective (Simon,
1955) action selection mechanisms which allow a system to "do the right thing at
the right time" (Maes, 1989). Since biological systems must interleave high and
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low priority behaviours at different time scales such action selection mechanisms
must be both goal-oriented and contextually appropriate. A further benefit of
seriality is the conferment of contextuality upon a system thereby providing the
potential for interpretation and reinterpretation of external phenomena, together
with behavioural success and failure, modulated by internal state.
Intelligent systems are non-trivially autonomous — able to self-select and self
regulate on the basis of both in-built and learned utility metrics such as economy,
initially at behavioural, and later, epistemic levels. Systems must, therefore, be
cognisant of behavioural success and default without which there can be little
scope for progressive adaptation and epistemic growth over ontogenesis. Such
progressive adaptation necessitates memory so that later competences do not
merely recapitulate their predecessors, but extend and generalise them (Fodor &
Pylyshyn, 1988), and support epistemic derivations of earlier behaviours.
Biological systems possess a range of adaptive specialisations subserved by func¬
tionally distinct neuronal regions (Gazzaniga et ai, 1998) which constrain the
ontogenetic potential of systems thereby differentiating the simple from the com¬
plex. Ontogenetic development, constrained by a set of core perceptual, be¬
havioural and cognitive primitives — the ontological lower bounds of the sys¬
tem — occurs through self-organisational processes resting on inter-system and
system-environment interactions. Artificial systems too, should be extendible
both through design and self-organisation.
These are the kinds of metrics which have been used to assess artificial systems
throughout this thesis, and those which motivated the robotic architecture pre¬
sented in chapter 4.
• Finally, quantitative analysis requires a variety of architectures which are suf¬
ficiently complex to make the exercise worthwhile. Currently the majority of
implementations remain capable of only single simple behaviours, or single plan¬
ning tasks with research focussed on refinement of such capabilities rather than
the development of richer and more versatile systems. The key benchmarks of
achievement outlined in the preceding paragraphs are not the target of the ma¬
jority of robotics research and are only minimally present in a very small number
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of implementations.
Once the discipline of robotics has reached the stage where it features multiple
architectures which incorporate many, or all, of these benchmarks, quantitative
analysis can begin and we will be able to compare the kinds of engineering solu¬
tions which can support them and determine whether, as suggested by McGonigle
(1987):
"The number of solutions to the problem of complexity may be finite
and may, indeed, reduce to one."
Until this point has been attained the focus of argument and research must be at the
paradigmatic rather than implementational level. For this reason the thesis falls not
within the Popperian (1963) falsificatory tradition, but rather adheres more closely to
the analyses of Lakatos (1978) which depicts the growth of scientific knowledge within
research programmes (which often rest on untested, and untestable, assumptions7)
and Kuhn (1962) which suggests that the transitions between competing research pro¬
grammes ('paradigm shifts') are often not based on falsificatory evidence.
The aim of the research presented herein is to suggest that the time has now come for a
paradigm shift within both cognitive science and robotics. It is suggested that neither
of the traditional approaches to intelligent systems, symbol-based nor behaviour-based,
can support the development of complex artificial systems. Both of these stances can
be viewed as degenerating research programmes — in terms of both their character¬
isation of intelligent biological systems and their application to the construction of
artificial systems. This analysis is supported by evidence from biology which suggests
that the core assumptions of both stances involve mischaracterisation of the indexical
competences of complex systems — symbols and rules or reflexes and associations.
Currently there exist a variety of architectures motivated by competing views of adap-
tivity and intelligence, and many skilled programmers and engineers capable of devel¬
oping successful artificial systems within given problem domains. However, it appears
that neither of the traditional stances, nor more recent approaches inspired by dynam-
icism or situated theories, can support the development of complex artificial systems in
7 Rather such assumptions stand or fall with the research program itself.
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addition to simple ones. The problems of control, seriality, multi-tasking, learning etc.,
tend to be addressed separately within the majority of implementations. Quantitative
analysis of system performance in any one of these areas, or for individual compe¬
tences, neglects a fundamental issue: which of our competing paradigms is capable of
both adequately characterising biological systems and can support the construction of
artificial systems which exhibit behaviour of similar robustness and complexity? We
are currently only beginning to address this question.
This thesis has attempted to outline some of the major competing paradigms within
both cognitive science and robotics in order to make a preliminary assessment of their
efficacy. The conclusion of the thesis is that a new synthetic paradigm is required,
motivated by the characterisation of complex biological systems from a dynamic per¬
spective. The implementations derived from this stance are currently in their infancy
but it is believed that this approach might be capable of supporting incrementation of
systems both by design and through system self-organisation with greater extendibility
than traditional approaches.
6.4 Final conclusions
This thesis has argued that the stalemate in robotics arising from cognitive and be¬
havioural characterisations of intelligent systems might best be resolved by adoption
of a new design stance. It is suggested that our understanding of intelligent systems
will be optimally enhanced by a synthetic strategy of biological characterisation in con¬
junction with engineering of artificial systems. It is suggested, furthermore, that the
synthetic strategy will be successful only if reverse engineering is targeted at complex
systems for these possess design features qualitatively different from those of simple
systems.
Although currently artificial intelligence has a lot more to learn from psychology than
vice versa, intelligent systems can only be understood through their reverse engineering
followed by rigorous testing of the resulting designs in complex environments. An archi¬
tecture inspired by McGonigle and Chalmers' characterisation of the epistemic growth
of complex biological systems was presented. It is suggested that this architecture can
support scaling of the system both by design and, ultimately, through self-organisation.
Some experiments in self-organised navigation are also reported which illustrate the
feasibility of the synthetic intelligence stance.
Finally, a dynamic perspective is advocated which emphasises the transactional nature
of the development of intelligence. Just as biological systems develop over ontogenesis,
our artificial systems should be provided with both rich design primitives, and complex
environment, which can support the self-organisation of competences over the lifespan.
It is suggested that self-organisation from system lower bounds is the future of robotics
— we cannot install complexity in artificial systems, but must rather provide the
preconditions for its growth.
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Figure A.l: compass-discrepancy (desired) [theta]
compass-discrepancy (desired) [theta] This function (see Figure A.l) calculates





get-angle (x, y) [0] This routine (see Figure A.2) calculates and returns a new steering
angle (0), based on the current position, and the position of the target (x,y).
The external state variables max-theta and min-theta are used in the case where 0
falls outside the range min-theta < 9 < max-theta.
A.1.3 get-swerve()[0]
get-swerve () [0] Returns a steering angle based on proximity to lateral objects (see
Figure A.3).
A.1.4 ir-object-left0[0,1]






Figure A.4: ir-object-left() [0,1]
sensors. Returns 1 if an object is present, otherwise returns 0 (see Figure A.4).
A.1.5 ir-object-right() [0,1]
ir-object-right() [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the right-side
IR sensors. Returns 1 if an object is present, otherwise returns 0 (see Figure A.5).
A.1.6 object-left(threshold)[0,1]
object-left (threshold) [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the left¬









object-right (threshold) [0,1] Determines whether an object is detected by the
right-side sonar sensors (see Figure A.7). Returns 1 if an object is below threshold




obstacle (threshold) [0,1] Returns 1 if an obstacle is detected within (optional
threshold) distance or the default value of 20 inches, 0 otherwise (see Figure A.8).
A.2 Orientation and alignment
A.2.1 align-left(distance)[1]
Figure A.9: align-left(distance)[l]
align-left (distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a rear surface (see Figure A.9), re¬
turning 1 on completion.
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A.2.2 align-rear(distance)[1]
Figure A.10: align-rear (distance) [1]
align-rear(distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a rear surface (see Figure A.10),
returning 1 on completion.
A.2.3 align-right(distance)[1]
align-right (distance) [1] Aligns the Nomad to a right-hand surface (see Figure A.11),
returning 1 on completion.
A.2.4 conv-to-degrees(rads)[theta]
conv-to-degrees(rads) [theta] This function (see Figure A.12) is passed a value in
radians (rads) and returns the equivalent value in degrees (theta).
A.2.5 conv-to-radians(theta)[rads]
conv-to-radians (theta) [rads] This function (see Figure A.13) is passed a value in
degrees (theta) and returns the equivalent value in radians (rads).
A.2.6 fine-align(bearing)[1]
f ine-align(bearing) [1] This function (see Figure A.14) is called after turn-to-bearing (bearing.
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Figure A. 11: align-right (distance) [1]
and rotates base and turret very slowly (1 ) towards the desired bearing, return¬
ing 1 on completion.
A.2.7 orient-left(distance)[1]
orient-left (distance) [1] Moves the nomad to a position distance inches away
from a left-side surface (see Figure A.15), returning 1 on completion.
A.2.8 orient-rear(distance)[1]
orient-rear (distance) [1] Moves the nomad to a position distance inches away
from a rear surface (see Figure A.16), returning 1 on completion.
A.2.9 orient-right(distance)[1]
orient-right (distance) [1] Moves the nomad to a position distance inches away
from a right-side surface (see Figure A.17), returning 1 on completion.
A.2.10 turn-to-bearing(bearing)[disc]
turn-to-bearing(bearing) [disc] This function (see Figure A.18) rotates turret and



















Figure A.15: orient-left (distance) [1]
A.3 Avoidance
A.3.1 avoidthreshold []
avoid(threshold) [] threshold is an optional parameter, the default value is 20
270
Figure A.16: orient-rear (distance) [1]
START
Figure A.17: orient-right (distance) [1]
inches. This function is designed to run as a child process and implements (see







Figure A. 18: turn-to-bearing(bearing)[disc]
Figure A.19: avoid(threshold)[)
A.3.2 rotate()[]
rotate() [] Rotates to left or right whilst an obstacle is detected (see Figure A.20).
The function exits when sensor readings indicate that no object is within a range of






vm (75, theta. ih^ia)
Figure A.21: follow-left (distance) []
follow-left (distance) [] A wall-following loop for use as a child process (see Fig¬
ure A.21). Allows the nomad to shadow obstacles at a range of distance (an optional
parameter, the default is 22 inches).
A.4.2 follow-right(distance)[]
follow-right (distance) [] A wall-following loop for use as a child process (see Fig-
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Figure A.22: follow-right (distance) []
ure A.22). Allows the nomad to shadow obstacles at a range of distance (an optional




Figure A.23: get-adjustl(distance) [theta]
get-adjustl(distance) I9steerl Returns the steering angle for following a right-side
object, distance is an optional parameter, the default is 22 inches (see Figure A.23).
The external state variables max-adjustl and min-adjustl are used in the case of
6steer falling outside the range min-adjustl < 6steer < max-adjustl.
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AAA get-adjustr (distance) I9steer~\




theta = error * 10
Figure A.24: get-adjustr(distance)[theta]
get-adjustr (distance) [9steer] Returns the steering angle for following a left-side
object (see Figure A.24). distance is an optional parameter, the default is 22 inches.
The external state variables max-adjustr and min-adjustr are used in the case of
6steer falling outside the range min-adjustr < 9steer < max-adjustr.
A. 5 Navigation
A.5.1 go(x,y,range) [0,1]
go(.x,-y,range) [0,1] A navigation routine (see Figure A.25) designed for use indepen¬
dently or as a child process. The algorithm moves the nomad directly from its current
position to within the specified range of (x,y).
A.5.2 go-monitor(x,y.timeout.range.frequency)[0,1]
go-monitor (r.y, timeout .range .frequency) [0,1] This function (see Figure A.26)
serves to constrain go when invoked as a parent process. It takes five compulsory
arguments: x and y are the goal coordinates; timeout is the function's timeout period
in seconds; range within which recovery is possible; frequency is that of checking
progress towards the goal position. It returns 1 if the child process exits successfully
before timeout has expired, or if upon timeout the nomad is within recovery distance
(range), 0 is returned in any other case.
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START
Figure A.25: go(x,y,range) [0,1]
Figure A.26: go-monitor(:r,y,timeout,range,frequency)[0,1]
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